TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Wolff, Guntram B. T1 - Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU JF - Public Choice N2 - We investigate the effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the finance minister in the budget process and deficits on interest rate spreads of Eurozone countries. Deficits significantly increase risk premia measured by relative swap spreads. The effect of deficits is significantly lower under EMU. This effect partly results from neglecting the role of fiscal institutions. After controlling for institutional changes, fiscal policy remains a significant determinant of risk premia in EMU. Better institutions are connected with lower risk premia. Furthermore deficits matter less for risk premia in countries with better institutions. Markets acknowledge that better institutions reduce fiscal difficulties rendering the monitoring of annual developments less important. KW - Budget institutions KW - Fiscal rules KW - Sovereign risk premia KW - EMU KW - Fiscal policy Y1 - 2008 VL - 136 IS - 3-4 SP - 379 EP - 396 ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Strauch, Rolf Rainer A1 - von Hagen, Jürgen T1 - Fiscal Governance in Europe N2 - This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Based on original research, the book classifies European Union countries from 1985 to 2004. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union. Y1 - 2009 SN - 9780521138260 N1 - Available as print and ebook in your Hertie Library. Als Druckversion und eBook in der Hertie Bibliothek verfügbar. PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - Cambridge [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Yläoutinen, Sami T1 - Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe JF - Journal of Public Policy N2 - This paper considers the effects of fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 1998-2008. The first part makes predictions about which form of fiscal governance fits which form of government. Under multi-party coalition governments, fiscal contracts where governments make political commitments to multi-annual fiscal plans work well. In countries where two political blocks face off against one another, delegation based around a strong finance ministry should be most effective. The second part examines electoral and party systems, which affect the form of government in place. The third part documents norms, rules, and institutions in place. The final section considers the joint effects of fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. On balance, the underlying political climate is crucial for determining what types of fiscal norms, institutions, and rules function best. The more countries diverge from their expected form of fiscal governance, the greater the increase in a country’s debt burden. KW - Budgetary procedures KW - Fiscal rules KW - Public finances Y1 - 2010 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X09990213 SN - 0143-814X N1 - Available as ejournal in your Hertie Library. Als elektronische Zeitschrift in der Hertie Bibliothek verfügbar. VL - 30 IS - 1 SP - 45 EP - 62 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Salazar-Morales, Diego A1 - Hallerberg, Mark ED - Spoon, Jae-Jae ED - Ringe, Nils T1 - Trilateral Competitive Interdependence: European and American Trade Policy Choices and the rise of China T2 - The European Union and Beyond: Multilevel-Governance, Institutions and Policymaking Y1 - 2020 SN - 9781785523359 PB - European Council of Political Research Press CY - Colchester ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Salazar-Morales, Diego A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - The Role of Fiscal Coordination and Partisanship in the Spanish Fiscal Federalist System: Lessons for European Union reforms N2 - An issue that the European Union continues to face is how to coordinate the economic and fiscal policies of its member states. Recent reforms that created the European Semester require additional information concerning member states’ fiscal plans for the Commission and Council to review more rigorously. Spain has developed similar provisions for its regions. In this paper, Mark Hallerberg and Diego Salazar-Morales consider the possible lessons arising from the emerging federation in Spain for the European framework. They analyse the performance of Spain’s fiscal federalist framework with a special emphasis on its coordination and political relationship with the autonomous regions. Their findings suggest that coordination agreements are negatively correlated with balances, indicating that such agreements are indicators of fiscal problems and also that they did not contribute to lower deficits. Moreover, they find that politics, rather than fiscal rules and frameworks, led to differing fiscal performance. The paper concludes with lessons from Spain’s experience for the European Union. KW - Spain KW - European Union KW - fiscal policy KW - coordination KW - shared goals Y1 - 2018 UR - https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Spanish-Fiscal-Federalism.pdf ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Wehner, Joachim A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Regimes, Leaders, and Lockdowns: Who Responded More Quickly to the COVID-19 Pandemic? JF - The Journal of Politics N2 - Do institutions or individuals shape policy in a crisis? We examine the timing of COVID-19 lockdowns in relation to regime type and leader characteristics. One view emphasizes institutional structure: were autocracies, with fewer constraints, quicker to lock down? Another highlights individual traits: did the speed of response depend on whether those in charge were doctors, scientists, women, or populists? Using a global dataset for 188 countries of political leaders and health ministers in office at the start of the pandemic, we find that democracies implemented lockdowns faster than autocracies. Individual traits of leaders mattered little, though countries with doctors heading health ministries were less likely to lock down—suggesting their presence may have helped hesitant leaders delay action. Our design addresses concerns about reciprocal causation and sample selection bias and proves robust to potential confounders. Political institutions, more than individual attributes, shaped the initial pandemic response