TY - BOOK A1 - Woll, Cornelia T1 - The Power of Inaction: Bank Bailouts in Comparison N2 - Bank bailouts in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the onset of the Great Recession brought into sharp relief the power that the global financial sector holds over national politics, and provoked widespread public outrage. In The Power of Inaction, Cornelia Woll details the varying relationships between financial institutions and national governments by comparing national bank rescue schemes in the United States and Europe. Woll starts with a broad overview of bank bailouts in more than twenty countries. Using extensive interviews conducted with bankers, lawmakers, and other key players, she then examines three pairs of countries where similar outcomes might be expected: the United States and United Kingdom, France and Germany, Ireland and Denmark. She finds, however, substantial variation within these pairs. In some cases the financial sector is intimately involved in the design of bailout packages; elsewhere it chooses to remain at arm's length. Such differences are often ascribed to one of two conditions: either the state is strong and can impose terms, or the state is weak and corrupted by industry lobbying. Woll presents a third option, where the inaction of the financial sector critically shapes the design of bailout packages in favor of the industry. She demonstrates that financial institutions were most powerful in those settings where they could avoid a joint response and force national policymakers to deal with banks on a piecemeal basis. The power to remain collectively inactive, she argues, has had important consequences for bailout arrangements and ultimately affected how the public and private sectors have shared the cost burden of these massive policy decisions. Y1 - 2014 SN - 978-0-8014-7115-5 PB - Cornell University Press ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Woll, Cornelia T1 - Firm Interests: How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade N2 - Firms are central to trade policy-making. Some analysts even suggest that they dictate policy on the basis of their material interests. Cornelia Woll counters these assumptions, arguing that firms do not always know what they want. To be sure, firms lobby hard to attain a desired policy once they have defined their goals. Yet material factors are insufficient to account for these preferences. The ways in which firms are embedded in political settings are much more decisive. Woll demonstrates her case by analyzing the surprising evolution of support from large firms for liberalization in telecommunications and international air transport in the United States and Europe. Within less than a decade, former monopolies with important home markets abandoned their earlier calls for subsidies and protectionism and joined competitive multinationals in the demand for global markets. By comparing the complex evolution of firm preferences across sectors and countries, Woll shows that firms may influence policy outcomes, but policies and politics in turn influence business demands. This is particularly true in the European Union, where the constraints of multilevel decision-making encourage firms to pay lip service to liberalization if they want to maintain good working relations with supranational officials. In the United States, firms adjust their sectoral demands to fit the government's agenda. In both contexts, the interaction between government and firm representatives affects not only the strategy but also the content of business lobbying on global trade. Y1 - 2008 SN - 9780801446092 PB - Cornell University Press ER - TY - GEN A1 - Jacquot, Sophie A1 - Woll, Cornelia ED - Jacquot, Sophie ED - Woll, Cornelia T1 - Les usages de l’Europe : acteurs et transformations européennes N2 - Comment s'impose l'Europe? Par sa production législative et politique uniquement ou également grâce aux divers usages qui en sont faits? Ce livre s'attache à analyser qui s'implique dans l'intégration européenne, comment et dans quels buts. En mettant en évidence le rôle des acteurs en tant que vecteurs de transformations et en développant la notion d'usages de l'Europe, ce travail collectif entend apporter une perspective supplémentaire à l'agenda des recherches sur l'européanisation et l'impact de l'intégration européenne. Y1 - 2004 SN - 9782747564991 PB - L’Harmattan CY - Paris ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Woll, Cornelia T1 - Politics in the Interest of Capital: A Not-So-Organized Combat JF - Politics & Society N2 - In recent debates about inequality, many have pointed to the predominant position of the finance. This article highlights that structural power, not lobbying resources, are key to explaining variations across countries. It examines finance-government negotiations over national bank rescue schemes during the recent financial crisis. Given the structural power of finance, the variation in bank bailouts across countries cannot be explained by lobbying differences. Instead of observing organized interest intermediation, we can see that disorganization was crucial for the financial industry to get off the hook and let the government carry the burden of stabilizing the economy. Put differently, structural power is strongest when finance remains collectively inactive. In contrast to traditional accounts of the lobbying influence of finance, the comparison highlights that the lack of organization can have crucial redistributive consequences. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329216655318 VL - 44 IS - 3 SP - 373 EP - 391 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Woll, Cornelia T1 - Bank Rescue Schemes in Continental Europe: The Power of Collective Inaction JF - Government and Opposition N2 - Comparing bank rescue schemes in France and Germany during the banking crisis of 2008–9, this article argues that collective inaction is a little-studied aspect in the exercise of power in business–government relations. Contrary to studies that focus on lobbying, structural power or the influence of beliefs, the comparison highlights that governments depend on contributions from the financial industry during crisis management. In the negotiations to design bank support schemes, some countries, such as France, succeeded in engaging their financial sector collectively. Such public–private burden-sharing arrangements alleviate the public budget and increase mutual surveillance between banks during government support. In other countries, such as Germany, a collectively organized industry response failed, which forced the government to design an entirely public support scheme. The German government reacted to this perceived imbalance by imposing tighter banking regulation to avoid a repetition of the impotence it experienced in 2008. Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/gov.2014.5 VL - 49 IS - 3 SP - 426 EP - 451 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Woll, Cornelia T1 - National business associations under stress: Lessons from the French case JF - West European Politics N2 - Since its reform in 1998, the national association of French employers and industry, MEDEF, appears to be an example of strong interest organisation. Unlike trade unions, the peak business organisation has been stable and unified, especially in terms of membership density. Through a study of the collective action of businesses in France, this article sheds doubt on such an impression and argues that the national business association has been put severely under stress in recent years. Like all encompassing associations, MEDEF comprises a great variety of interests and constantly has to manage its internal heterogeneity. An analysis of the historical and institutional context of its recent reform demonstrates that MEDEF's forceful media campaign should not be understood as a display of actual strength and coherence; rather it is the last resort of collective action that the association can claim legitimately as its responsibility. Y1 - 2006 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/01402380600619819 VL - 29 IS - 3 SP - 489 EP - 512 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Woll, Cornelia T1 - Lobbying in the European Union: From sui generis to a comparative perspective JF - Journal of European Public Policy N2 - This article reviews the literature on lobbying in the European Union. After initial surveys of the landscape of non-governmental actor participation, theoretical investigations have focused on the modes of network governance and later on the phenomenon of Europeanization. Yet studies have increasingly moved away from considering EU lobbying as a sui generis phenomenon. Normalizing the study of interest group participation in the EU and understanding the opportunities and constraints that are characteristic for it has led more and more scholars to adopt a comparative perspective. The most interesting parallels exist between Washington and Brussels, but unfortunately there have been very few attempts to explore the connection between the American literature on lobbying and EU studies. This article makes a first step towards such a comparison and points to concepts common in comparative politics that could provide considerable insight into the study of EU lobbying. Y1 - 2006 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760600560623 VL - 13 IS - 3 SP - 456 EP - 469 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Woll, Cornelia T1 - La réforme du Medef : chronique des difficultés de l'action collective patronale JF - Revue française de science politique N2 - Depuis sa réforme en 1998, le Mouvement des entreprises de France (Medef) apparaît comme une association puissante et unifiée. En étudiant l’action collective patronale en France, cet article met en doute cette impression. Contrairement aux apparences, l’organisation centrale du patronat français se trouve face à des défis comparables à la désyndicalisation des salariés. En tant que fédération, le Medef est constitué d’une multitude d’intérêts divers et doit gérer cette hétérogénéité interne avant de pouvoir agir politiquement. L’analyse du contexte historique et institutionnel de sa réforme récente montre que la nouvelle stratégie de communication politique du Medef n’atteste pas de la puissance ou de la cohérence de l’organisation ; elle est plutôt le dernier domaine d’action publique que l’association peut assumer pleinement sans perdre sa légitimité aux yeux de ses membres. N2 - Since its reform in 1998, the national association of French employers and industry, Medef, seems to be an example of strong interest organisation. Through a study of the collective action of businesses