TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Basinger, scott T1 - Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom JF - American Political Science Review N2 - This paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital, using the analogy of a “tournament” as a substitute for the ”race-to-the-bottom” model. Our key insight is that political costs that accompany legislating have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood and scale of reforms. While countries with higher political costs are less likely themselves to enact reforms, the presence of these costs also reduces competing countries' incentives to reform regardless of their own political costs. Domestic politics therefore mitigates the pressures for downward convergence of tax policy despite increased capital mobility. We examine the capital tax policies in OECD countries during the period from 1980 to 1997 and find that states are sensitive to tax reforms in competitor countries, although their responses to reforms are mediated by their own domestic costs to reform. We define two potential sources of political costs of reform: transaction costs, due to the presence of multiple veto players in the legislative process, and constituency costs, due to ideological opposition to policy changes that benefit capital. Our evidence reveals that a reduction in these costs either domestically or abroad increases the likelihood that a country enacts tax reforms. Y1 - 2004 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055404001133 SN - 1537-5943 VL - 98 IS - 2 SP - 261 EP - 276 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Marier, Patrik T1 - Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries JF - American Journal of Political Science N2 - Recent scholarship on budgeting in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries indicates that political institutions impact the level of budget discipline. Building upon this previous research, we argue that the principal problem that must be addressed in both the government and the legislature to insure strong fiscal discipline is the common pool resource (CPR) problem. At the cabinet level, the CPR problem arises because ministers consider the implications of decisions on their ministries only. The level of the CPR problem in the legislature depends upon the electoral system. Using a data set of LAC countries for the period 1988–97, we find that executive power in the budget process is most effective in reducing budget deficits when electoral incentives for the personal vote is high in the legislature, while strengthening the president (or prime minister) in countries where the personal vote is low in the legislature has no effect. Y1 - 2004 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00088.x SN - 1540-5907 VL - 48 IS - 3 SP - 571 EP - 587 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Strauch, Rolf A1 - von Hagen, Jürgen T1 - Budgeting in Europe after Maastrichtpatterns of reform and their effectiveness JF - Hacienda Publica Espanola N2 - Este trabajo analiza el desarrollo de las reglas e instituciones fiscales en los países europeos durante la última década. Hallamos que el grado de cambios de los procesos presupuestarios y de las reglas fiscales difiere mucho entre los distintos países. Se evalúa el patrón de los cambios con respecto a los diferentes tipos ideales de gobernabilidad fiscal. Nuestro análisis muestra que los países que adoptan reglas en consonancia con sus instituciones fiscales predichas consiguen mayores logros en el plano fiscal que otras naciones que no hacen eso. Tenemos, pues, una explicación parcial de por qué razón el efecto del marco fiscal europeo ha sido asimétrico en relación con los países miembros. Y1 - 2004 UR - https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=1112074 SN - 0210-1173 SP - 203 EP - 228 ET - Nº Extra 2004 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions JF - International Organization N2 - I argue that two types of veto players matter in the choice of monetary institutions: party veto players and subnational governments, which are strong in federal systems but weak in unitary systems. A crucial issue is whether voters can readily identify the manipulation of the economy with party players. A second issue concerns the national party veto player's ability to control either fiscal or monetary policy. In one-party unitary governments identification and control are clear; parties where such governments are common prefer flexible exchange rates and dependent central banks. In multiparty coalition governments in unitary systems, identification is traditionally difficult, and the ability to target benefits to specific constituencies under fiscal policy makes fiscal policy autonomy more attractive for coalition governments. Such governments prefer central banks that are politically independent but that finance government debt. Under federalism, parties that constitute the central government have less control over fiscal policy and they prefer flexible exchange rates. Subnational governments do not support a dependent central bank that gives more power to the central government. Y1 - 2002 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1162/002081802760403775 SN - 1531-5088 VL - 56 IS - 4 SP - 775 EP - 802 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - The political economy of taxation in Prussia, 1871-1914 JF - Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte N2 - This paper examines the political economy of taxation in the Bundesstaat of Prussia during the Kaiserreich period. It examines how different factors of production with different levels of relative mobility, organized roughly along party lines, interacted with one another on taxation issues. It pays particular attention to the institutional composition of the Prussian state and how the institutions affected the mix of taxes the state levied. In particular, several elements of Prussia's electoral system, including the use of a three-class system, the distribution of electoral districts, and an indirect vote, guaranteed that large agricultural landowners would hold most of the power in spite of increasing industrialization. The parliament therefore consistently changed the tax code to reduce the burden on large agriculture. Y1 - 2002 UR - https://www.jstor.org/stable/3088405?