TY - JOUR A1 - Gandrud, Christopher A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - When all is said and done: updating “Elections, special interests, and financial crisis” JF - Research and Politics N2 - How do elections affect the costliness of financial crises to taxpayers? Previous research contends that more electorally competitive countries choose policies that are less costly to taxpayers. In this paper, we update Keefer’s seminal 2007 article published in International Organization with revised data. The original article found that more electorally competitive countries had lower fiscal costs from responding to crises. The commonly used IMF/World Bank data set Keefer employed has since been extensively corrected and expanded. We update the original analysis with the newest version of this data set. After doing so, we find no evidence for an association between electoral competitiveness and the fiscal costs of responding to financial crises both within the original sample and outside of it. Our update highlights a broader methodological lesson: that the costs of responding to financial crises can take many years to be settled. Future research should explicitly address and model this delayed cost resolution. KW - Financial crisis KW - Fiscal policy KW - Electoral competitiveness Y1 - 2015 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15509 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168015589335 SN - 2053-1680 VL - 2 IS - 3 SP - 1 EP - 9 PB - Sage CY - London [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gandrud, Christopher A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Does Banking Union Worsen the EU’s Democratic Deficit? The Need for Greater Supervisory Data Transparency JF - Journal of Common Market Studies N2 - Does banking union exacerbate the European Union’s democratic deficit? Using Scharpf’s ‘input’ and ‘output’ legitimacy concepts, it is argued in this article that its design does worsen the democratic deficit. There are good reasons to limit ‘input legitimacy’ for politically independent institutions. ‘Output legitimacy’ is then even more relevant. Transparency is a key part of ‘output legitimacy’. It enables actors to judge whether the regulator is acting in the public’s interest and can improve their outputs. This article focuses on the banking data that the supervisors collect. Data available to the European public is evaluated and compared to America’s banking union. European practices are not comparable in terms of availability or detail. An original survey of relevant officials is conducted, which results in the finding that only 11 of 28 Member States release any information on the banks they supervise. Both EU and national supervisors should provide publicly available, timely and consistent individual bank data. Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/jcms.12226 SN - 0021-9886 SN - 1468-5965 VL - 53 IS - 4 SP - 769 EP - 785 PB - Blackwell CY - Oxford [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gandrud, Christopher A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Deo, Sahil A1 - Franz, Christian T1 - Preventing German Bank Failures: Federalism and decisions to save troubled banks JF - Politische Vierteljahresschrift N2 - We examine government decisions to support troubled banks. Our contribution is the examination of how federalism can affect decisions to classify banks as systemically important. Whether a bank is viewed by politicians as ‘systemically important’ varies based on how its failure would affect supporters of the government. How a federation is designed has a strong influence on which banks are given public assistance. Where the top level of government is solely responsible for banks, there will be fewer systemically important institutions and so more banks will be allowed to fail. Where lower levels are responsible, governments will allow fewer failures. We use this approach to understand government support for failing banks in Germany. Our findings are relevant for the European Banking Union. Y1 - 2015 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15475 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/0032-3470-2015-2-159 SN - 0032-3470 VL - 56 IS - 2 SP - 159 EP - 181 PB - Westdt. Verl. CY - Köln [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bearce, David A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Democracy and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes JF - Economics and Politics Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00381.x SN - 0954-1985 VL - 23 IS - 2 SP - 172 EP - 194 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Fiscal federalism reforms in the European Union and the Greek crisis JF - European Union Politics Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116510387652 SN - 1465-1165 VL - 12 IS - 1 SP - 127 EP - 142 ER - TY - BOOK A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Scartascini, Carlos G. A1 - Stein, Ernesto Hugo T1 - Who decides the budget? : a political economy analysis of the budget process in Latin America T1 - Quienes deciden el presupuesto? La economía polítca del proceso presupuestario en américa Latina Y1 - 2009 SN - 1-59782-089-x SN - 978-1-59782-089-9*pbk PB - Inter-American Development Bank [u.a.] CY - Washington, DC [u.a.] ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Gandrud, Christopher A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Statistical Agencies and Responses to Financial Crises : Eurostat, Bad Banks and the ESM JF - West European Politics Y1 - 2016 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Stolfi, Francesco A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Clientelistic budget cycles: evidence from health policy in the Italian regions JF - Journal of European Public Policy Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2015.1075577 SP - 1 EP - 18 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Focanti, Diego A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Scartascini, Carlos T1 - Tax Reforms in Latin America in an Era of Democracy IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-457 Y1 - 2013 UR - http://ssrn.com/abstract=2367703 UR - https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/4693 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Clark, William R. A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Keil, Manfred A1 - Willett, Thomas D. T1 - Measures of financial openness and interdependence JF - Journal of Financial Economic Policy Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1108/17576381211206497 SN - 1757-6385 VL - 4 IS - 1 SP - 58 EP - 75 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Burdekin, Richard C.K. A1 - Banaian, King A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Siklos, Pierre L. T1 - Fiscal and monetary institutions and policies: onward and upward? JF - Journal of Financial Economic Policy Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1108/17576381111182918 SN - 1757-6385 VL - 3 IS - 4 SP - 340 EP - 354 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Yläoutinen, Sami T1 - Fiscal Governance in Central and Eastern Europe before and after European Union Accession: What Role Europeanisation? N2 - Our paper focuses on the development of fiscal institutions in Central and East European countries from 1998 to 2007. Following the Europeanisation literature as well as the expectations that the European Union established in its dialogue with prospective members through annual “Preaccession Economic Programmes,” one would anticipate that there would have been reform of fiscal institutions in the run-up to EU accession. Unlike in most other policy fields, there is an additional incentive to continue reform once a country has joined the EU, which is eurozone membership. This paper explains how we measure fiscal institutions and fiscal reforms. We provide time series data on the fiscal institutions each country has had in place, and, based on a new set of surveys and interviews we conducted, we compare the state of these fiscal institutions in 2007, or after the countries had acceded to the EU, with the institutions in place before accession. We find that preparations for the EU accession prior to 2004 did lead to some changes in budget process in this set of countries. The carrot of EMU membership after acceding to the EU, however, has so far not had the same effect--the pace of reform has since stalled, with most countries leaving the same fiscal institutions in place.In some countries further reforms to develop medium-term fiscal frameworks are either planned or are in a process of being initiated but it is too early to say if the reforms will truly materialise and transform the frameworks into a vehicle that would impose a serious constraint for government spending. T3 - Hertie School Working Papers Series - 37 Y1 - 2009 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-1667 PB - Hertie School of Governance CY - Berlin ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Wolff, Guntram B. T1 - Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU JF - Public Choice N2 - We investigate the effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the finance minister in the budget process and deficits on interest rate spreads of Eurozone countries. Deficits significantly increase risk premia measured by relative swap spreads. The effect of deficits is significantly lower under EMU. This effect partly results from neglecting the role of fiscal institutions. After controlling for institutional changes, fiscal policy remains a significant determinant of risk premia in EMU. Better institutions are connected with lower risk premia. Furthermore deficits matter less for risk premia in countries with better institutions. Markets acknowledge that better institutions reduce fiscal difficulties rendering the monitoring of annual developments less important. KW - Budget institutions KW - Fiscal rules KW - Sovereign risk premia KW - EMU KW - Fiscal policy Y1 - 2008 VL - 136 IS - 3-4 SP - 379 EP - 396 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Yläoutinen, Sami T1 - Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe JF - Journal of Public Policy N2 - This paper considers the effects of fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 1998-2008. The first part makes predictions about which form of fiscal governance fits which form of government. Under multi-party coalition governments, fiscal contracts where governments make political commitments to multi-annual fiscal plans work well. In countries where two political blocks face off against one another, delegation based around a strong finance ministry should be most effective. The second part examines electoral and party systems, which affect the form of government in place. The third part documents norms, rules, and institutions in place. The final section considers the joint effects of fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. On balance, the underlying political climate is crucial for determining what types of fiscal norms, institutions, and rules function best. The more countries diverge from their expected form of fiscal governance, the greater the increase in a country’s debt burden. KW - Budgetary procedures KW - Fiscal rules KW - Public finances Y1 - 2010 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0143814X09990213 SN - 0143-814X N1 - Available as ejournal in your Hertie Library. Als elektronische Zeitschrift in der Hertie Bibliothek verfügbar. VL - 30 IS - 1 SP - 45 EP - 62 ER -