TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Baerg, Nicole T1 - Explaining Instability in the Stability and Growth Pact The Contribution of Member State Power and Euroskepticism to the Euro Crisis JF - Comparative Political Studies N2 - The Stability and Growth Pact clearly failed to prevent the euro crisis. We contend that the failure was due largely to the ability of the Member States to undermine the Pact’s operation. The European Commission served as a “watchdog” to monitor fiscal performance. The Member States themselves, however, collectively had the ability to change the content of the reports for individual states. We confirm the expectation that powerful Member States had the most success in undermining the role of the Commission. Perhaps more surprisingly, we find supporting evidence for our argument that governments with euroskeptic populations behind them were also more successful in weakening the Commission’s warnings. These results have broader theoretical implications concerning which mechanisms explain country-specific outcomes under a shared rule. Another contribution is the creation of a new data set of European Commission assessments of Member State economic programs and Council of Minister revisions. Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016633230 SN - 1552-3829 VL - 49 IS - 7 SP - 968 EP - 1009 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Scartascini, Carlos T1 - When Do Governments Improve Fiscal Institutions? Lessons from Financial Crisis and Fiscal Reform in Latin America JF - Economia N2 - Do crises really lead to more institutional reforms? This paper explores the connection between financial crises and one type of reform frequently advocated during the recent global financial crisis, namely, fiscal institutional reforms. Some authors expect that crises lead to reforms, but we demonstrate that the relationship is not so straightforward. Using a data set of Latin American countries that experienced several crises and also several periods of reform in the period from 1990 to 2005, we find that the type of crisis and its duration matter. We argue that reforms are less likely during a banking crisis, whereas fiscal crises are most likely to lead to fiscal reforms. This means that the type of economic crisis is important for explaining the likelihood of reforms. We explore other possible explanations for reform, such as the partisanship of the president and whether a country is under an IMF program, and do not find confirming evidence for alternative explanations. Y1 - 2015 UR - https://www.jstor.org/stable/24570865?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents SN - 1529-7470 VL - 16 IS - 1 SP - 41 EP - 76 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Weber, Katja T1 - German Unification 1815-1871 and Its Relevance for Integration Theory JF - Journal of European Integration N2 - This paper reconsiders German unification during the period 1815-1871. First, it makes explicit the comparison between the German Empire and the European Union. Actors faced remarkably similar institution-building problems in both organisations. The second part of the paper evaluates the usefulness of three arguments from two theoretical traditions in European Union integration studies to explain the course of German unification. Following an analytic narrative approach, it considers the relevant actors and the relevant decision points to evaluate two versions of intergovernmentalism, one focused on the security concerns of actors and one focused on economic concerns, as well as neo-functionalism. Economic interests did play a role even in the geopolitically heavy 19th century. Neo-functionalism was less useful, although some structures like pan-German interest groups in support of further integration did develop as neo-functionalists would predict. Y1 - 2002 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/07036330290014633 SN - 1477-2280 VL - 24 IS - 1 SP - 1 EP - 21 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Weber, Katja T1 - Explaining variation in institutional integration in the European Union: why firms may prefer European solutions JF - Journal of European Public Policy N2 - We offer a theoretical framework that sheds light on firm preferences for more co-operative structures at the European level. We argue that the magnitude of external threat to the industry, combined with the level of the industry's transaction costs, plays a crucial role in determining firms' preferences for greater integration at the European level. Firms in industries where both the level of threat from abroad and transaction costs are high are likely to favor more binding institutions at the European level. To illustrate our argument we examine the institutional choices of EU-based firms in three different industrial sectors: aerospace, pharmaceuticals, and automobiles. Y1 - 2001 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/13501760110041532 SN - 1466-4429 VL - 8 IS - 2 SP - 171 EP - 191 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Roberts Clark, William T1 - Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy JF - American Political Science Review N2 - The literature on global integration and national policy autonomy often ignores a central