TY - JOUR A1 - Gandrud, Christopher A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Deo, Sahil A1 - Franz, Christian T1 - Preventing German Bank Failures: Federalism and decisions to save troubled banks JF - Politische Vierteljahresschrift N2 - We examine government decisions to support troubled banks. Our contribution is the examination of how federalism can affect decisions to classify banks as systemically important. Whether a bank is viewed by politicians as ‘systemically important’ varies based on how its failure would affect supporters of the government. How a federation is designed has a strong influence on which banks are given public assistance. Where the top level of government is solely responsible for banks, there will be fewer systemically important institutions and so more banks will be allowed to fail. Where lower levels are responsible, governments will allow fewer failures. We use this approach to understand government support for failing banks in Germany. Our findings are relevant for the European Banking Union. Y1 - 2015 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15475 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/0032-3470-2015-2-159 SN - 0032-3470 VL - 56 IS - 2 SP - 159 EP - 181 PB - Westdt. Verl. CY - Köln [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bearce, David A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Democracy and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes JF - Economics and Politics Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00381.x SN - 0954-1985 VL - 23 IS - 2 SP - 172 EP - 194 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Fiscal federalism reforms in the European Union and the Greek crisis JF - European Union Politics Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116510387652 SN - 1465-1165 VL - 12 IS - 1 SP - 127 EP - 142 ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Scartascini, Carlos G. A1 - Stein, Ernesto Hugo T1 - Who decides the budget? : a political economy analysis of the budget process in Latin America T1 - Quienes deciden el presupuesto? La economía polítca del proceso presupuestario en américa Latina Y1 - 2009 SN - 1-59782-089-x SN - 978-1-59782-089-9*pbk PB - Inter-American Development Bank [u.a.] CY - Washington, DC [u.a.] ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Domestic Budgets in a United Europe : Fiscal Governance from the End of Bretton Woods to EMU Y1 - 2004 SN - 0801442710 PB - Cornell Univ. Press CY - Ithaca [u.a.] ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Döring, Herbert A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Patterns of parliamentary behavior : Passage of legislation across Western Europe Y1 - 2004 SN - 0-7546-3936-3 SN - 9780754639367 PB - Ashgate CY - Aldershot [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gandrud, Christopher A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Statistical Agencies and Responses to Financial Crises : Eurostat, Bad Banks and the ESM JF - West European Politics Y1 - 2016 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Stolfi, Francesco A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Clientelistic budget cycles: evidence from health policy in the Italian regions JF - Journal of European Public Policy Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1075577 SP - 1 EP - 18 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Focanti, Diego A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Scartascini, Carlos T1 - Tax Reforms in Latin America in an Era of Democracy IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-457 Y1 - 2013 UR - http://ssrn.com/abstract=2367703 UR - https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/4693 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Clark, William R. A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Keil, Manfred A1 - Willett, Thomas D. T1 - Measures of financial openness and interdependence JF - Journal of Financial Economic Policy Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1108/17576381211206497 SN - 1757-6385 VL - 4 IS - 1 SP - 58 EP - 75 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Burdekin, Richard C.K. A1 - Banaian, King A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Siklos, Pierre L. T1 - Fiscal and monetary institutions and policies: onward and upward? JF - Journal of Financial Economic Policy Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1108/17576381111182918 SN - 1757-6385 VL - 3 IS - 4 SP - 340 EP - 354 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Wehner, Joachim T1 - When do you get Economists as Policy-Makers? JF - British Journal of Political Science N2 - We analyze when economists become top-level “economic policy-makers”, focusing on financial crises and the partisanship of a country’s leader. We present a new dataset of the educational and occupational background of 1200 political leaders, finance ministers, and central bank governors from 40 developed democracies from 1973 to 2010. We find that left leaders appoint economic policy-makers who are more highly trained in economics and finance ministers who are less likely to have private finance backgrounds but more likely to be former central bankers. Finance ministers appointed during financial crises are less likely to have a financial services background. A leader’s exposure to economics training is also related to appointments. This suggests one crucial mechanism for affecting economic policy is through the selection of certain types of economic policy-makers. Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000801 SN - 1469-2112 SP - 1 EP - 13 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Gandrud, Christopher T1 - The Measurement of Real-Time Perceptions of Financial Stress: Implications for Political Science JF - British Journal of Political Science N2 - How do politicians and voters respond to financial market stress, and with what political effects? Previous research addressing these questions lacks a crucial variable: a continuous, real-time indicator of the level of financial market stress that policy makers and voters perceived. We need a measure of actors’contemporary perceptions of financial market conditions to understand why they made a given choice and with what effects. Previous binary crisis measures are constructed post hoc, so tend to be biased towards severe crises and away from circumstances in which governments effectively responded to emerging trouble. As such, they suffer from clear selection bias. Annual post hoc measures do not necessarily capture conditions as they were perceived at the time of events such as elections. As dichotomous indicators, they do not measure crisis severity or how it varies over time. They use ad hoc methods to determine when crises have ended. Previous continuous measures of financial market stress are less common and suffer from other problems. They capture quantities whose importance, measurement, and reporting varies significantly across countries and over time. To overcome these issues, we develop a continuous measure of real-time perceptions of financial market stress with a kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) of detailed qualitative data, namely monthly Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) reports. We call it the EIU Perceptions of Financial Market Stress Index, or FinStress for short. FinStress enables new political research possibilities. As a continuous measure, it could be used to examine which policies can effectively prevent or reduce extreme stress, and which political conditions are conducive to implementing these policies. As a comparable continuous monthly indicator, FinStress could be used to test hypotheses that rely on sub-annual data and follow the intensity of stress over time. Here we provide examples for studying the impact of financial market stress on voters’choices and on revisions to European Union government budget figures. We thus contribute to the wider methodological toolkit by showing how KPCA can be used to summarize vast quantities of similarly formatted qualitative texts into continuous cross-sectional time-series indicators. Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000291 SP - 1 EP - 13 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Gandrud, Christopher T1 - Explaining variation and change in supervisory confidentiality in the European Union JF - West European Politics N2 - Some European Union member states’ financial regulators choose to make some of the data they routinely collect on individual banks publicly available. Others treat this data as confidential. What explains this difference? This paper considers the possible effects of crises, path-dependent legal institutions, and the design of deposit insurance schemes. At the national level, the paper focuses on contrasting German and Dutch cases. After the recent economic crisis, the Dutch released more data while the German authorities maintained strict confidentiality rules. The design of deposit insurance schemes provides a key reason why the level of secrecy varies, with the Dutch move from an ex post to an ex ante scheme where the government served as the ultimate backstop leading to questions about the accounts of individual banks while the German system favoured continued secrecy. The paper also describes the level of transparency at the EU level. Multilevel legal restrictions and bureaucratic capacity tilt EU banking union practices towards member states that treat financial supervisory data as confidential. Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2017.1389421 SN - 0140-2382 N1 - Published online: 06 Nov 2017 VL - 41 IS - 4, Secrecy in Europe SP - 1025 EP - 1048 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Fiscal Governance and Fiscal Outcomes under EMU before and after the Crisis T2 - The Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis Y1 - 2016 SN - 9780198755739 PB - Oxford University Press CY - Oxford ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Strauch, Rolf A1 - von Hagen, Jürgen T1 - The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries JF - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the main pattern of budgetary institutions and their determinants across the EU 15 member states. Empirical evidence for the time period 1985–2004 suggests that the centralisation of budgeting procedures restrains public debt. In countries with one-party governments or coalition governments where parties are closely aligned and where political competition among them is low, this is achieved by the delegation of decision-making power to the minister of finance. Fiscal contracts that require countries to set multi-year targets and that reinforce those targets increase fiscal discipline in countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions and where parties regularly compete against each other. Y1 - 2007 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.11.005 SN - 1873-5703 VL - 23 IS - 2 SP - 338 EP - 359 ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Hallerberg, Mark ED - Ayuso-i-Casals, Joaquim ED - Deroose, Servaas ED - Flores, Elena ED - Moulin, Laurent T1 - Who Provides Signals to Voters about Government Competence on Fiscal Matters? The Importance of Independent Watchdogs T2 - Policy Instruments for Sound Fiscal Policies N2 - The Maastricht Treaty set a series of convergence criteria that Member States have to meet to join the euro area. The Treaty is not specific, however, about how to prevent free-riding fiscal behaviour once Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is in place. