TY - JOUR A1 - Wiese, Frauke A1 - Schlecht, Ingmar A1 - Bunke, Wolf-Dieter A1 - Gerbaulet, Clemens A1 - Hirth, Lion A1 - Jahn, Martin A1 - Kunz, Friedrich A1 - Lorenz, Casimir A1 - Mühlenpfordt, Jonathan A1 - Reimann, Juliane A1 - Schill, Wolf-Peter T1 - Open Power System Data - Frictionless data for electricity system modelling JF - Applied Energy N2 - The quality of electricity system modelling heavily depends on the input data used. Although a lot of data is publicly available, it is often dispersed, tedious to process and partly contains errors. We argue that a central provision of input data for modelling has the character of a public good: it reduces overall societal costs for quantitative energy research as redundant work is avoided, and it improves transparency and reproducibility in electricity system modelling. This paper describes the Open Power System Data platform that aims at realising the efficiency and quality gains of centralised data provision by collecting, checking, processing, aggregating, documenting and publishing data required by most modellers. We conclude that the platform can provide substantial benefits to energy system analysis by raising efficiency of data pre-processing, providing a method for making data pre-processing for energy system modelling traceable, flexible and reproducible and improving the quality of original data published by data providers. Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.11.097 VL - 236 SP - 409 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Hirth, Lion A1 - Schlecht, Ingmar T1 - Redispatch Markets in Zonal Electricity Markets: Inc-Dec Gaming as a Consequence of Inconsistent Power Market Design (not Market Power) T2 - EconStor Y1 - 2019 UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10419/194292 PB - ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Ehrhart, Karl-Martin A1 - Eicke, Anselm A1 - Hirth, Lion A1 - Ocker, Fabian A1 - Ott, Marion A1 - Schlecht, Ingmar A1 - Wang, Runxi T1 - Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets N2 - This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these extensions do not dissolve inc-dec gaming, which already occurs in our setup of two regions. We also benchmark market-based redispatch against grid investment, cost-based redispatch, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The comparison highlights a significant inefficiency of market-based redispatch and inflated redispatch payments. Finally, we study seven variations of our basic model to assess whether different market fundamentals or market design changes mitigate inc-dec gaming. None of these variations eliminate inc-dec gaming entirely. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4300874 PB - ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH CY - Mannheim ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Ehrhart, Karl-Martin A1 - Eicke, Anselm A1 - Hirth, Lion A1 - Ocker, Fabian A1 - Ott, Marion A1 - Schlecht, Ingmar A1 - Wang, Runxi T1 - Analysis of a Capacity-Based Redispatch Mechanism N2 - This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible consumers with a market-based approach. We conduct a game-theoretical analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism. Our analysis reveals that despite its intention, the capacity-based redispatch is prone to undesirable behavior of market participants. The reason is that the availability payment incentivizes participants to change their energy consumption (generation) behavior. However, this also applies to undesired participants who increase the redispatch requirement through participation. Under certain assumptions, the additional redispatch potential equals the additional redispatch demand it creates. Consequently, the mechanism does not resolve network constraints, while causing costs for the compensation payments. Furthermore, we study three alternative implementation options, none of which resolves the underlying problem. It follows from our analysis that a mechanism can only be promising if it is capable to distinguish between the potential participants to exclude the undesirable ones. Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4830366 PB - ZEW – Leibniz-Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH CY - Mannheim ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schlecht, Ingmar A1 - Maurer, Christoph A1 - Hirth, Lion T1 - Financial contracts for differences: The problems with conventional CfDs in electricity markets and how forward contracts can help solve them JF - Energy Policy N2 - Contracts for differences are widely seen as a cornerstone of Europe's future electricity market design. This paper is about designing such contracts. We identify the dispatch and investment distortions that conventional CfDs cause, the patches used to overcome these shortcomings, and the problems these fixes introduce. We then propose an alternative contract we call “financial” CfD. This hybrid between conventional CfDs and forward contracts mitigates revenue risk to a substantial degree while providing undistorted incentives. Like conventional CfDs, it is long-term and tailored to technology-specific (wind, solar, nuclear) generation patterns but, like forwards, decouples payments from actual generation. The proposed contract mitigates volume risk and avoids margin calls by accepting physical assets as collateral. KW - Management, Monitoring, Policy and Law KW - General Energy Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2024.113981 VL - 186 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Winzer, Christian A1 - Ramírez-Molina, Héctor A1 - Hirth, Lion A1 - Schlecht, Ingmar T1 - Profile contracts for electricity retail customers JF - Energy Policy N2 - Decarbonization involves a large-scale expansion of low-carbon generators such as wind and solar and the electrification of heating and transport. Both space heating and battery-electric cars have significant embedded flexibility potential. Granular price signals that convey abundance or scarcity of electricity are a precondition for customers or aggregators acting on their behalf to exploit this flexibility. However, unmitigated real-time prices expose customers to electricity price risks. To tackle the dual need of providing flexibility incentives while protecting customers from cost shocks, real-time tariffs with a hedging component can be a solution. In such contracts customers pre-agree an amount of energy and a consumption profile, while hourly deviations are charged at spot prices. In this paper we analyze design options by using a dataset of anonymized smart meter data and show that profile tariffs can bring electricity bill volatility to similarly low levels as fixed tariffs while providing full flexibility incentives from spot prices. Y1 - 2024 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2024.114358 SN - 0301-4215 VL - 195 PB - Elsevier BV ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ehrhart, Karl-Martin A1 - Eicke, Anselm A1 - Hirth, Lion A1 - Ocker, Fabian A1 - Ott, Marion A1 - Schlecht, Ingmar A1 - Wang, Runxi T1 - Analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism JF - Energy Economics N2 - This paper discusses a capacity-based redispatch mechanism in which awarded market participants are compensated for their availability for redispatch, rather than activation. The rationale is to develop a market design that prevents so-called “inc-dec gaming” when including flexible consumers with a market-based approach. We conduct a game-theoretical analysis of a capacity-based redispatch mechanism. Our analysis reveals that despite its intention, the capacity-based redispatch is prone to undesirable behavior of market participants. The reason is that the availability payment incentivizes participants to change their energy consumption or generation behavior. However, this also applies to undesired participants who increase the redispatch requirement through participation. Under certain assumptions, the additional redispatch potential equals the additional redispatch requirement it creates. Consequently, the mechanism does not resolve network constraints, while causing costs for the compensation payments. Furthermore, we study three alternative implementation options, none of which resolves the underlying problem. It follows from our analysis that a mechanism can only be promising if it is capable to distinguish between the potential participants to exclude the undesired ones. Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2025.108751 VL - 149 PB - Elsevier BV ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ehrhart, Karl-Martin A1 - Eicke, Anselm A1 - Hirth, Lion A1 - Ocker, Fabian A1 - Ott, Marion A1 - Schlecht, Ingmar A1 - Wang, Runxi T1 - Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets JF - The Energy Journal N2 - This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these extensions do not dissolve inc-dec gaming, which already occurs in our setup of two regions. We also benchmark market-based redispatch against grid investment, cost-based redispatch, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The comparison highlights a significant inefficiency of market-based redispatch and inflated redispatch payments. Finally, we study seven variations of our basic model to assess whether different market fundamentals or market design changes mitigate inc-dec gaming. None of these variations eliminate inc-dec gaming entirely. Y1 - 2026 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/01956574251365606 VL - 47 IS - 1 SP - 77 EP - 108 ER -