TY - JOUR A1 - Kreilinger, Valentin T1 - Possibilities for upgrading inter-parliamentary cooperation after the 2014 European elections JF - Polish Quarterly of International Affairs N2 - The parliaments in the EU are facing a choice. They may exploit the existing possibilities, continue business as usual (possibly with declining participation in inter-parliamentary cooperation, so no change), or bypass existing interparliamentary structures. The last and most extreme scenario would mean that some national parliaments, for example the six founding members or the Member States that have adopted the euro, create their own conference, with serious repercussions to “pre-in” countries, to the EU institutions, and to the inclusiveness of economic and financial governance. The second option (business as usual) does not help building a genuine Economic and Monetary Union either. Only the first scenario would help reduce the existing weakness in democratic accountability and legitimacy, both in general, and especially in connection with the genuine EMU in the making. An inter-parliamentary conference as a place to discuss these policies could have the positive effect of gradually becoming an arena in which the future direction of the Union’s economic policy is shaped. KW - Studies KW - Parliamentary elections-UK KW - Cooperation KW - Accountability KW - Economic policy Y1 - 2014 UR - https://search.proquest.com/docview/1535024225?accountid=11379 SN - 1230-4999 VL - 23 IS - 1 SP - 57 EP - 68 PB - Polish Institute of International Affairs CY - Warschau ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kreilinger, Valentin T1 - Prognosen zur Zusammensetzung und Arbeit des Europäischen Parliaments nach der Wahl 2014 JF - integration N2 - Vom 22. bis 25. Mai 2014 wird ein neues Europäisches Parlament gewählt. Trotz vieler Unwägbarkeiten lassen sich bereits mögliche Veränderungen durch diese Europawahl skizzieren. Zwei große Trends sind auf der Basis aktueller Prognosen wahrscheinlich: Stimmengewinne für die Fraktion der Progressiven Allianz der Sozialisten und Demokraten (S&D) bei Verlusten für die Fraktion der Europäischen Volkspartei (EVP) und Zugewinne für populistische und europakritische Parteien zulasten der etablierten Parteien. Sie würden das Europäische Parlament nicht paralysieren, aber eine (noch) stärkere Zusammenarbeit der etablierten Parteien forcieren, die auch durch den Prozess und den Zeitplan bis zum Amtsantritt der neuen Europäischen Kommission begünstigt wird. Eine Analyse des Abstimmungsverhaltens der Abgeordneten in der Legislaturperiode 2009-2014 hilft, diese möglichen Veränderungen im europäischen Machtgefüge besser einzuordnen. Da die beiden großen Fraktionen und politischen Lager gleichauf zu liegen scheinen, ist das Rennen jedoch noch völlig offen. Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/0720-5120-2014-1-3 SN - 0720-5120 VL - 37 IS - 1 SP - 3 EP - 20 PB - Nomos Verl.-Ges. CY - Baden-Baden ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Kreilinger, Valentin T1 - Nationale Parlamente T2 - Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2018 Y1 - 2018 SN - 978-3-8452-9103-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845291031-135 SP - 135 EP - 140 PB - Nomos Verlag CY - Baden-Baden ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Kreilinger, Valentin T1 - Nationale Parlamente T2 - Jahrbuch der Europäischen Integration 2017 Y1 - 2017 SN - 978-3-8452-8489-7 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/9783845284897-172 SP - 173 EP - 178 PB - Nomos Verlag CY - Baden-Baden ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kreilinger, Valentin T1 - From procedural disagreement to joint scrutiny? The Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance JF - Perspectives on Federalism N2 - The provision of Article 13 TSCG to create an Interparliamentary Conference was the starting point for long discussions after which national parliaments and the European Parliament eventually reached a compromise. This article pursues a two-fold objective: It first examines the different phases of interparliamentary negotiations from 2012 to 2015. On the basis of a distinction between three competing models for interparliamentary cooperation, the article shows that the two models of EP-led scrutiny and creating a collective parliamentary counterweight did not prevail: Parliaments agreed that the new Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance (SECG) would follow the ‘standard’ interparliamentary conference (COSAC model). In terms of national parliaments’ actual participation, the lowest common denominator compromise has not changed the numbers of participating MPs: Attendance records are stable over time, the size of national delegations continues to vary and participating MPs are still twice as likely to be members of Budget or Finance committees than to be members of European affairs committees. KW - European Union KW - national parliaments KW - Economic Governance KW - interparliamentary cooperation Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2478/pof-2018-0035 SN - 2036-5438 IS - 10(3) SP - 155 EP - 183 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kreilinger, Valentin T1 - Scrutinising the European Semester in national parliaments: what are the drivers of parliamentary involvement? JF - Journal of European Integration N2 - How exactly are national parliaments involved in the European Semester? The stronger coordination of fiscal and economic policies in the European Union (EU) in reaction to the sovereign debt crisis has forced national parliaments to adapt their procedures. This article examines how the European Semester is scrutinised and what factors have driven parliamentary activities in the French National Assembly, the German Bundestag, the Irish Dáil and the Portuguese Assembleia between 2012 and 2017. Particularly noteworthy is that legal provisions for a parliamentary debate on the Stability Programme can be ignored in France, that the German Bundestag is much less active in the European Semester than in EU affairs or in the budget process and that the weakness of Ireland’s parliament in the annual budget procedure affects its role in the European Semester. This article therefore suggests defining minimum standards for parliamentary involvement and strengthening interparliamentary cooperation. KW - National Parliaments KW - European Semester KW - economic and monetary union KW - democratic legitimacy KW - parliamentary oversight Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2018.1450402 SN - 1477-2280 IS - 40(3) SP - 325 EP - 340 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Fromage, Diane A1 - Kreilinger, Valentin T1 - National parliaments' third yellow card and the struggle over the revision of the Posted Workers Directive JF - European Journal of Legal Studies N2 - The Treaty of Lisbon strengthened the role of national parliaments in the EU legislative process by creating the Early Warning System. This procedure offers them the possibility to send reasoned opinions to the European Commission if they have subsidiarity concerns about a legislative proposal. Since 2009 the necessary threshold (i.e. one third of the total number of votes) has only been reached three times. The most recent of these 'yellow cards' was triggered by the Commission's proposal to revise the Posted Workers Directive, an event that allows us to shed some light on how national parliaments use this mechanism and how the European Commission has reacted. The subsidiarity concerns were rejected by the Commission and the legislative process continues despite deep divisions between old and new Member States over the controversial policy issue of revising the Posted Workers Directive. Y1 - 2017 UR - https://ejls.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/sites/32/2017/11/National-Parliaments-Third-Yellow-Card-and-the-Struggle-over-the-Revision-of-the-Posted-Workers-Directive-.pdf SN - 1973-2937 IS - 10(1) SP - 125 EP - 160 ER -