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) represents an institutional response.1 Its design includes preventive and corrective mechanisms. The emphasis for the preventive arm rests on the monitoring of Member State behaviour. Euro-area Member States produce Stability Programme updates yearly in the autumn. The European Commission, for its part, assesses the programmes and makes recommendations to the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (henceforth ‘ECOFIN’) on whether the programmes meet European fiscal objectives, which in particular includes the achievement of budget positions ‘close to balance or in surplus’. In order to move to the formal corrective arm of the Pact, a Member State would have to be found to have an ‘excessive deficit’. Y1 - 2007 SN - 978-0-230-27179-1 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230271791_11 PB - Palgrave Macmillan CY - London ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Basinger, scott T1 - Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom JF - American Political Science Review N2 - This paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital, using the analogy of a “tournament” as a substitute for the ”race-to-the-bottom” model. Our key insight is that political costs that accompany legislating have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood and scale of reforms. While countries with higher political costs are less likely themselves to enact reforms, the presence of these costs also reduces competing countries' incentives to reform regardless of their own political costs. Domestic politics therefore mitigates the pressures for downward convergence of tax policy despite increased capital mobility. We examine the capital tax policies in OECD countries during the period from 1980 to 1997 and find that states are sensitive to tax reforms in competitor countries, although their responses to reforms are mediated by their own domestic costs to reform. We define two potential sources of political costs of reform: transaction costs, due to the presence of multiple veto players in the legislative process, and constituency costs, due to ideological opposition to policy changes that benefit capital. Our evidence reveals that a reduction in these costs either domestically or abroad increases the likelihood that a country enacts tax reforms. Y1 - 2004 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404001133 SN - 1537-5943 VL - 98 IS - 2 SP - 261 EP - 276 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Marier, Patrik T1 - Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries JF - American Journal of Political Science N2 - Recent scholarship on budgeting in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries indicates that political institutions impact the level of budget discipline. Building upon this previous research, we argue that the principal problem that must be addressed in both the government and the legislature to insure strong fiscal discipline is the common pool resource (CPR) problem. At the cabinet level, the CPR problem arises because ministers consider the implications of decisions on their ministries only. The level of the CPR problem in the legislature depends upon the electoral system. Using a data set of LAC countries for the period 1988–97, we find that executive power in the budget process is most effective in reducing budget deficits when electoral incentives for the personal vote is high in the legislature, while strengthening the president (or prime minister) in countries where the personal vote is low in the legislature has no effect. Y1 - 2004 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00088.x SN - 1540-5907 VL - 48 IS - 3 SP - 571 EP - 587 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Strauch, Rolf A1 - von Hagen, Jürgen T1 - Budgeting in Europe after Maastrichtpatterns of reform and their effectiveness JF - Hacienda Publica Espanola N2 - Este trabajo analiza el desarrollo de las reglas e instituciones fiscales en los países europeos durante la última década. Hallamos que el grado de cambios de los procesos presupuestarios y de las reglas fiscales difiere mucho entre los distintos países. Se evalúa el patrón de los cambios con respecto a los diferentes tipos ideales de gobernabilidad fiscal. Nuestro análisis muestra que los países que adoptan reglas en consonancia con sus instituciones fiscales predichas consiguen mayores logros en el plano fiscal que otras naciones que no hacen eso. Tenemos, pues, una explicación parcial de por qué razón el efecto del marco fiscal europeo ha sido asimétrico en relación con los países miembros. Y1 - 2004 UR - https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=1112074 SN - 0210-1173 SP - 203 EP - 228 ET - Nº Extra 2004 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions JF - International Organization N2 - I argue that two types of veto players matter in the choice of monetary institutions: party veto players and subnational governments, which are strong in federal systems but weak in unitary systems. A crucial issue is whether voters can readily identify the manipulation of the economy with party players. A second issue concerns the national party veto player's ability to control either fiscal or monetary policy. In one-party unitary governments identification and control are clear; parties where such governments are common prefer flexible exchange rates and dependent central banks. In multiparty coalition governments in unitary systems, identification is traditionally difficult, and the ability to target benefits to specific constituencies under fiscal policy makes fiscal policy autonomy more attractive for coalition governments. Such governments prefer central banks that are politically independent but that finance government debt. Under federalism, parties that constitute the central government have less control over fiscal policy and they prefer flexible exchange rates. Subnational governments do not support a dependent central bank that gives more power to the central government. Y1 - 2002 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760403775 SN - 1531-5088 VL - 56 IS - 4 SP - 775 EP - 802 ER -