TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Brexit: Bereit für Phase 2? Wie es nach dem Austritt weitergeht N2 - Fast fünf Jahrzehnte nachdem das Vereinigte Königreich der Union beigetreten ist und dreieinhalb Jahre nachdem sich die Briten in einem Referendum mit knapper Mehrheit für den Brexit entschieden haben, beendet Großbritannien am 31. Januar um Mitternacht deutscher Zeit offiziell seine Mitgliedschaft. Die direkten Folgen des Austritts halten sich dennoch zunächst in Grenzen. Noch bis zum Jahresende läuft eine Übergangsfrist, während der sich Großbritannien weiterhin an alle EU-Standards halten muss, Teil des Binnenmarkts und der Zollunion bleibt und Beiträge in den EU-Haushalt zahlt. Erst am Ende dieser Frist wird Großbritannien nicht nur formal und institutionell, sondern auch faktisch aus der EU ausscheiden. Beiden Seiten bleiben damit elf Monate, um ihre künftigen Beziehungen zu regeln und ein umfassendes Freihandelsabkommen zu vereinbaren. Gelingt das nicht, drohen die Einführung von Zöllen, Importquoten und anderen Handelsbeschränkungen. Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen wären mit denen eines No-Deal Brexits durchaus vergleichbar. Das Ringen um den Brexit geht also in die nächste Runde. Drei Fragen werden dabei in den kommenden Monaten entscheidend sein. Erstens, ist ein Abkommen innerhalb der gesetzten Frist überhaupt zu erreichen? Zweitens, wie breit könnte so ein erstes Abkommen werden? Und drittens, wie geschlossen wird die EU in den kommenden Verhandlungen auftreten können? Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-32875 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Koenig, Nicole A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - One year of geopolitical Commission - Time to get real N2 - Twelve months ago, Ursula von der Leyen announced that her Commission would be a geopolitical one. This promise was a response to the crisis of multilateralism, the growing competition between the US and China, the fallout of Brexit, and the broad range of brewing and frozen conflicts in the EU’s neighbourhood. One year later, a geopolitically assertive EU is needed more than ever. The pandemic has underlined the vulnerability of Europe’s supply chains and intensified the political rift between the US and China. The further the two superpowers move towards economic decoupling, the clearer it becomes how exposed Europe is to this rivalry. Meanwhile, the crises in the eastern Mediterranean, Mali, and Belarus have reminded Europeans of their geopolitical responsibilities. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-36850 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Freudlsperger, Christian A1 - Knudsen, Edward L. A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Transatlantic Trade post-Trump - Priorities for a Pragmatic Reset N2 - After four turbulent years in trade relations, Europe has high expectations of the Biden administration. However, the room for big trade reforms is small and new grand-scale liberalization is neither economically necessary nor politically realistic. Accordingly, we propose a pragmatic agenda that focuses on ending ongoing trade conflicts and making progress on some WTO reforms as well as trade-adjacent issues such as climate change and supply-chain security. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-37127 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/transatlantic-trade-post-trump-priorities-for-a-pragmatic-reset ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Stahl, Anna T1 - Pushed by the pandemic - Shaping Europe’s changing geo-economic relations with China N2 - The coronavirus crisis accentuates many of the existing tensions in EU-China relations. While some see China’s economic rebound as a main factor in Europe’s own recovery, the crisis will also harden the country’s adherence to a state-led development model, further reduce its willingness to level the playing field and intensify big power competition with the U.S. This policy paper argues that the EU should not overestimate its dependencies on China and take a robust stance in ongoing negotiations, for example regarding the Comprehensive Investment Agreement. Moreover, the EU should further strengthen its ability to counter the distorting effects of Chinese economic practices and step up efforts to shield itself from the negative repercussions of the geo-economic rivalry between China and the U.S. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-36975 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Nguyen, Thu A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Check yourself before you wreck yourself N2 - Strengthening the EU’s capacity to act in economic policy making has become a fashionable talking point on the European policy agenda. At the same time, there is little debate about the institutional preconditions to be able to live up to these ambitions. In this policy brief, Nils Redeker and Thu Nguyen argue that the combination of grand policy ambition and institutional neglect constitutes a dangerous mix. Without new financial tools and decision-making procedures, the agenda is bound to disappoint. The authors argue that the debate on EU economic sovereignty needs to start talking about real reforms or else stop raising false expectations. Y1 - 2021 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-40183 U6 - https://doi.org/10.48462/opus4-4018 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Küspert, Theresa T1 - Taking a closer look: How to improve the design of the Solvency Support Instrument N2 - The Solvency Support Instrument (SSI) is central to the European Commission’s proposal to mitigate economic damage of the pandemic. It would use part of the money raised under the Recovery Instrument to provide equity support to struggling firms. It could become a powerful tool for the recovery. However, in its current form, the instrument risks providing free lunch bailouts for owners and private investors without ensuring that public support secures jobs, avoids market concentration, and puts firms on a growth path more conducive with the EU’s broader industrial policy goals. To remedy these shortcomings, the instrument needs clear political criteria for equity support and better political control. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-35835 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Go big or go home. How to make European industrial policy work N2 - When it comes to industrial policy, the EU remains big in ambition but meager in substance. This is not surprising. With its renewed strategy, the EU Commission aims to follow the international trend towards more active industrial policy. However, it has to do so within a framework that was designed to discourage – indeed even prevent – the investment- centered policies at the heart of the current discussion. For the EU’s industrial strategy to really have teeth, it needs new financial instruments, a stronger macroeconomic focus on growth and employment and better governance. Y1 - 2021 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-39279 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/go-big-or-go-home-how-to-make-european-industrial-policy-work U6 - https://doi.org/10.48462/opus4-3927 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Same shock, different effects. EU member states’ exposure to the economic consequences of Putin’s war N2 - The economic knock-on effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine are going to be felt throughout Europe. While the overall economic fallout is still difficult to predict, the impact will differ from country to country. This brief takes a very first look at divergences in exposure, focusing on direct trade links, potential costs of energy dependence on Russia and vulnerabilities towards rising energy prices more generally. It shows that the EU’s member states’ vulnerability to the economic consequences of the war is very unevenly distributed. To cushion the economic blow and ensure political unity, the EU will likely have to organise some sharing of the economic burden of this crisis. KW - Ukraine War, Economic shock, EU response Y1 - 2022 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-42960 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/de/publikationen/detail/publication/putins-krieg ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Nguyen, Thu A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - How to make the marriage work: Wedding the Recovery and Resilience Facility and European Semester N2 - A year into its existence, the Recovery and Resilience Facility finds itself closely wed to the European Semester. It is a difficult marriage, but it is a marriage made to last. Any debate on the future of the Semester will take place against the backdrop of the RRF experience. And any future fiscal capacity at the EU level will not come without a Semester-style reform leg. It is therefore crucial to make this marriage work. In this policy brief, Nils Redeker and Thu Nguyen argue that this requires three things: 1) scaling back recommendations under the regular Semester, 2) balancing out the asymmetric powers that the Commission now has over different member states, and 3) striking the right balance between flexibility and enforcement of agreed plans. KW - European Semester; economic governance; recovery instrument Y1 - 2022 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-42537 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/how-to-make-the-marriage-work ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - After the German election: What's next in EU industrial policy? N2 - The green and digital transformation of industry was one of the central issues in the German election campaign. However, many fundamental decisions on industrial policy can only be taken at the European level. The new German government must therefore turn its attention to Brussels as soon as possible and provide answers to specific questions: How can an investment-oriented industrial policy be organized in the single market? What European regulatory framework does the transformation of European industry to climate neutrality require? And finally, how much geopolitics can European industrial policy take? Y1 - 2021 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-42413 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/what-next-in-european-industrial-politics ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Walter, Stefanie A1 - Ray, Ari A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - The Politics of Bad Options: Why the Eurozone's Problems Have Been So Hard to Resolve N2 - Why was the Eurozone crisis so difficult to resolve? Why was it resolved in a manner in which some countries bore a much larger share of the pain than other countries? Why did no country leave the Eurozone rather than implement unprecedented austerity? Who supported and opposed the different policy options in the crisis domestically, and how did the distributive struggles among these groups shape crisis politics? Building on macro-level statistical data, original survey data from interest groups, and qualitative comparative case studies, this book argues and shows that the answers to these questions revolve around distributive struggles about how the costs of the Eurozone crisis should be divided among countries, and within countries, among different socioeconomic groups. Together with divergent but strongly held ideas about the 'right way' to conduct economic policy and asymmetries in the distribution of power among actors, severe distributive concerns of important actors lie at the root of the difficulties of resolving the Eurozone crisis as well as the difficulties to substantially reform EMU. The book provides new insights into the politics of the Eurozone crisis by emphasizing three perspectives that have received scant attention in existing research: a comparative perspective on the Eurozone crisis by systematically comparing it to previous financial crises, an analysis of the whole range of policy options, including the ones not chosen, and a unified framework that examines crisis politics not just in deficit-debtor, but also in surplus-creditor countries. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-politics-of-bad-options-9780198857020?cc=de&lang=en&# SN - 9780198857020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198857013.001.0001 PB - Oxford University Press CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Walter, Stefanie T1 - We’d rather pay than change the politics of German non-adjustment in the Eurozone crisis JF - The Review of International Organizations N2 - Germany’s large current account surplus has been widely criticized, especially against the backdrop of the role of macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone crisis. We argue that Germany’s resistance to reduce its massive current account surplus through an expansionary policy at home is rooted in distributive struggles about the design of possible adjustment policies. To explore this argument, we leverage original survey data from 135 German economic interest groups, qualitative interviews with interest group representatives and policymakers, and data from public opinion surveys. We show that while there is general support for internal adjustment among German interest groups, they disagree heavily about which specific policies should be implemented to achieve this goal. Together with a broad public and elite-based consensus to avoid a break-up of the Eurozone, this polarization turns financing into a politically attractive strategy. Rather than being rooted only in German ordoliberal ideas or Germany’s export-oriented structure, distributive conflicts contribute significantly to Germany’s resistance to reduce its large current-account surplus. Because similar dynamics can be observed in other surplus countries, we argue that distributive struggles within surplus countries played an important role in interstate conflicts about the management of the crisis. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11558-020-09390-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-020-09390-1 SN - Electronic ISSN 1559-744X, Print ISSN 1559-7431 VL - 15 SP - 573 EP - 599 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - The Politics of Stashing Wealth: The Decline of Labor Power and the Global Rise in Corporate Savings JF - The Journal of Politics N2 - This article investigates the political roots of the global rise in corporate savings. In recent years, firms throughout advanced economies have started to accumulate enormous savings. Instead of using their revenues to reinvest or raise wages, many companies now stash their profits within financial markets, contributing to sluggish growth, financial fragilities, and rising inequality. I argue that political institutions that determine the balance of power between firms and employees play an important role in shaping this trend. The stronger unions are, the more they pressure firms into using revenues for pay increases and investment. The more unions’ influence erodes, the stronger the rise of savings. Using panel data from 25 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries as well as a regression discontinuity design leveraging the German law on codetermination, I find robust and causal evidence supporting this claim. These results have implications for our broader understanding of how political institutions affect financial imbalances and economic inequality. Y1 - 2021 UR - https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/10.1086/716298 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1086/716298 SN - ISSN: 0022-3816, E-ISSN: 1468-2508 VL - 84 IS - 2 SP - 975 EP - 991 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Rommel, Tobias T1 - Misremembering Weimar: Hyperinflation, the Great Depression, and German collective economic memory JF - Economics & Politics N2 - The well-known German aversion to inflation has attracted a lot of interest and is often attributed to a specific historical memory: Weimar. Yet we do not know much about why hyperinflation seems to overshadow the Great Depression in German collective economic memory. To answer this question, we study what exactly it is that Germans believe to remember about their past. Using original survey data, we show that many Germans do not distinguish between hyperinflation and the Great Depression, but see them as two dimensions of the same crisis. They conflate Weimar economic history into one big crisis, encompassing both rapidly rising prices and mass unemployment. Additionally, more educated and politically interested Germans are more likely to commit this fallacy. Our finding thus nuances ideational explanations for Germany's economic policy stance in the European Union. Y1 - 2021 UR - https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12182 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12182 SN - 1468-0343 VL - 33 IS - 3 SP - 664 EP - 686 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Gnath, Katharina