TY - JOUR A1 - Kreilinger, Valentin T1 - From procedural disagreement to joint scrutiny? The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance JF - Perspectives on Federalism N2 - The provision of Article 13 TSCG to create an Interparliamentary Conference was the starting point for long discussions after which national parliaments and the European Parliament eventually reached a compromise. This article pursues a two-fold objective: It first examines the different phases of interparliamentary negotiations from 2012 to 2015. On the basis of a distinction between three competing models for interparliamentary cooperation, the article shows that the two models of EP-led scrutiny and creating a collective parliamentary counterweight did not prevail: Parliaments agreed that the new Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance (SECG) would follow the ‘standard’ interparliamentary conference (COSAC model). In terms of national parliaments’ actual participation, the lowest common denominator compromise has not changed the numbers of participating MPs: Attendance records are stable over time, the size of national delegations continues to vary and participating MPs are still twice as likely to be members of Budget or Finance committees than to be members of European affairs committees. KW - European Union KW - national parliaments KW - Economic Governance KW - interparliamentary cooperation Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2478/pof-2018-0035 SN - 2036-5438 IS - 10(3) SP - 155 EP - 183 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Freudlsperger, Christian A1 - Weinrich, Martin T1 - Decentralized EU Policy Coordination in Crisis? The Case of Germany JF - JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies N2 - Abstract Europeanization research found no general convergence towards centralized EU policy coordination, despite decentralized systems' comparatively slow and ineffective position‐taking. Does this finding hold against the threat, urgency, and uncertainty exerted by recent years' polycrisis? We posit that decentralized systems indeed persist, albeit in a three‐step reactive sequence in which situational centralization during crises dialectically reinforces decentralization in the long run. First, the prime minister's office harnesses a crisis to acquire hierarchical control of position‐taking. Second, to exploit the deep expertise of the bureaucracy and maximize its bargaining power on the EU‐level, it co‐opts a lead ministry. Third, due to the institutional underpinnings of the decentralized system, the lead ministry, rather than the prime minister's office, eventually retains the administrative capacities created in crisis. We illustrate this causal mechanism in a comparison of the German government's EU policy coordination during the Eurozone and Schengen crises. KW - - KW - European Union KW - crisis KW - policy coordination KW - reactive sequence KW - decentralization KW - Germany Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13159 SP - n/a EP - n/a ER -