in France, this article sheds doubt on such an impression and argues that the business association has also been put severely under stress. Like all encompassing associations, Medef comprises a great variety of interests and constantly has to manage its internal heterogeneity. An analysis of the historical and institutional context of its recent reform demonstrates that Medefâ??s forceful media campaign should not be understood as a display of actual strength and coherence ; rather it is the last resort of collective action that the association can claim legitimately as their responsibility. Y1 - 2006 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3917/rfsp.562.0255 VL - 56 IS - 2 SP - 255 EP - 279 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Woll, Cornelia T1 - The road to external representation: the European Commission's activism in international air transport JF - Journal of European Public Policy N2 - This article argues that the role the Commission plays in European foreign policies goes beyond the execution of the competences delegated by the member states. The Commission is not just the external negotiator of the EU, it can also use its powers as the guardian of the Treaties to expand its foreign policy competences. The case study of international air transport illustrates how the Commission was able to obtain an external negotiation mandate in June 2003 to which member states were originally opposed. The analysis draws particular attention to the Commission's reliance on the European Court of Justice and to a cognitive strategy centred on the United States. By means of these two tools, the Commission was able to affect the default condition of member state preferences and reorient the focal point of intergovernmental negotiations. KW - European Commission KW - European foreign policies KW - external negotiation mandate KW - international air transport KW - open aviation area Y1 - 2006 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760500380734 VL - 13 IS - 1 SP - 52 EP - 69 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Woll, Cornelia T1 - Vers des compétences externes : l'activisme de la commission européenne en matière d'aviation internationale JF - Politique européenne N2 - Pour analyser le rôle joué par la Commission dans les politiques étrangères européennes, nous montrons comment la Commission peut élargir ses compétences en utilisant ses droits en tant que gardienne des traités. L’étude de cas de la politique européenne en matière d’aviation internationale illustre comment la Commission a pu obtenir un mandat de négociation externe que les Etats membres lui avaient auparavant refusé. Pour cela la Commission s’est appuyée sur des recours juridictionnels et a employé une stratégie cognitive qui inscrit la question de l’aviation civile dans la concurrence avec les Etats-Unis. Par ces deux moyens, la Commission a su changer les préférences des Etats membres et réorienter le point focal des négociations intergouvernementales. Y1 - 2005 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3917/poeu.017.0137 VL - 17 IS - 3 SP - 137 EP - 158 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Woll, Cornelia A1 - Balme, Richard T1 - Europe and the Transformation of French Policy-Making: a Cross-Sectoral Approach JF - Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaften N2 - This article sheds light on the “Europeanisation” of French policy-making – defined as the national adjustment to European integration – and asks whether different policy domains experience the same kind of pressure to adjust. Four sectors representing different policy types are examined: monetary and budgetary policies, public services, agricultural policy and equal employment. This cross-sectional approach reveals different degrees of change and patterns of adaptation, whilst in no case the EU fully supplanted national decision-making. The authors’ conclusion suggests that regulative and redistributive policies are less conflicting with European integration than distributive policies at the core of the French welfare state, but that the latter are also strongly resilient and resistant to radical changes. Patterns of policy changes are highly complex and diversified, and their “path-dependency” is rooted in the political feasibility of public policy at the domestic level. N2 - Der Beitrag analysiert die „Europäisierung“ zentraler Politikbereiche in Frankreich, wobei vier Felder im Zentrum stehen: die Geld- und Haushaltspolitik, öffentliche Dienstleistungen, die Agrarpolitik sowie arbeitsrechtliche Gleichstellungspolitiken. In der vergleichenden Untersuchung wird deutlich, dass sowohl die Reichweite des Wandels als auch die Muster der Anpassung unterschiedlich ausgeprägt sind; in keinem Fall finden sich Entscheidungsprozesse vollständig „europäisiert“. Regulative und redistributive Politiken erscheinen in Bezug auf die europäische Integration weniger problematisch als der distributive Kern des französischen Wohlfahrtsstaates, letzterer ist aber grundlegenden Veränderungen gegenüber sehr viel widerstandsfähiger. Europäisierung ist also nicht gleichbedeutend mit einer alleinigen Ausrichtung der Politik an regulativen Leitbildern. Der Wandel verläuft vielmehr nach äußerst komplexen Mustern und ist mit Blick auf die unterschiedliche nationale Umsetzbarkeit in hohem Maße „pfadabhängig“. Y1 - 2005 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/zfse.2005.3.3.388 N1 - Also translated and published as: "从议程设置到弹性:适应欧洲的法国政策决策 [From Agenda-Setting to Resilience: French Policy-Making Adaptation to Europe]”, China Public Administration Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2009 pp.50-64. VL - 3 IS - 3 SP - 388 EP - 409 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Woll, Cornelia A1 - Jacquot, Sophie T1 - Usage of European Integration - Europeanisation from a Sociological Perspective JF - European Integration online Papers (EIoP) N2 - The effect of European integration on its member states constitutes the new research agenda within the study of European integration. Marked by the "the institutionalist turn" of Anglo-Saxon political sciences, the most dominant theories on europeanisation focus on structural arrangements. Institutional incompatibility between the European and the national level, so the hypothesis, creates pressures for change. Actors are often only considered as mediators of these pressures. Consequentially, few approaches try to explain adaptational change initiated by policy actors in the absence of institutional pressures. Using a political sociology approach, the central concern of this paper is to insist on the political discretion of national actors in translation of European requirements. We believe that understanding not only "adaptation to" but also "usage of" the process of European integration is important to understanding the transformation of European member states. By insisting on usage, we aim at analysing both the strategic interaction of rational actors with the European institutions and the more sociological effect of "usage" - as "daily practice" - on the interest and identities of the actors. Y1 - 2003 UR - https://ssrn.com/abstract=485983 N1 - Also translated and published as: “Implementarea conceptului de integrare europeana sau europenizarea din perspectiva sociologica,” Studii de securitate Vol. 2 No. 3, 2004. VL - 7 IS - 12 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Woll, Cornelia ED - Dehousse, Renaud T1 - La politique de concurrence T2 - Politiques européennes N2 - POLITIQUES EUROPEENNES offre une vue d'ensemble du système institutionnel, des acteurs, du jeu politique et des modes d'action de l’Union, à la fois dans les domaines où son intervention est ancienne et dans ceux où son influence est plus récente. Agriculture, monnaie, concurrence, mais aussi commerce, enseignement supérieur, social, environnement ou même politique étrangère : l’influence de l’Europe se fait sentir dans un grand nombre de domaines, et pourtant son action reste largement méconnue. Fruit d’une coopération entre politistes, juristes, économistes et sociologues, tous enseignants à Sciences Po, ce manuel sans équivalent en langue française donne les clés pour mettre en perspective les dynamiques de la construction européenne depuis ses origines et pour comprendre les défis auxquels elle fait face aujourd’hui. Conçu comme un support pour des enseignements d’introduction à l’intégration européenne, il propose un panorama clair et synthétique des politiques européennes et de leur développement. Enrichi de nombreux encadrés, zooms, documents et références bibliographiques, il s’adresse aux étudiants, chercheurs et enseignants des premiers et deuxièmes cycles en science politique, droit, économie, administration publique et administration économique et sociale. Y1 - 2009 SN - 978-2-7246-1132-8 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3917/scpo.dehou.2009.03.0171 SP - 171 EP - 188 PB - Presses de Sciences Po CY - Paris ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Woll, Cornelia ED - Coen, David ED - Richardson, Jeremy T1 - Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union: Who Captures Whom? T2 - Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors, and Issues N2 - What role do firms play in the making of EU trade policy? This chapter surveys the policy domain and lays out the instruments firms can employ to influence decisions on trade. It underlines that European trade policy is characterized by a high degree of institutional complexity, which firms have to manage in order to be successful. In particular, the European Commission works intensively to solicit business input in order to gain bargaining leverage vis-à-vis third countries and the EU member states. This reverse lobbying creates a two-channel logic of trade policy lobbying in the EU. Corporate actors have a very good chance of working closely with the European Commission if they can propose pan-European trade policy solutions. This can be either trade liberalization or EU-wide regulatory restrictions on trade. Demands for traditional protectionist measures, especially those that reveal national interest divergences, are difficult to defend at the supranational level. Protectionist lobbying therefore goes through the national route, with corporate actors working to block liberalization by affecting the consensus in the Council of Ministers. The chapter illustrates this two-channel logic by studying business–government interactions in agricultural trade, textiles and clothing, financial services, and telecommunication services. Y1 - 2009 UR - https://global.oup.com/academic/product/lobbying-the-european-union-9780199207350?cc=de&lang=en& SN - 