TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Pardo, Nicolas T1 - Salience and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets JF - Journal of Policy Analysis and Management N2 - This paper studies the enforcement of fines, and, in particular, the effects of simplification and salience nudges on timely payments. In a randomized controlled trial, we add cover letters to 80,000 payment notifications for speeding. The letters increase the salience of the payment deadline, the late penalty, or both. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. Stressing the late penalty significantly and persistently increases payment rates. The effect is largest if both parameters are made salient. The most effective treatment yields a net revenue gain that covers approximately 25 percent of the labor costs of the ticket administration personnel. A survey experiment documents how the salience nudges alter prior (mis)perceptions about the communicated parameters. The survey results rationalize the differential effects of the treatments and, together with the evidence from the RCT, offer a broader framework for explaining why certain nudges are effective in some contexts but fail in others. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22387 VL - 2 SP - 426 EP - 449 ET - 41 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Pardo, Nicolas A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Salience, Incentives, and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets T2 - MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper N2 - This paper studies the enforcement of fines. We randomly assign 80,000 speeding tickets to treatments that increase the salience of the payment deadline, late penalties, or both. Stressing the penalties significantly and persistently increases payment rates. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. The findings from the RCT are consistent with a survey experiment which documents the treatments' impact on priors about parameters of the compliance problem. Exploiting discontinuous variation in fines, we then document a strong price responsiveness: a 1% increase in the payment obligation induces a 0.23 percentage point decrease in timely compliance. This semi-elasticity suggests that the impact of the salience nudges is equivalent to the effect of a 4-9% reduction in fines. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://ssrn.com/abstract=3600770 ET - No. 2020/9 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Pardo, Nicolas T1 - Jak zlepšit výběr pokut? Experiment se zjednodušením informací Y1 - 2023 UR - https://www.prf.cuni.cz/aktuality/jak-zlepsit-vyber-pokut-experiment-se-zjednodusenim-informaci IS - Studie 2/2023 PB - Legal Data Hub ER - TY - THES A1 - Pardo, Nicolas T1 - Essays in Behavioral Public Economics N2 - This dissertation uses detailed micro data to shed light on issues affecting decision making in the administration of public resources. By helping to understand these dynamics, it informs the design of more effective policies, which ultimately translates into an increase in social welfare. In particular, it studies the role of cognitive limitations and social dynamics on the collection and use of public resources. The analysis of this question is carried out in three separate chapters, using administrative data at the sub-national level in a variety of settings. The first chapter analyzes the presence of interactions between economic agents on the expenditure side of public finances. Specially, it studies the presence of fiscal interactions on the expenditure decisions of local governments in Colombia. The next two chapters focus on the revenue side of public finances, and analyze the role of social norms and cognitive limitations on individual compliance in two different settings. The second chapter studies the role of intergenerational transmission of social norms on property tax compliance in Argentina. Finally, the third chapter investigates the effect of salience and information simplification on timely compliance for the payment of speeding tickets in the Czech Republic. T3 - Dissertations submitted to the Hertie School - 06/2019 Y1 - 2019 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-31034 N1 - Shelf mark: 2019D012 + 2019D012+1 ER -