A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Deutschland und die Stabilität der Wirtschafts-und Währungsunion T2 - Handbuch zur deutschen Europapolitik N2 - Die Corona-Pandemie stellt die zweite große Bewährungsprobe für die Eurozone seit ihrem Bestehen dar. Nachdem die Wirtschafts-und Währungsunion (WWU) aus der Eurokrise der Jahre 2010 bis 2015 mit einigen Narben, aber doch weitestgehend intakt und handlungsfähig hervorgegangen ist, sah sie sich ab Anfang 2020 erneut einer potenziell existenzgefährdenden Krise ausgesetzt. Die Antworten, die die Mitgliedstaaten bis Ende Juli 2020 auf die Pandemie gefunden haben, unterscheiden sich von der Politik in der Eurokrise: Während der Fokus zur Krisenrettung zuvor auf der Vergabe von Krediten gegen Auflagen und einem punktuellen Umbau der Euro-Architektur im Bereich der Bankenaufsicht und-abwicklung lag, stand im Sommer 2020 ein umfassendes schuldenfinanziertes EU-Wiederaufbauinstrument im Zentrum der Krisenbekämpfung. Es ging nicht mehr um Kredite, sondern um gemeinsame … Y1 - 2021 UR - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783748909514-287/deutschland-und-die-stabilitaet-der-wirtschafts-und-waehrungsunion?page=1 SN - ISBN print: 978-3-8487-6852-3, ISBN online: 978-3-7489-0951-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748909514-287 SP - 287 EP - 300 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Hainbach, Natascha T1 - Flattening the Recession Curve - Comparing Initial Fiscal Responses to the Corona Crisis Across the EU N2 - While the ongoing pandemic affects all European economies, we show that it is likely to cause much more economic damage in some member states than in others. Early fiscal crisis responses by EU governments do not reflect these differences. If anything, countries which are likely to be especially vulnerable are currently committing fewer fiscal resources to fighting the economic fallout than others. A joint European policy response to share the fiscal burden of this crisis is, therefore, urgently needed. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-35161 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Bremer, Björn T1 - Geduldig am Abgrund N2 - Die EU-Mitgliedstaaten zögern weiter, eine wirklich europäische Antwort auf die Krise zu geben. Damit verspielen sie die derzeit breite öffentliche Zustimmung für europäischer Solidarität. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-35213 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Nguyen, Thu T1 - If not now, when? The German government should seize the opportunity that the Conference on the Future of Europe provides N2 - Last week, the Conference on the Future of Europe was concluded. Now far-reaching reform proposals are on the table. However, there is a great risk of these proposals petering out. The Russian war of aggression shows how urgently the EU needs reforms. The German government should therefore seize the opportunity presented by the Conference. First, it should take its own European policy ambitions seriously and join forces with France to push for treaty changes. Second, it must find pragmatic steps in the short term to develop a constructive agenda from the Conference proposals, even below the threshold of treaty change. KW - CoFoE, Treaty Reform, Bundesregierung Y1 - 2022 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-45271 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/when-if-not-now-the-conference-on-the-future-of-europe-as-a-european-policy-opportunity-for-the-german-government ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Jäger, Philipp T1 - New needs, new prices, same money - Why the EU must raise its game to combat the war’s economic fallout N2 - Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts EU economic policy making on the spot. At the beginning of the war, there was some uncertainty whether the combination of dampening growth, rising energy prices and new investment needs would warrant new common EU spending. However, in recent weeks the fog has cleared. It is now evident, that without additional common expenditures the EU risks undermining its common position towards Russia and that new money is needed to finance necessary investments in energy independence. KW - Russian War, Inflation, REPowerEU Y1 - 2022 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-45307 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/new-needs-same-money?Array=&cHash=8759da94162d39910cd9443139cc8013 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Wielding the Big Gun – What the ECB’s New Bond Purchasing Program Means for EU Governance N2 - With the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI), the ECB has significantly widened its toolbox. However, the implications of the new program go beyond monetary policy. By linking bond purchases to member states following the EU’s economic governance framework, the central bank has potentially increased the size of the gun the Commission and the Council can wield to incentivize compliance. But it has also made it much harder to pull the trigger. Without reforms, the new ECB program will therefore accentuate existing deficiencies of the rulebook. The onus is now on politics to change that. KW - Economic Governance, Inflation, ECB Y1 - 2022 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-45316 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/transmission-protection-instrument ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Jansen, Jannik A1 - Jäger, Philipp A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - For climate, profits, or resilience? Why, where and how the EU should respond to the Inflation Reduction Act N2 - The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has rekindled European fears of missing out in the global green technology race. However, EU member states still disagree on whether the greater risk lies in doing too much or too little. At heart, there remains significant confusion on which European sectors stand to lose competitiveness; how much the EU should fret about these losses; and whether there is a need for joint support from the EU level to avoid economic divergence. We take a first stab at the existing sectoral evidence. Our results suggest that the IRA will undercut European production costs in several sectors. This does not mean the EU must mimic the US program. However, it does mean that the EU needs to turn its piecemeal Green Deal Industrial Plan into a coherent strategy. This requires a greater focus on green industries in which Europe can develop a competitive edge and more joint financing at the EU level. Y1 - 2023 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/ira-europe-response ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Lindner, Johannes A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - "It’s the politics, stupid” - don't squander this golden opportunity for reforming the fiscal rules N2 - On the reform of fiscal rules, the EU risks letting a once-in-a-decade opportunity slip. The time window for a successful reform is tight. And the Commission's current proposal is economically sound but politically overconfident. This risks drawing the Commission into political fights it cannot win, and would repeat some of the mistakes of the last reform process. At the same, current rules remain impossible to apply. Those who romanticize the old framework therefore need to realize that a retreat to the old system is not an option. The EU thus needs a compromise and needs it fast. To get there in the little time left, we propose four improvements: first, the system needs some numerical benchmarks for debt reduction in the adjustment period; second, it should include a clear definition of the scope of possible deviations through growth-oriented reforms and investments; third it should come with explicit carve-outs for national expenditures linked to some EU programs; and fourth, it needs credible enforcement through better ownership not only at the national but also at the European level. Y1 - 2023 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/fiscal-rules-reform ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Lindner, Johannes A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Germany Needs a Europe Pact N2 - German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently presented a new “Germany-Pact” to advance the country, following media reporting that has portrayed Germany as the “sick man of Europe” due to its waning economy. However, as Johannes Lindner and Nils Redeker observe, Europe does not play a big role in this pact. In this op-ed, originally published in Handelsblatt, they explain why Germany should refocus on the EU single market and develop an overall strategy for modernising the country and Europe. Y1 - 2023 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/germany-needs-a-europe-pact N1 - This policy position is also available in German: Lindner, J., & Redeker, N. (2023). Deutschland braucht einen Europapakt. https://www.delorscentre.eu/de/publikationen/detail/publication/germany-needs-a-europe-pact ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Lindner, Johannes A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Gastkommentar: Warum Deutschland jetzt einen Europa-Pakt braucht JF - Handelsblatt N2 - Deutschland schwächelt und sollte sich wieder stärker auf den EU-Binnenmarkt konzentrieren, meinen Johannes Lindner und Nils Redeker. Sie fordern eine Modernisierungsstrategie. Y1 - 2023 UR - https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/gastbeitraege/gastkommentar-warum-deutschland-jetzt-einen-europa-pakt-braucht/29394152.html ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Chasing Shadows: What the Net Zero Industry Act Teaches Us About EU Industrial Policy N2 - The Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) was touted as the EU‘s big response to the US Inflation Reduction Act. After a year of negotiations, it will finally hit the legislative books. In his policy position, Nils Redeker analyses what has become of the EU‘s green industrial policy ambitions, what the NZIA teaches us about Europe‘s role in the clean tech race, and what the next Commission needs to do to formulate a constructive answer to the global return of industrial policy. Y1 - 2024 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/chasing-shadows-what-the-net-zero-industry-act-teaches-us-about-eu-industrial-policy ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Abou-Chadi, Tarik A1 - Jansen, Jannik A1 - Kollberg, Markus A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Debunking the Backlash - Uncovering European Voters' Climate Preferences N2 - The notion of a broad green backlash is set to dominate this year's European election campaign. Based on new survey data from more than 15.000 respondents in Germany, France and Poland, we show that it is largely overblown. A majority of voters still wish for a more ambitious climate policy and would support a raft of concrete measures to bring down emissions. However, supporting pivotal voters in the middle will require a stronger focus on green investment and industrial policy and offsetting measures for effective but unpopular policies like carbon pricing. Parties should not waste the coming months outbidding each other over how to cater to imagined climate fatigue but compete over concrete recipes to green the economy. Y1 - 2024 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/debunking-the-backlash-uncovering-european-voters-climate-preferences ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Jäger, Philipp A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Delivering on Draghi – How to finally get real about the EU’s clean industrial strategy N2 - With the Clean Industrial Deal (CID), the European Commission has pledged to finally get real about a common clean industrial policy. This would be a first. Previous attempts resulted in an industrial policy in name only. In practice, they suffered from a lack of sectoral focus, poor coordination across policy fields, and insufficient financial backing. New data from 280,000 state aid awards shows that of the €353 billion granted on the supply side since 2019, only 12% targeted sectors the EU identified as strategically important. To move beyond half-measures, the CID should now act fast and pragmatically on three fronts: First, it should clearly define what specific sectors to support and why. Second, rather than waiting for new coordination frameworks, it should deploy existing EU tools—such as trade policy, procurement rules, and regulation—to develop sector-specific strategies. And third, as our new data indicates that fragmentation risks in clean industries remain limited, it should make full use of state aid instruments to direct national subsidies toward priority industries. Y1 - 2025 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/delivering-on-draghi ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - How to defend Europe without risking another euro crisis N2 - Europe intends to rapidly and strongly increase its defense spending. It should do so without risking Europe’s fiscal sustainability and financial stability at a time of great danger. We argue that the Commission’s current plan to use the flexibility built in the EU’s fiscal rules will not achieve this: On the one hand, this will not lead to the long-term certainty over available resources for defense spending that is now needed. On the other hand, relying on the flexibility and in particular the use of the national escape clause would likely amount to an unplugging of the rules that could stoke strong market reactions. Therefore, the best way to create the necessary fiscal space is a targeted and temporary exemption of defense spending from the fiscal rules. We outline how this could be done through a change of the legal texts. Finally, we explain how common borrowing could complement a rule change if member states agree to pool decision-making powers in defense policy matters. Y1 - 2025 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/how-to-defend-europe-without-risking-another-euro-crisis ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Luft nach oben: Wieso die EU-Fiskalregeln Spielraum für eine Reform der Schuldenbremse lassen N2 - In Deutschland hat sich eine rege Debatte darüber entsponnen, ob und wie die Schuldenbremse zu reformieren sei, um wichtige Investitionsbedarfe stemmen zu können. Gegen eine Reform wird allerdings immer wieder vorgebracht, die gerade erst reformierten EU-Fiskalregeln seien für Deutschland im Ergebnis restriktiver als die Schuldenbremse. Träfe dies zu, wäre eine Reform der Schuldenbremse entweder wertlos oder aber der neu geschaffene Spielraum könnte nur zum Preis des Bruchs europäischer Regeln genutzt werden. In diesem Policy Brief untersuchen wir die Interaktion zwischen den EU-Fiskalregeln und der Schuldenbremse und kommen zu einem differenzierten Ergebnis: Erstens enthalten die europäischen Regeln systematisch mehr Spielraum für schuldenfinanzierte Ausgaben als die Schuldenbremse. Dieser zusätzliche Spielraum ergibt sich sowohl bei der Festlegung des mehrjährigen Ausgabenpfades wie auch danach bei der Überwachung der Regeln. Der Spielraum wächst zweitens dadurch, dass schuldenfinanzierte Ausgaben für die Stärkung von Wachstum und Wachstumspotenzial genutzt und sie von Reformen begleitet werden, die das Wachstumspotenzial anheben. Drittens beschränken die europäischen Regeln die Ausweitung konsumtiver Ausgaben deutlich. Eine Ausnahme hiervon bilden allerdings Verteidigungsausgaben. Y1 - 2024 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/de/publikationen/detail/publication/wieso-die-eu-fiskalregeln-spielraum-fuer-eine-reform-der-schuldenbremse-lassen PB - Jacques Delors Centre, Bertelsmann Stiftung ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Tordoir, Sander A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas T1 - How buy-European rules can help save Europe’s car industry N2 - Europe’s car industry faces a perfect storm. Chinese car exports are surging, European producers are being squeezed out of global markets, US tariffs are rising, and domestic demand remains 20% below pre-pandemic levels. Instead of sliding into a costly muddle of regulatory rollbacks, bailouts, and fragmented national subsidies, the EU should harness its single market - 450 million consumers and a vast corporate sector - to drive demand for Europe-made vehicles. That means co-ordinating consumer subsidies with a buy-European clause, applying it to both private and corporate fleets, and using it as a platform for reciprocal EV-subsidy agreements with trusted trade partners. A window for action is open: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain all need to renew their EV-support schemes in the coming months. Together, they represent 70% of EU car registrations—and could launch broader European coordination. Y1 - 2025 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/how-buy-european-rules-can-help-save-europes-car-industry PB - Bertelsmann Stiftung CY - Gütersloh ER -