KW - Democracy, Leaders, Pandemics, Public Health Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1086/739403 SN - 0022-3816 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ardanaz, Martín A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Scartascini, Carlos T1 - Fiscal consolidations and electoral outcomes in emerging economies: Does the policy mix matter? Macro and micro level evidence from Latin America JF - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - Do voters punish governments that introduce fiscal “austerity” measures? If so, does voter response vary according to the composition of fiscal adjustments? The empirical literature on the political economy of fiscal adjustments, which is mostly OECD-based, argues that consolidations do not have significant electoral consequences. In contrast, we find that voters punish fiscal consolidations at the polls in Latin America. To explain this result, we focus on the way fiscal adjustments episodes are implemented, both in terms of their design (taxes vs. spending) and timing. Such episodes rely fundamentally on increasing tax rates and bases of indirect taxes (such as the VAT) that hit broad segments of the population. Moreover, these policies are often implemented when politicians have no choice but to consolidate, that is, under severe economic circumstances. These macro results are corroborated with micro evidence from an original survey experiment that measures voter’s fiscal policy preferences over the business cycle in seven countries across Latin America. The experimental evidence shows that respondents prefer expenditure cuts to tax increases during downturns, which is the opposite of the type of consolidations that countries typically pursue. KW - Fiscal deficit, Taxes, Public expenditures, Business cycle, Elections Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101918 VL - Volume 64 IS - September 2020, 101918 ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Kucik, Jeffrey A1 - Mukherjee, Bumba T1 - Principles of International Political Economy N2 - Principles of International Political Economy is the only text to bridge the gap between the real world of politics underlying the international economy and the tools that researchers use to understand IPE. Utilizing a central theoretical framework, the book provides a systematic and widespread introduction to the standard topics covered in an IPE course. It also emphasizes the role of domestic and international institutions in IPE and incorporates several subject areas that are not covered well in other texts, including political determinants and consequences of financial crises; implications of the rise of the BRICs; international environmental politics; the political origins and effect of sovereign debt; and the politics of foreign aid and its effect on development, democracy, and human rights. KW - International Political Economy Y1 - 2019 SN - 978-0-19-979618-2 PB - Oxford University Press Inc CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Salazar-Morales, Diego A A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - The role of fiscal coordination and partisanship in the Spanish fiscal federalist system JF - Regional & Federal Studies N2 - During the euro crisis, the sustainability of Spain’s debt burden was called into question. By 2019, however, Spain had successfully navigated its own crisis and reduced its debt burden. What role did Spain’s emerging fiscal federal system play in this recovery? We analyze the performance of Spain’s fiscal federalist framework and how it affected the country’s budgetary balance, with a special emphasis on its coordination and on political relationships within the autonomous regions. Contrary to what advocates of the benefits of fiscal coordination argue, we find that coordination does not prevent the erosion of fiscal discipline in regions. Our results show that politics, rather than fiscal rules and frameworks, play an important role and have led to differing fiscal performance. In regions where incumbents were re-elected, coordination is employed to ensure more positive budgetary balances. Conversely, in regions with changing incumbents, coordination serves as an indicator of future fiscal problems. KW - Fiscal policy, coordination, shared goals, Spain, European Union Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/13597566.2021.1915778 VL - 32 IS - 5 SP - 617 EP - 639 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Baerg, Nicole A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Council Checks of the Commission under the European Semester: Does Member State Power and Euroscepticism Still Matter? JF - Journal of Common Market Studies N2 - The European Commission recommends evaluations of the economic plans of member states. The Council then provides final text. Previous research suggests that the Council selectively edits the Commission's recommendations. Both large member states and those with eurosceptic populations are likely to have the Council weaken what the Commission writes about them. We examine the determinants of the Council's editing of these texts after the introduction of the European Semester in the period 2011–18. We also account for different varieties of euroscepticism as the literature has become more differentiated. Using metrics of textual changes based on automated and hand-coding, we find little evidence of a systematic relationship between euroscepticism and textual editing. We do, however, find evidence that member state's voting power and euro status matters. Our findings suggest that eurosceptic no longer affects textual editing of such documents under the European Semester. KW - European Semester; Economic and Monetary Union; European Commission Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.13268 VL - 60 IS - 1 SP - 58 EP - 80 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark ED - Zürn, Michael T1 - Der Markt als Umverteilungsinstrument und die Rolle des Staates JF - Zur Kritik des liberalen Skripts: Innere Spannungen, gebrochene Versprechen und die Notwendigkeit der Selbsttransformation (Leviathan Sonderband) Y1 - 2024 UR - https://www.nomos-shop.de/en/p/zur-kritik-des-liberalen-skripts-gr-978-3-7560-1829-1 SN - ISBN 978-3-7560-1829-1 VL - Sonderband 42 SP - 216 EP - 239 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden ER -