TY - GEN A1 - Novak, Stephanie A1 - Elster, Jon ED - Novak, Stephanie ED - Elster, Jon T1 - Majority Decisions: Principles and Practices N2 - Description see http://www.cambridge.org/us/academic/subjects/politics-international-relations/political-theory/majority-decisions-principles-and-practices#description Y1 - 2014 N1 - ISBN-13: 978-1107054097 PB - Cambridge University Press CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Novak, Stephanie T1 - Single Representative, Single Voice: Magical Thinking and the Representation of the EU on the World Stage JF - Global Policy Y1 - 2014 N1 - DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.12147 VL - 5 IS - s1 (October) SP - 68 EP - 75 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Novak, Stephanie T1 - The Silence of Ministers: Consensus and Blame Avoidance in the Council of the European Union JF - Journal of Common Market Studies Y1 - 2013 VL - 51 IS - 6 SP - 1091 EP - 1107 ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Novak, Stephanie T1 - La prise de décision au Conseil de l'Union européenne BT - pratiques du vote et consensus T3 - Nouvelle Bibliothèque de Thèses Y1 - 2011 SN - 978-2-247-10676-9 PB - Dalloz CY - Paris ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Novak, Stephanie T1 - Qualified Majority Voting from the Single European Act to the Present Day BT - An Unexpected Permanence N2 - This study probes the way in which the use of the qualified majority voting has developed in the Council of the European Union. The investigation begins with the Single European Act, which expanded the field of decision making by qualified majority in an effort to facilitate the adoption of the directives concerning the Single Market. Quantitative data and interviews with members of the Council point to unexpected continuity. • The number of legislative acts adopted despite negative votes and abstentions was low throughout the period investigated (on average, less than a quarter of the documents requiring a qualified majority). • Yet the search for a qualified majority rather than for universal agreement is the driving force behind negotiations. The negotiators’ main goal is to determine whether or not there is a blocking minority against any given decision. The existence or the absence of such a minority determines the moment when the presidency of the Council proposes a document’s adoption. Today as in the past, concern over effectiveness explains why the presidency resorts to the use of a qualified majority as a weapon of dissuasion towards negotiators who fear ending up in a minority. 2 - Qualified majority voting from the Single European Act to the present day: an unexpected permanence • Despite this, the minutes of these Council meetings point to a low opposition and abstention rate, because ministers who fail to gain satisfaction tend to rally to the majority once they know that a measure is going to be adopted. • The publication of votes, which began in 1993, has not put paid to this strategy. Most decisions are taken by the preparatory committees that prepare Council meetings (Coreper and Special Committee on Agriculture), but the measures have to be officially adopted by the Council of Ministers, which gives the member states the opportunity to rally to the majority between the time a measure is unofficially agreed on and the moment it is officially adopted. • However, ministers of member states in which there is stringent parliamentary oversight cannot avail themselves of that opportunity. Thus it is going to be necessary to assess the extent to which the increase in national parliaments’ role laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon has a practical impact on voting in the Council. Y1 - 2011 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-20664 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Novak, Stephanie A1 - Elster, Jon ED - Novak, Stephanie ED - Elster, Jon T1 - Majority Decisions BT - Principles and Practices KW - Majorities KW - Democracy KW - Voting KW - Judicial review KW - Decision-making procedure KW - Voting criteria Y1 - 2014 SN - 9781107054097 PB - Cambridge University Press CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Novak, Stephanie T1 - Single Representative, Single Voice : Magical Thinking and Representation of the EU on the World Stage JF - Global Policy N2 - It is frequently argued that the EU should speak with a single voice on the international stage in order to play an effective role in the field of foreign policy. The representation of the EU by a single representative is often viewed as a remedy to this lack of a single voice. This article analyzes that argument and asks whether the relative disillusionment that followed the appointment of a president of the European Council and of a high representative of the EU suggests that stronger EU representation on the world stage is needed. The article argues that equating the institutionalization of a single representative with an ability on the part of the EU to speak with a single voice amounts to ‘magical thinking’ because no institutional engineering can overcome member states’ divisions. Furthermore, different successful cases of external action led by a few member states in spite of the lack of unanimity show that the single voice is an unhelpful myth. Lastly, the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty reforms reveals that the EU does not need stronger external representation and that any principle of representation relying on personalization should be dismissed as inadequate in the EU context. Y1 - 2014 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12147 SN - 1758-5899 VL - 5 IS - s1 SP - 68 EP - 75 ER -