978-0-19-920735-0 SP - 277 EP - 297 PB - Oxford University Press CY - Oxford ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Woll, Cornelia T1 - Politics in the Interest of Capital. A Not-So-Organized Combat. T2 - MaxPo Discussion Paper N2 - The rise in inequality has been explained with reference to organized groups and the lobbying of the financial sector. This article argues that the image of politics as organized combat is contradicted by empirical evidence on lobbying in the United States, and does not travel well to Europe. The power of finance does not operate through organized political influence. Rather, politics in the interest of capital unfolds as a structural feature of advanced economies over time. Tellingly, at the height of the financial crisis, one of the most promising strategies of institutions seeking government support was not organizing for combat, but collective inaction. Our challenge, then, is to explain how the power of finance has built up and is playing out in creating inequality. A more structural, less agency-focused perspective highlights how the rise of finance has been supported by actors that few would accuse of being finance-friendly, such as the European center-left parties and consumers. Reconceptualizing the power of finance has important implications for political solutions to rising inequality. Y1 - 2015 UR - http://www.maxpo.eu/pub/maxpo_dp/maxpodp15-2.pdf VL - 15 IS - 2 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Woll, Cornelia A1 - Fourcade, Marion A1 - Steiner, Philippe A1 - Streeck, Wolfgang T1 - Moral Categories in the Financial Crisis T2 - MaxPo Discussion Paper N2 - Karl Marx observed long ago that all economic struggles invite moral struggles, or masquerade as such. The reverse may be true as well: deep moral-political conflicts may be waged through the manipulation of economic resources. Using the recent financial and Eurozone crises as empirical backgrounds, the four papers gathered here propose four different perspectives on the play of moral judgments in the economy, and call for broader and more systematic scholarly engagement with this issue. Focusing on executive compensation, bank bailouts, and the sovereign debt crisis, the symposium builds on a roundtable discussion held at the opening of the Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo) in Paris on November 29, 2012. Y1 - 2013 UR - https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_1854550_1/component/file_1854548/content VL - 13 IS - 1 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Woll, Cornelia A1 - Grossman, Emiliano T1 - Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts T2 - Open Forum CES Paper Series N2 - How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of intervention during the 2007-2009 financial crisis? This paper analyzes comparatively what explains government responses to banking crises. Why does the type of intervention during financial crises vary to such a great extent across countries? By analyzing the variety of bailouts in Europe and North America, we will show that the strategies governments use to cope with the instability of financial markets does not depend on economic conditions alone. Rather, they take root in the institutional and political setting of each country and vary in particular according to the different types of business-government relations banks were able to entertain with public decision-makers. Still, “crony capitalism” accounts overstate the role of bank lobbying. With four case studies of the Irish, Danish, British and French bank bailout, we show that countries with close one-on-one relationships between policy-makers and bank management tended to develop unbalanced bailout packages, while countries where banks have strong interbank ties and collective negotiation capacity were able to develop solutions with a greater burden sharing from private institutions. Y1 - 2012 UR - https://pure.mpg.de/rest/items/item_1477827_2/component/file_1477825/content VL - 8 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Woll, Cornelia T1 - Beyond Ideological Battles: A Strategic Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation in Europe T2 - Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po N2 - The highly politicized debate about the recent Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM) Directive of the European Union led many observers to suspect an ideological battle between countries seeking to impose transnational regulation on financial service industries such as hedge funds and liberal market economies insisting on the benefits of market discipline in order to protect their financial centers. The battle that appeared to particularly pit France against the United Kingdom can thus be interpreted as an example of a regulatory paradigm shift in the aftermath of the crisis. This article cautions against such an ideas-centered account of financial regulation and points to the economic interests that drove the French and German agendas. However, contrary to the assumptions of traditional political economy approaches, national preferences were not simply defined by the aggregate of a country’s economic interests. Rather, industry success in shaping government positions on alternative investment regulation crucially depended on how a given industry fit into the government’s overarching