TY - BOOK A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Strauch, Rolf Rainer A1 - von Hagen, Jürgen T1 - Fiscal Governance in Europe N2 - This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Based on original research, the book classifies European Union countries from 1985 to 2004. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union. Y1 - 2009 SN - 9780521138260 N1 - Available as print and ebook in your Hertie Library. Als Druckversion und eBook in der Hertie Bibliothek verfügbar. PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - Cambridge [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Strauch, Rolf A1 - von Hagen, Jürgen T1 - The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries JF - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the main pattern of budgetary institutions and their determinants across the EU 15 member states. Empirical evidence for the time period 1985–2004 suggests that the centralisation of budgeting procedures restrains public debt. In countries with one-party governments or coalition governments where parties are closely aligned and where political competition among them is low, this is achieved by the delegation of decision-making power to the minister of finance. Fiscal contracts that require countries to set multi-year targets and that reinforce those targets increase fiscal discipline in countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions and where parties regularly compete against each other. Y1 - 2007 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.11.005 SN - 1873-5703 VL - 23 IS - 2 SP - 338 EP - 359 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Strauch, Rolf A1 - von Hagen, Jürgen T1 - Budgeting in Europe after Maastrichtpatterns of reform and their effectiveness JF - Hacienda Publica Espanola N2 - Este trabajo analiza el desarrollo de las reglas e instituciones fiscales en los países europeos durante la última década. Hallamos que el grado de cambios de los procesos presupuestarios y de las reglas fiscales difiere mucho entre los distintos países. Se evalúa el patrón de los cambios con respecto a los diferentes tipos ideales de gobernabilidad fiscal. Nuestro análisis muestra que los países que adoptan reglas en consonancia con sus instituciones fiscales predichas consiguen mayores logros en el plano fiscal que otras naciones que no hacen eso. Tenemos, pues, una explicación parcial de por qué razón el efecto del marco fiscal europeo ha sido asimétrico en relación con los países miembros. Y1 - 2004 UR - https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=1112074 SN - 0210-1173 SP - 203 EP - 228 ET - Nº Extra 2004 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Strauch, Rolf T1 - On the Cyclicality of Public Finances in Europe JF - Empirica N2 - Under EMU, monetary policy is oriented toward the euro area as a whole and fiscal policy is an important instrument remaining in the hands of national governments to cushion economic shocks to individual countries. The current paper analyses the cyclical pattern of public finances in Europe and addresses the question of whether fiscal policies have been geared towards this stabilising role. Although taxes fluctuate countercyclically in a conventional manner, we find that discretionary measures have tended to undermine automatic stabilisers. On the expenditure side, we find that public investment also displays a consistent procyclical pattern. Dynamic analysis reveals that a permanent shock to output induces asynchronous fluctuations in taxes and expenditures in the year of the shock and in periods thereafter. Finally, we examine political and institutional factors. The political fragmentation of the government as well as the partisan hue of the government do not interfere with the cyclical response of public finances, but we do find evidence of a pronounced electoral cycle. Y1 - 2002 UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1020299609077 SN - 1573-6911 VL - 29 IS - 3 SP - 183 EP - 207 ER -