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents SN - 0075-2800 VL - 2002 IS - 2 SP - 11 EP - 33 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Strauch, Rolf T1 - On the Cyclicality of Public Finances in Europe JF - Empirica N2 - Under EMU, monetary policy is oriented toward the euro area as a whole and fiscal policy is an important instrument remaining in the hands of national governments to cushion economic shocks to individual countries. The current paper analyses the cyclical pattern of public finances in Europe and addresses the question of whether fiscal policies have been geared towards this stabilising role. Although taxes fluctuate countercyclically in a conventional manner, we find that discretionary measures have tended to undermine automatic stabilisers. On the expenditure side, we find that public investment also displays a consistent procyclical pattern. Dynamic analysis reveals that a permanent shock to output induces asynchronous fluctuations in taxes and expenditures in the year of the shock and in periods thereafter. Finally, we examine political and institutional factors. The political fragmentation of the government as well as the partisan hue of the government do not interfere with the cyclical response of public finances, but we do find evidence of a pronounced electoral cycle. Y1 - 2002 UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1020299609077 SN - 1573-6911 VL - 29 IS - 3 SP - 183 EP - 207 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark T1 - Fiscal Policy in the European Union JF - European Union Politics Y1 - 2002 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116502003002001 SN - 1741-2757 VL - 3 IS - 2 SP - 139 EP - 150 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Vinhas de Souza, Lucio A1 - Roberts Clark, William T1 - Political Business Cycles in EU Accession Countries JF - European Union Politics N2 - This paper considers whether political business cycles existed in East European accession countries during the period 1990-9. Based on the Mundell-Fleming model expanded in Clark and Hallerberg (2000), we argue that the type of exchange rate regime and the relative independence of the central bank affects the instruments governments use to influence the economy before elections. In our empirical analysis, we find that accession countries with dependent central banks and flexible exchange rates have looser monetary policies in electoral periods than in non-electoral periods. If a country has a fixed exchange rate regime, it manipulates its economy in election years through running larger budgets instead of through looser monetary policy. The presence of such cycles in Eastern Europe has implications for the introduction of the euro in EU accession countries. Y1 - 2002 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116502003002005 SN - 1741-2757 VL - 3 IS - 2 SP - 231 EP - 250 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Marzinotto, Benedicta A1 - Wolff, Guntram T1 - Explaining the evolving role of national parliaments under the European Semester JF - Journal of European Public Policy N2 - This contribution examines and explains the role of national parliaments in the European Semester process. It builds on original survey-based evidence and traces whether national parliaments discuss and vote on Stability/Convergence and on National Reform Programmes; how their involvement changed over time; and what might condition national varieties of parliamentary scrutiny over European Union (EU) affairs. We find significant cross-country variation in whether the debate is taking place at the parliamentary level; whether it is European Affairs or finance committees that are involved; and whether there is involvement ex ante (before submission) and/or ex post (after country-specific recommendations). From 2012 to 2015, finance committees played an increasingly prominent role. Traditional measures of the strength of parliament do not explain what we observe. We do find that non-euro area member states were most likely to monitor EU recommendations under the European Semester and that this effect increased over time. Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2017.1363273 SN - 1466-4429 N1 - Published online: 31 Aug 2017 VL - 25 IS - 2 SP - 250 EP - 267 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hallerberg, Mark A1 - Scartascini, Carlos T1 - Explaining changes in tax burdens in Latin America: Do politics trump economics? JF - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - This paper examines whether elections, which are generally held on fixed dates, and banking crises explain the timing of tax reforms and the allocation of the additional tax burden. Using an original fine-grained data set of tax reforms, the paper finds support for the role of these two sources of variation. In particular, the probability of reform is higher during banking crises. During electoral periods, increasing taxes becomes highly unlikely, even if the government is facing financing problems. Interestingly, politics seem to trump economics: banking crises do not affect the probability of having a reform during electoral times. Moreover, the presence of an IMF program affects the tax instruments chosen: countries with a program increase the value-added tax, while those without raise the personal income tax. Finally, the ideology of the president does not explain who bears the additional tax burden. Y1 - 2017 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.07.004 SN - 1873-5703 VL - 48 SP - 162 EP - 179 ER -