geo-political agenda. By highlighting this feedback loop between government strategy and industry lobbying, the paper proposes a strategic analysis of financial regulation, as opposed to accounts that consider positions to be pre-determined by ideas or socioeconomic structures. N2 - La polémique autour de la directive européenne sur les fonds d’investissement alternatif (AIFM) est souvent citée comme exemple d’une bataille idéologique. D’un côté, on trouve les pays membre qui insistent sur une réglementation accrue des marchés financiers, en particulier la France, de l’autre côté, ceux qui souhaitent préserver le marché libre, notamment le Royaume Uni. Nous montrons les limites des récits qui s’intéressent uniquement aux paradigmes de la réglementation financière après la crise et insistons sur les intérêts économiques derrière les différentes positions. En revanche, les positions nationales ne doivent pas être comprises comme simple agrégat des positions de l’industrie financière d’un pays. Le succès de leur lobbying dépend en très grande partie de la compatibilité des demandes particulières avec la stratégie géopolitique du gouvernement. L’objectif de l’article est ainsi de tracer les boucles de rétroaction entre les stratégies des gouvernements et le lobbying de l’industrie financière d’un pays, afin de proposer une analyse stratégique de la négociation intergouvernementale. Y1 - 2011 UR - https://spire.sciencespo.fr/hdl:/2441/eu4vqp9ompqllr09hae2n8o0n/resources/beyond-ideological-battles-a-strategic-analysis-of-hedge-fund-regulation-in-europe1.pdf VL - 2 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Woll, Cornelia A1 - Jacquot, Sophie T1 - Action publique Européenne : les acteurs stratégiques face a l'Europe T1 - A Sociological Perspective on Strategic Action in European Integration JF - Politique européenne N2 - Cet article s'intéresse à l'influence de la sociologie dans l'analyse de l'action publique européenne. Nous revenons notamment sur la notion "d'usage" que nous avons développée auparavant et plaidons pour une prise en compte plus systématique de l'action stratégique dans l'analyse des transformations européennes. Nous analysons les évolutions récentes des études européennes vers une prise en compte plus systématique de l'imbrication sociale des acteurs, ce qui permet d'étudier leur rationalité sans tomber dans certains pièges des approches du choix rationnel trop réductrices. L'analyse de l'action intentionnée permet de mettre en lumière trois dimensions spécifiques des transformations européennes : (1) les processus non contraignants et informels, (2) les effets de la circulation des acteurs entre les différents niveaux du système européen, et (3) l’importance des coalitions ambiguës et parfois inattendues qui se forment, souvent malgré des divergences profondes sur les objectifs à atteindre. N2 - Many have noted that European integration theory has moved beyond the theoretical divide between inter-governmentalists and neo-functionalists that marked the 1990s. While some authors simply abandoned theoretical frameworks to concentrate on empirical puzzles, others adopted positions stemming from international relations theory or comparative political science. The most important paradigmatic divide in European Union studies now seems to be between rationalists and constructivists, or rational choice institutionalists and more sociological perspectives on the study of European integration that focus on the role of ideas and representation in the evolution of institutional settings. This paper surveys recent studies that have adopted the latter perspective while at the same time concentrating on the strategic decision making of intentional actors at the center of rational choice approaches. By studying the contributions of such a middle-ground perspective to the study of Europeanization in particular, we argue against a dichotomy between rational and constructivist approaches and highlight the centrality of fluid coalition patterns and power relationships in the study of the European Union. Y1 - 2008 U6 - https://doi.org/10.3917/poeu.025.0161 VL - 25 IS - 2 SP - 161 EP - 192 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Woll, Cornelia A1 - Artigas, Alvaro T1 - When trade liberalization turns into regulatory reform: The impact on business–government relations in international trade politics JF - Regulation & Governance N2 - Business–government relations on trade issues are generally characterized as protectionist lobbying or – less often – lobbying for the liberalization of markets. However, with the evolution of the trading system, negotiations today concern not just market opening, but also the regulatory frameworks that structure international trade. This transformation has important consequences for the ways in which private interests can contribute to trade negotiations. Instead of simply trying to exert pressure, businesses and other private actors now form working relationships with governments based on expertise, learning, and information exchange. This article illustrates these new forms of public–private interactions with examples from the USA, the European Union, and Brazil. KW - Brazil KW - European Union KW - lobbying KW - trade KW - United States Y1 - 2007 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00010.x VL - 1 IS - 2 SP - 121 EP - 138 ER -