TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Hemker, Johannes T1 - Corona: A European Safety Net for the Fiscal Response N2 - In order to avoid permanent scars from the economic impact of the Coronavirus in Europe, a determined fiscal response will be necessary. We argue that there should be a clear division of labor between Europe and national governments: the latter will have to provide stimulus with targeted measures, while Europe needs to build a safety net so that member states will not lose access to bond markets due to speculative attacks. This safety net should have three components: A commitment by member states to use ESM instruments without conditionality; a commitment by the ECB to use all of its tools; and a number of flanking measures to underscore member states’ commitments. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-35107 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Grund, Sebastian A1 - Odendahl, Christian T1 - Sharing the fiscal burden of the crisis - A Pandemic Solidarity Instrument for the EU N2 - EU member states must share the burden of the fiscal costs of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Pandemic Solidarity Instrument delivers such burden sharing: The EU would borrow 440 billion euros in the market and would give it as grants to member states for specific spending in areas such as health care, short-time works schemes or stimulus packages; it would also give guarantees to the European Investment Bank to provide liquidity to European companies. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-35141 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - How to defend Europe without risking another euro crisis N2 - Europe intends to rapidly and strongly increase its defense spending. It should do so without risking Europe’s fiscal sustainability and financial stability at a time of great danger. We argue that the Commission’s current plan to use the flexibility built in the EU’s fiscal rules will not achieve this: On the one hand, this will not lead to the long-term certainty over available resources for defense spending that is now needed. On the other hand, relying on the flexibility and in particular the use of the national escape clause would likely amount to an unplugging of the rules that could stoke strong market reactions. Therefore, the best way to create the necessary fiscal space is a targeted and temporary exemption of defense spending from the fiscal rules. We outline how this could be done through a change of the legal texts. Finally, we explain how common borrowing could complement a rule change if member states agree to pool decision-making powers in defense policy matters. Y1 - 2025 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/how-to-defend-europe-without-risking-another-euro-crisis ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Luft nach oben: Wieso die EU-Fiskalregeln Spielraum für eine Reform der Schuldenbremse lassen N2 - In Deutschland hat sich eine rege Debatte darüber entsponnen, ob und wie die Schuldenbremse zu reformieren sei, um wichtige Investitionsbedarfe stemmen zu können. Gegen eine Reform wird allerdings immer wieder vorgebracht, die gerade erst reformierten EU-Fiskalregeln seien für Deutschland im Ergebnis restriktiver als die Schuldenbremse. Träfe dies zu, wäre eine Reform der Schuldenbremse entweder wertlos oder aber der neu geschaffene Spielraum könnte nur zum Preis des Bruchs europäischer Regeln genutzt werden. In diesem Policy Brief untersuchen wir die Interaktion zwischen den EU-Fiskalregeln und der Schuldenbremse und kommen zu einem differenzierten Ergebnis: Erstens enthalten die europäischen Regeln systematisch mehr Spielraum für schuldenfinanzierte Ausgaben als die Schuldenbremse. Dieser zusätzliche Spielraum ergibt sich sowohl bei der Festlegung des mehrjährigen Ausgabenpfades wie auch danach bei der Überwachung der Regeln. Der Spielraum wächst zweitens dadurch, dass schuldenfinanzierte Ausgaben für die Stärkung von Wachstum und Wachstumspotenzial genutzt und sie von Reformen begleitet werden, die das Wachstumspotenzial anheben. Drittens beschränken die europäischen Regeln die Ausweitung konsumtiver Ausgaben deutlich. Eine Ausnahme hiervon bilden allerdings Verteidigungsausgaben. Y1 - 2024 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/de/publikationen/detail/publication/wieso-die-eu-fiskalregeln-spielraum-fuer-eine-reform-der-schuldenbremse-lassen PB - Jacques Delors Centre, Bertelsmann Stiftung ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Tordoir, Sander A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas T1 - How buy-European rules can help save Europe’s car industry N2 - Europe’s car industry faces a perfect storm. Chinese car exports are surging, European producers are being squeezed out of global markets, US tariffs are rising, and domestic demand remains 20% below pre-pandemic levels. Instead of sliding into a costly muddle of regulatory rollbacks, bailouts, and fragmented national subsidies, the EU should harness its single market - 450 million consumers and a vast corporate sector - to drive demand for Europe-made vehicles. That means co-ordinating consumer subsidies with a buy-European clause, applying it to both private and corporate fleets, and using it as a platform for reciprocal EV-subsidy agreements with trusted trade partners. A window for action is open: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain all need to renew their EV-support schemes in the coming months. Together, they represent 70% of EU car registrations—and could launch broader European coordination. Y1 - 2025 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/how-buy-european-rules-can-help-save-europes-car-industry PB - Bertelsmann Stiftung CY - Gütersloh ER -