TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Copelovitch, Mark A1 - Gandrud, Christopher T1 - Financial Data Transparency, International Institutions, and Sovereign Borrowing Costs JF - International Studies Quarterly N2 - Recent events in international finance illustrate the close connection between the viability of a country's major private financial institutions and the sustainability of its sovereign debt. We explore the precise nature of this connection and the ways in which it shapes investors’ expectations of sovereign creditworthiness. We consider how investors use the overall level of information available about the private financial sector—and the potential risks it poses to government finances—when making decisions about investing in sovereign debt. We expect that governments providing more information about the private financial sector will have lower, and less volatile, borrowing costs. In order to test this argument, we create a new Financial Data Transparency (FDT) Index measuring governments’ willingness to release credible financial system data. Using the FDT and a sample of high-income OECD countries, we find that such transparency reduces sovereign borrowing costs. The effects are conditional on the level of public indebtedness. Transparent countries with low debt enjoy lower and less volatile borrowing costs. Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqx082 SN - 1468-2478 VL - 62 IS - 1 SP - 23 EP - 41 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gandrud, Christopher A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - When all is said and done: updating “Elections, special interests, and financial crisis” JF - Research and Politics N2 - How do elections affect the costliness of financial crises to taxpayers? Previous research contends that more electorally competitive countries choose policies that are less costly to taxpayers. In this paper, we update Keefer’s seminal 2007 article published in International Organization with revised data. The original article found that more electorally competitive countries had lower fiscal costs from responding to crises. The commonly used IMF/World Bank data set Keefer employed has since been extensively corrected and expanded. We update the original analysis with the newest version of this data set. After doing so, we find no evidence for an association between electoral competitiveness and the fiscal costs of responding to financial crises both within the original sample and outside of it. Our update highlights a broader methodological lesson: that the costs of responding to financial crises can take many years to be settled. Future research should explicitly address and model this delayed cost resolution. KW - Financial crisis KW - Fiscal policy KW - Electoral competitiveness Y1 - 2015 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15509 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168015589335 SN - 2053-1680 VL - 2 IS - 3 SP - 1 EP - 9 PB - Sage CY - London [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gandrud, Christopher A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Does Banking Union Worsen the EU’s Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency JF - Journal of Common Market Studies N2 - Does banking union exacerbate the European Union’s democratic deficit? Using Scharpf’s ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy concepts, it is argued in this article that its design does worsen the democratic deficit. There are good reasons to limit ‘input legitimacy’ for politically independent institutions. ‘Output legitimacy’ is then even more relevant. Transparency is a key part of ‘output legitimacy’. It enables actors to judge whether the regulator is acting in the public’s interest and can improve their outputs. This article focuses on the banking data that the supervisors collect. Data available to the European public is evaluated and compared to America’s banking union. European practices are not comparable in terms of availability or detail. An original survey of relevant officials is conducted, which results in the finding that only 11 of 28 Member States release any information on the banks they supervise. Both EU and national supervisors should provide publicly available, timely and consistent individual bank data. Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12226 SN - 0021-9886 SN - 1468-5965 VL - 53 IS - 4 SP - 769 EP - 785 PB - Blackwell CY - Oxford [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gandrud, Christopher A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Deo, Sahil A1 - Franz, Christian T1 - Preventing German Bank Failures: Federalism and decisions to save troubled banks JF - Politische Vierteljahresschrift N2 - We examine government decisions to support troubled banks. Our contribution is the examination of how federalism can affect decisions to classify banks as systemically important. Whether a bank is viewed by politicians as ‘systemically important’ varies based on how its failure would affect supporters of the government. How a federation is designed has a strong influence on which banks are given public assistance. Where the top level of government is solely responsible for banks, there will be fewer systemically important institutions and so more banks will be allowed to fail. Where lower levels are responsible, governments will allow fewer failures. We use this approach to understand government support for failing banks in Germany. Our findings are relevant for the European Banking Union. Y1 - 2015 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15475 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/0032-3470-2015-2-159 SN - 0032-3470 VL - 56 IS - 2 SP - 159 EP - 181 PB - Westdt. Verl. CY - Köln [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bearce, David A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Democracy and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes JF - Economics and Politics Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00381.x SN - 0954-1985 VL - 23 IS - 2 SP - 172 EP - 194 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Fiscal federalism reforms in the European Union and the Greek crisis JF - European Union Politics Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116510387652 SN - 1465-1165 VL - 12 IS - 1 SP - 127 EP - 142 ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Scartascini, Carlos G. A1 - Stein, Ernesto Hugo T1 - Who decides the budget? : a political economy analysis of the budget process in Latin America T1 - Quienes deciden el presupuesto? La economía polítca del proceso presupuestario en américa Latina Y1 - 2009 SN - 1-59782-089-x SN - 978-1-59782-089-9*pbk PB - Inter-American Development Bank [u.a.] CY - Washington, DC [u.a.] ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Domestic Budgets in a United Europe : Fiscal Governance from the End of Bretton Woods to EMU Y1 - 2004 SN - 0801442710 PB - Cornell Univ. Press CY - Ithaca [u.a.] ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Döring, Herbert A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Patterns of parliamentary behavior : Passage of legislation across Western Europe Y1 - 2004 SN - 0-7546-3936-3 SN - 9780754639367 PB - Ashgate CY - Aldershot [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gandrud, Christopher A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Statistical Agencies and Responses to Financial Crises : Eurostat, Bad Banks and the ESM JF - West European Politics Y1 - 2016 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Stolfi, Francesco A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Clientelistic budget cycles: evidence from health policy in the Italian regions JF - Journal of European Public Policy Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1075577 SP - 1 EP - 18 ER -