result from open economy macroeconomics: Capital mobility constrains monetary policy when the exchange rate is fixed and fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible. Similarly, examinations of the electoral determinants of monetary and fiscal policy typically ignore international pressures altogether. We develop a formal model to analyze the interaction between fiscal and monetary policymakers under various exchange rate regimes and the degrees of central bank independence. We test the model using data from OECD countries. We find evidence that preelectoral monetary expansions occur only when the exchange rate is flexible and central bank independence is low; preelectoral fiscal expansions occur when the exchange rate is fixed. We then explore the implications of our model for arguments that emphasize the partisan sources of macroeconomic policy and for the conduct of fiscal policy after economic and monetary union in Europe. Y1 - 2000 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2307/2586015 SN - 1537-5943 VL - 94 IS - 2 SP - 323 EP - 346 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Basinger, Scott T1 - Globalization and Tax Reform: An Updated Case for the Importance of Veto Players JF - Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift Y1 - 1999 UR - https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/24199862.pdf?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents SN - 2364-9976 VL - 40 IS - 4 SP - 618 EP - 627 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Basinger, Scott T1 - Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries JF - Comparative Political Studies N2 - This article examines the role that economic and political factors played in tax reform in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from 1986 to 1990. Some writers argue that economic integration forced states to reform their tax systems. The authors' findings indicate that economic openness had an indirect effect on the level of change in marginal tax rates. The institutional structure of a country was most important—countries that had only one veto player or only one institution or party whose approval was necessary for a bill to become law enacted more sweeping reform than states that had more than one veto player. These results suggest that even when international or domestic economic factors might dictate a change in policy, reform will not be as sweeping in countries in which agreement among several institutions and/or parties is necessary. Y1 - 1998 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414098031003003 SN - 1552-3829 VL - 31 IS - 3 SP - 321 EP - 353 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Tax Competition in Wilhelmine Germany and Its Implications for the European Union JF - World Politics N2 - The twenty-five German states from 1871 to 1914 present a useful data set for examining how increasing economic integration affects tax policy. After German unification the national government collapsed six currencies into one and liberalized preexisting restrictions on capital and labor mobility. In contrast, the empire did not directly interfere in the making of state tax policy; while states transferred certain indirect taxes to the central government, they maintained their own autonomous tax and political systems through World War I. This paper examines the extent to which tax competition forced the individual state tax systems to converge from 1871 to 1914. In spite of a diversity of political systems, tax competition did require states to harmonize their rates on mobile factors like capital and high income labor, but it did not affect tax rates on immobile factors. In states where the political system guaranteed agricultural dominance, taxes on land were reduced, while in states with more open systems, tax rates remained higher. One unexpected result is that tax rates on capital and income converged upward instead of downward. The most dominant state, Prussia, served as the lowest-common-denominator state, but pressure from the national government, especially to increase expenditures, forced all states to raise their tax rates. These results suggest possible ways for the European Union to avoid a forced downward convergence of member state tax rates on capital and mobile labor. Y1 - 1996 UR - https://www.jstor.org/stable/25053969?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents SN - 0043-8871 VL - 48 IS - 3 SP - 324 EP - 357 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Anheier, Helmut K. A1 - Cingolani, Luciana A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Kaufmann, Sonja A1 - List, Regina T1 - Global Crise and Governance – Lessons, Implications, Recommendations T2 - The Governance Report 2018 N2 - The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008-9 was the greatest economic stress test since the 1940s. It put not only financial markets and currencies at risk; entire economies and political systems were threatened as the GFC soon revealed major governance shortcomings and weaknesses felt across a wide spectrum of policy fields. Globalization seemed in jeopardy, the Washington Consensus of neoliberal policies broken, and democratic backsliding set in as populism and protectionism began to take root. The GFC