TY - JOUR A1 - Cowls, Josh A1 - Darius, Philipp A1 - Santistevan, Dominiquo A1 - Schramm, Moritz T1 - Constitutional metaphors: Facebook’s “supreme court” and the legitimation of platform governance JF - New Media and Society N2 - Who governs—and who should govern—online communication? Social media companies, international organizations, users, or the state? And by what means? A range of rhetorical devices have been used to simplify the complexities associated with the governance of online platforms. This includes “constitutional metaphors”: metaphorical allusions to traditional political concepts such as statehood, democracy, and constitutionalism. Here, we empirically trace the ascent of a powerful constitutional metaphor currently employed in the news media discourse on platform governance: characterizations of Facebook’s Oversight Board (OB) as a “supreme court.” We investigate the metaphor’s descriptive suitability and question its normative and political ramifications. We argue that uncritical characterizations of the OB as Facebook’s “supreme court” obscure its true scope and purpose. In addition, we argue that appropriating the socio-cultural symbolism and hence political legitimacy of a supreme court and mapping it onto a different type of actor poses a threat to responsible platform governance. KW - constitutional metaphors KW - content analysis KW - digital constitutionalism KW - Oversight Board KW - platform governance Y1 - 2022 UR - https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/14614448221085559 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/14614448221085559 ER -