TY - JOUR A1 - Scharpf, Adam A1 - Gläßel, Christian T1 - Career Pressures and Organizational Evil: A Novel Perspective on the Study of Organized Violence JF - International Studies Review N2 - Dictators, rebel commanders, and mafia bosses frequently delegate gruesome and immoral tasks to their subordinates. However, most individuals want to avoid such work. This analytical essay proposes an institutional logic to understand how dictatorships, insurgent organizations, and criminal gangs get their evil work done nonetheless. We argue that common features of organizations produce mundane career pressures that incentivize subordinates to zealously execute reprehensible tasks. Subordinates may come under pressure for six distinct reasons: incompetence, misconduct, origin, isolation, organizational backlog, and shrinkage. Superiors, in turn, can exploit that pressured subordinates hope to improve their prospects for advancement by loyally executing the organization’s evil tasks. Empirically, we illustrate how Nazi Germany utilized each of the suggested career pressures to staff the units in charge of the Holocaust. We highlight that our logic might also apply to less extreme forms of organizational evil. Together, the essay offers a novel perspective to demystify radical behavior in state and non-state organizations with important implications for our understanding of transnational terrorist violence and underworld crimes. KW - bureaucracy KW - hierarchy KW - promotions KW - recruitment KW - terrorism KW - crime KW - Holocaust Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/isr/viac009 VL - 24 IS - 3 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - De Juan, Alexander A1 - Gläßel, Christian A1 - Haass, Felix A1 - Scharpf, Adam T1 - The Political Effects of Witnessing State Atrocities: Evidence from the Nazi Death Marches JF - Comparative Political Studies N2 - How does witnessing regime atrocities influence the political attitudes of bystanders? We argue that observing regime violence against innocent civilians triggers psychological dissonance between beliefs about the regime and the witnessed moral transgression. As a result, regime support should decrease among bystanders of state atrocities. We analyze original, highly disaggregated archival data from the Nazi death marches at the end of World War II, which confronted ordinary German citizens with the regime’s crimes. We find that locations with higher victim numbers had lower vote shares for right-wing nationalist parties after the war. Supporting our proposed mechanism, we show that (1) this effect was strongest when Nazi crimes were at the center of public discourse and (2) that witnessing Nazi atrocities was associated with individuals’ rejection of Hitler 20 years later. The findings have implications for understanding democratization prospects and people’s nostalgia for fallen autocrats. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231178736 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gläßel, Christian A1 - González, Belén A1 - Scharpf, Adam T1 - Grist to the mill of subversion: strikes and coups in counterinsurgencies JF - European Journal of International Relations N2 - Why are acts of organized resistance associated with coups? Inspired by the Arab Spring, a large literature suggests that militaries confronted with civil resistance tend to side with protesters and oust their government. In the historically most coup-prone environment of insurgencies, however, alliances between the military and protesters are implausible because soldiers suspect insurgents behind social dissent. Disentangling different types of resistance, this article analyzes whether and how strikes, demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks affect the military’s disposition and ability to stage a coup during counterinsurgencies. We argue that only strikes trigger coup attempts. Soldiers interpret strikes as manifestations of a strengthening subversive enemy that threatens their victory over insurgents, while economic elites support a coup in the hope that the military will terminate costly walkouts. This interest alignment fosters military takeovers. We provide case-study evidence from Cold War Argentina and Venezuela to show our suggested mechanism at work. Demonstrating the scope of our argument, we quantitatively analyze coup attempts in counterinsurgency worldwide (1950–2005). Results show that strikes increase wartime coup risk, whereas demonstrations, riots, and guerrilla attacks do not. The findings highlight the backfiring potential of nonviolent resistance with important implications for post-coup political orders and democratization prospects. KW - - KW - Military coup KW - nonviolent resistance KW - elite collusion KW - bureaucratic authoritarianism KW - Argentina KW - Venezuela Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066120923028 SN - 1354-0661 SN - 1460-3713 VL - 26 IS - 4 SP - 1032 EP - 1060 PB - SAGE Publications CY - Sage UK: London, England ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Otto, Sabine A1 - Scharpf, Adam A1 - Gohdes, Anita R. T1 - Capturing Group Alignments: Introducing the Government and Armed Actors Relations Dataset (GAARD) JF - Research and Politics N2 - Recent research has generated important new insights into the existence, behavior, and violent consequences of armed actors in civil wars. However, the lack of suitable information on actor relationships with the state means that studies have been forced to assume that armed groups are either pro-government or anti-government and remain that way for the duration of their existence. Both assumptions severely limit our understanding of the armed actors themselves, as well as the violent dynamics they produce. This article introduces the Government and Armed Actors Relations Dataset (GAARD), which provides detailed information on all major armed groups and their fluctuating alignment with the state between 1989 and 2007. GAARD identifies when armed groups fight with or against the government, and when they lack relationships with the government altogether. It further provides information on all changes in group alignments and documents when and how these occurred. We demonstrate that more than 25% of armed groups changed their alignments and showcase how this allows researchers to pursue original research on the drivers, dynamics, and outcomes of civil conflicts. Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168020971891 VL - 7 IS - 4 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Scharpf, Adam A1 - Gläßel, Christian A1 - Edwards, Pearce T1 - International sports events and repression in autocracies: Evidence from the 1978 FIFA World Cup JF - American Political Science Review N2 - How do international sports events shape repression in authoritarian host countries? International tournaments promise unique gains in political prestige through global media attention. However, autocrats must fear that foreign journalists will unmask their wrongdoings. We argue that autocracies solve this dilemma by strategically adjusting repression according to the spatial-temporal presence of international media. Using original, highly disaggregated data on the 1978 World Cup, we demonstrate that the Argentine host government largely refrained from repression during the tournament but preemptively cleared the streets beforehand. These adjustments specifically occurred around hotels reserved for foreign journalists. Additional tests demonstrate that (1) before the tournament, repression turned increasingly covert, (2) during the tournament, targeting patterns mirrored the working shifts of foreign journalists, (3) after the tournament, regime violence again spiked in locations where international media had been present. Together, the article highlights the human costs of megaevents, contradicting the common whitewashing rhetoric of functionaries. Y1 - 2023 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055422000958 VL - 117 IS - 3 SP - 909 EP - 926 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Scharpf, Adam A1 - Gläßel, Christian T1 - Why Underachievers Dominate Secret Police Organizations: Evidence from Autocratic Argentina JF - American Journal of Political Science N2 - Autocrats depend on a capable secret police. Anecdotal evidence, however, often characterizes agents as surprisingly mediocre in skill and intellect. To explain this puzzle, this article focuses on the career incentives underachieving individuals face in the regular security apparatus. Low-performing officials in hierarchical organizations have little chance of being promoted or filling lucrative positions. To salvage their careers, these officials are willing to undertake burdensome secret police work. Using data on all 4,287 officers who served in autocratic Argentina (1975–83), we study biographic differences between secret police agents and the entire recruitment pool. We find that low-achieving officers were stuck within the regime hierarchy, threatened with discharge, and thus more likely to join the secret police for future benefits. The study demonstrates how state bureaucracies breed mundane career concerns that produce willing enforcers and cement violent regimes. This has implications for the understanding of autocratic consolidation and democratic breakdown. Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12475 VL - 64 IS - 4 SP - 791 EP - 806 ER -