TY - JOUR A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Walter, Stefanie T1 - We’d rather pay than change the politics of German non-adjustment in the Eurozone crisis JF - The Review of International Organizations N2 - Germany’s large current account surplus has been widely criticized, especially against the backdrop of the role of macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone crisis. We argue that Germany’s resistance to reduce its massive current account surplus through an expansionary policy at home is rooted in distributive struggles about the design of possible adjustment policies. To explore this argument, we leverage original survey data from 135 German economic interest groups, qualitative interviews with interest group representatives and policymakers, and data from public opinion surveys. We show that while there is general support for internal adjustment among German interest groups, they disagree heavily about which specific policies should be implemented to achieve this goal. Together with a broad public and elite-based consensus to avoid a break-up of the Eurozone, this polarization turns financing into a politically attractive strategy. Rather than being rooted only in German ordoliberal ideas or Germany’s export-oriented structure, distributive conflicts contribute significantly to Germany’s resistance to reduce its large current-account surplus. Because similar dynamics can be observed in other surplus countries, we argue that distributive struggles within surplus countries played an important role in interstate conflicts about the management of the crisis. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-020-09390-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-020-09390-1 SN - Electronic ISSN 1559-744X, Print ISSN 1559-7431 VL - 15 SP - 573 EP - 599 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - The Politics of Stashing Wealth: The Decline of Labor Power and the Global Rise in Corporate Savings JF - The Journal of Politics N2 - This article investigates the political roots of the global rise in corporate savings. In recent years, firms throughout advanced economies have started to accumulate enormous savings. Instead of using their revenues to reinvest or raise wages, many companies now stash their profits within financial markets, contributing to sluggish growth, financial fragilities, and rising inequality. I argue that political institutions that determine the balance of power between firms and employees play an important role in shaping this trend. The stronger unions are, the more they pressure firms into using revenues for pay increases and investment. The more unions’ influence erodes, the stronger the rise of savings. Using panel data from 25 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries as well as a regression discontinuity design leveraging the German law on codetermination, I find robust and causal evidence supporting this claim. These results have implications for our broader understanding of how political institutions affect financial imbalances and economic inequality. Y1 - 2021 UR - https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/716298 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1086/716298 SN - ISSN: 0022-3816, E-ISSN: 1468-2508 VL - 84 IS - 2 SP - 975 EP - 991 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Rommel, Tobias T1 - Misremembering Weimar: Hyperinflation, the Great Depression, and German collective economic memory JF - Economics & Politics N2 - The well-known German aversion to inflation has attracted a lot of interest and is often attributed to a specific historical memory: Weimar. Yet we do not know much about why hyperinflation seems to overshadow the Great Depression in German collective economic memory. To answer this question, we study what exactly it is that Germans believe to remember about their past. Using original survey data, we show that many Germans do not distinguish between hyperinflation and the Great Depression, but see them as two dimensions of the same crisis. They conflate Weimar economic history into one big crisis, encompassing both rapidly rising prices and mass unemployment. Additionally, more educated and politically interested Germans are more likely to commit this fallacy. Our finding thus nuances ideational explanations for Germany's economic policy stance in the European Union. Y1 - 2021 UR - https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12182 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12182 SN - 1468-0343 VL - 33 IS - 3 SP - 664 EP - 686 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Gnath, Katharina A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Deutschland und die Stabilität der Wirtschafts-und Währungsunion T2 - Handbuch zur deutschen Europapolitik N2 - Die Corona-Pandemie stellt die zweite große Bewährungsprobe für die Eurozone seit ihrem Bestehen dar. Nachdem die Wirtschafts-und Währungsunion (WWU) aus der Eurokrise der Jahre 2010 bis 2015 mit einigen Narben, aber doch weitestgehend intakt und handlungsfähig hervorgegangen ist, sah sie sich ab Anfang 2020 erneut einer potenziell existenzgefährdenden Krise ausgesetzt. Die Antworten, die die Mitgliedstaaten bis Ende Juli 2020 auf die Pandemie gefunden haben, unterscheiden sich von der Politik in der Eurokrise: Während der Fokus zur Krisenrettung zuvor auf der Vergabe von Krediten gegen Auflagen und einem punktuellen Umbau der Euro-Architektur im Bereich der Bankenaufsicht und-abwicklung lag, stand im Sommer 2020 ein umfassendes schuldenfinanziertes EU-Wiederaufbauinstrument im Zentrum der Krisenbekämpfung. Es ging nicht mehr um Kredite, sondern um gemeinsame … Y1 - 2021 UR - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783748909514-287/deutschland-und-die-stabilitaet-der-wirtschafts-und-waehrungsunion?page=1 SN - ISBN print: 978-3-8487-6852-3, ISBN online: 978-3-7489-0951-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748909514-287 SP - 287 EP - 300 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Hainbach, Natascha T1 - Flattening the Recession Curve - Comparing Initial Fiscal Responses to the Corona Crisis Across the EU N2 - While the ongoing pandemic affects all European economies, we show that it is likely to cause much more economic damage in some member states than in others. Early fiscal crisis responses by EU governments do not reflect these differences. If anything, countries which are likely to be especially vulnerable are currently committing fewer fiscal resources to fighting the economic fallout than others. A joint European policy response to share the fiscal burden of this crisis is, therefore, urgently needed. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-35161 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Bremer, Björn T1 - Geduldig am Abgrund N2 - Die EU-Mitgliedstaaten zögern weiter, eine wirklich europäische Antwort auf die Krise zu geben. Damit verspielen sie die derzeit breite öffentliche Zustimmung für europäischer Solidarität. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-35213 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Nguyen, Thu T1 - If not now, when? The German government should seize the opportunity that the Conference on the Future of Europe provides N2 - Last week, the Conference on the Future of Europe was concluded. Now far-reaching reform proposals are on the table. However, there is a great risk of these proposals petering out. The Russian war of aggression shows how urgently the EU needs reforms. The German government should therefore seize the opportunity presented by the Conference. First, it should take its own European policy ambitions seriously and join forces with France to push for treaty changes. Second, it must find pragmatic steps in the short term to develop a constructive agenda from the Conference proposals, even below the threshold of treaty change. KW - CoFoE, Treaty Reform, Bundesregierung Y1 - 2022 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-45271 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/when-if-not-now-the-conference-on-the-future-of-europe-as-a-european-policy-opportunity-for-the-german-government ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Jäger, Philipp T1 - New needs, new prices, same money - Why the EU must raise its game to combat the war’s economic fallout N2 - Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts EU economic policy making on the spot. At the beginning of the war, there was some uncertainty whether the combination of dampening growth, rising energy prices and new investment needs would warrant new common EU spending. However, in recent weeks the fog has cleared. It is now evident, that without additional common expenditures the EU risks undermining its common position towards Russia and that new money is needed to finance necessary investments in energy independence. KW - Russian War, Inflation, REPowerEU Y1 - 2022 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-45307 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/new-needs-same-money?Array=&cHash=8759da94162d39910cd9443139cc8013 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Wielding the Big Gun – What the ECB’s New Bond Purchasing Program Means for EU Governance N2 - With the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI), the ECB has significantly widened its toolbox. However, the implications of the new program go beyond monetary policy. By linking bond purchases to member states following the EU’s economic governance framework, the central bank has potentially increased the size of the gun the Commission and the Council can wield to incentivize compliance. But it has also made it much harder to pull the trigger. Without reforms, the new ECB program will therefore accentuate existing deficiencies of the rulebook. The onus is now on politics to change that. KW - Economic Governance, Inflation, ECB Y1 - 2022 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-45316 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/transmission-protection-instrument ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Jansen, Jannik A1 - Jäger, Philipp A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - For climate, profits, or resilience? Why, where and how the EU should respond to the Inflation Reduction Act N2 - The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has rekindled European fears of missing out in the global green technology race. However, EU member states still disagree on whether the greater risk lies in doing too much or too little. At heart, there remains significant confusion on which European sectors stand to lose competitiveness; how much the EU should fret about these losses; and whether there is a need for joint support from the EU level to avoid economic divergence. We take a first stab at the existing sectoral evidence. Our results suggest that the IRA will undercut European production costs in several sectors. This does not mean the EU must mimic the US program. However, it does mean that the EU needs to turn its piecemeal Green Deal Industrial Plan into a coherent strategy. This requires a greater focus on green industries in which Europe can develop a competitive edge and more joint financing at the EU level. Y1 - 2023 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/ira-europe-response ER -