triggered many responses to improve governance through reforms and regulatory measures of many kinds across a wide range of fields: most prominently in finance and banking, but also in fiscal policy, trade, labor markets and social security. Ten years after the GFC, the 2018 Governance Report takes stock and asks: How have countries fared, and are they better prepared to avoid or withstand another crisis of GFC proportions? To answer this question, the 2018 Report focuses on the performance of countries before and after the GFC. Using elaborate indicator and data systems, applying state-of-the-art analytics, and covering a wide range of countries, it offers a systematic comparison of governance performance from three perspectives: What public goods are being provided, at what quality and to what effect? How ready are countries to address governance challenges in the context of globalization? What are the administrative capacities of the public sector? With measures taken before the GFC and today, these perspectives on governance performance provide important benchmarks for measuring both resilience and progress and can assist policymakers in designing effective solutions. KW - Governance Report Y1 - 2018 SN - 0198821492 SP - 105 EP - 118 PB - Oxford University Press CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Redonda, Agustin A1 - de Sarralde, Santiago Diaz A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Johnson, Lise A1 - Melamud, Ariel A1 - Rozemberg, Ricardo A1 - Schwab, Jakob A1 - von Haldenwang, Christian T1 - Tax Expenditure and the Treatment of Tax Incentives for Investment JF - Economics - The Open Access Open-Assessment E-Journal N2 - Governments use tax expenditures to boost investment, innovation and employment. However, these schemes are largely opaque, costly and often ineffective in reaching their stated goals. They also frequently trigger unwanted side effects. In order to improve the performance of these tools, we present three concrete policy proposals: First, governments should increase transparency on tax benefits. G20 members should take the lead on this with frequent and comprehensive tax expenditure reports. Second, G20 governments should improve the design of tax incentives with the aim of minimizing the generation of windfall profits and negative spillover effects within and across (in particular, on poorer) countries. Third, governments should phase out tax expenditures that are environmentally harmful, including tax incentives for fossil fuels and other schemes that promote an unsustainable use of natural resources. Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5018/economics-ejournal.ja.2019-12 VL - 13 IS - 2019-12 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Markgraf, Jonas T1 - The Corporate Governance of Public Banks before and after the Global Financial Crisis JF - Global Policy N2 - During the 2008–09 financial crisis, many states were forced to nationalize faltering private banks. But also public banks ran into trouble and market actors continue to worry about their stability and crisis resilience. During the crisis, German public Landesbanken and Spanish public Cajas were hit hard. Yet, German public Sparkassen emerged strengthened from the crisis. This calls for a closer examination of the regulatory framework and corporate governance of public banks. We compare how corporate governance choices affected the financial crisis performance of public banks in three countries. Italy that had privatized its extensive public banking sector over the past decades; Spain that had problems with its savings banks during the crisis, which were eventually privatized or shut down; and Germany whose public savings banks navigated the financial crisis relatively well while its public Landesbanken got into serious trouble, and where calls for privatizing public banks resurface periodically. The paper considers the question whether Italy's banking crisis is partly rooted in the legacies of its formerly public banks and how the privatization of public banks in Spain and Italy can inform the debate in Germany and in other European Union countries with significant public banking sectors. Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12562 SN - 1758-5899 VL - 9 IS - Special Issue SP - 43 EP - 53 ER - TY - JFULL A1 - Anheier, Helmut K. A1 - Eichengreen, Barry A1 - Lombardi, Domenico A1 - Malkin, Anton A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Markgraf, Jonas A1 - Zettelmeyer, Jeromin A1 - Knight, Malcolm D. A1 - Davies, Howard A1 - Zhivitskaya, Maria A1 - Véron, Nicolas A1 - Buchheit, Lee C. A1 - Gulati, G. Mitu A1 - Haley, James A. ED - Anheier, Helmut K. T1 - Ten Years after the Global Financial Crisis: Lessons Learned, Opportunities Missed T2 - Global Policy Y1 - 2018 VL - 9 IS - S1 SP - 1 EP - 79 PB - University of Durham and John Wiley & Sons, Ltd ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Salazar-Morales, Diego A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Shaping a New International Trade Order: Competition and Co-operation among the European Union, the United States, and China T2 - Dahrendorf Forum IV: Working Paper No. 12 N2 - Following the establishment of the World Trade Organisationin January 1995, American and European trade relationships werefor a timecharacterised by ‘competitive interdependence’,astheUS and EUsimultaneously aimedtoadvance their commercial interests inthird countries. Under conditions of competitive interdependence, trade actorsresort to certain policy choices to gain advantage for their producers while restricting others’ ability to enter a market (Sbragia, 2010).In the last decade, however, European and American trade policymakers have facedthe challenges of a more competitive world and the emergence of newer trade powers such as China. Both actors have veered away frommultilateral deals as their preferred trade policy choices. In this paper, weuse the Sbragia (2010) framework to analyse the trade policy shifts made bythe EU and the US in the last decade. We argue that what had been a competitive interdependence relationship has recently changed toa trilateral structure in which both the EU and the US have focused their attention on countering Chinese competition. Moreover, China’s emergence has also pushed the USto reinvigorate the role of unilateralism and the EU to bolsterbilateralism as they both seek to secure their commercial shares worldwide. Y1 - 2019 UR - https://www.dahrendorf-forum.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/Shaping-a-New-International-Trade-Order-Salazar-Morales-Hallerberg.pdf ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Scartascini, Carlos ED - Flores-Macías, Gustavo A. T1 - Particularistic Political Institutions and Tax Neutrality in Latin America T2 - The Political Economy of Taxation in Latin America Y1 - 2019 SN - 9781108655934 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108655934 SP - 144 EP - 171 PB - Cambridge University Press ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Yläoutinen, Sami T1 - Fiscal Governance in Central and Eastern Europe before and after European Union Accession: What Role Europeanisation? N2 - Our paper focuses on the development of fiscal institutions in Central and East European countries from 1998 to 2007. Following the Europeanisation literature as well as the expectations that the European Union established in its dialogue with prospective members through annual “Preaccession Economic Programmes,” one would anticipate that there would have been reform of fiscal institutions in the run-up to EU accession. Unlike in most other policy fields, there is an additional incentive to continue reform once a country has joined the EU, which is eurozone membership. This paper explains how we measure fiscal institutions and fiscal reforms. We provide time series data on the fiscal institutions each country has had in place, and, based on a new set of surveys and interviews we conducted, we compare the state of these fiscal institutions in 2007, or after the countries had acceded to the EU, with the institutions in place before accession. We find that preparations for the EU accession prior to 2004 did lead to some changes in budget process in this set of countries. The carrot of EMU membership after acceding to the EU, however, has so far not had the same effect--the pace of reform has since stalled, with most countries leaving the same fiscal institutions in place.In some countries further reforms to develop medium-term fiscal frameworks are either planned or are in a process of being initiated but it is too early to say if the reforms will truly materialise and transform the frameworks into a vehicle that would impose a serious constraint for government spending. T3 - Hertie School Working Papers Series - 37 Y1 - 2009 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-1667 PB - Hertie School of Governance CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Wolff, Guntram B. T1 - Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU JF - Public Choice N2 - We investigate the effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the finance minister in the budget process and deficits on interest rate spreads of Eurozone countries. Deficits significantly increase risk premia measured by relative swap spreads. The effect of deficits is significantly lower under EMU. This effect partly results from neglecting the role of fiscal institutions. After controlling for institutional changes, fiscal policy remains a significant determinant of risk premia in EMU. Better institutions are connected with lower risk premia. Furthermore deficits matter less for risk premia in countries with better institutions. Markets acknowledge that better institutions reduce fiscal difficulties rendering the monitoring of annual developments less important. KW - Budget institutions KW - Fiscal rules KW - Sovereign risk premia KW - EMU KW - Fiscal policy Y1 - 2008 VL - 136 IS - 3-4 SP - 379 EP - 396 ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Strauch, Rolf Rainer A1 - von Hagen, Jürgen T1 - Fiscal Governance in Europe N2 - This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Based on original research, the book classifies European Union countries from 1985 to 2004. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union. Y1 - 2009 SN - 9780521138260 N1 - Available as print and ebook in your Hertie Library. Als Druckversion und eBook in der Hertie Bibliothek verfügbar. PB - Cambridge Univ. Press CY - Cambridge [u.a.] ER -