TY - JOUR A1 - Koop, Christel A1 - Reh, Christine A1 - Bressanelli, Edoardo T1 - Agenda‐setting under pressure: Does domestic politics influence the European Commission? JF - European Journal of Political Research N2 - The European Union (EU) has become increasingly visible and contested over the past decades. Several studies have shown that domestic pressure has made the EU's ‘electorally connected’ institutions more responsive. Yet, we still know little about how politicisation has affected the Union's non‐majoritarian institutions. We address this question by focusing on agenda‐setting and ask whether and how domestic politics influences the prioritisation of legislative proposals by the European Commission. We argue that the Commission, as both a policy‐seeker and a survival‐driven bureaucracy, will respond to domestic issue salience and Euroscepticism, at party, mass and electoral level, through targeted performance and through aggregate restraint. Building on new data on the prioritisation of legislative proposals under the ordinary legislative procedure (1999–2019), our analysis shows that the Commission's choice to prioritise is responsive to the salience of policy issues for Europe's citizens. By contrast, our evidence suggests that governing parties’ issue salience does not drive, and Euroscepticism does not constrain, the Commission's priority‐setting. Our findings contribute to the literature on multilevel politics, shedding new light on the strategic responses of non‐majoritarian institutions to the domestic politicisation of ‘Europe’. KW - agenda-setting; European Commission; politicisation; priorities; responsiveness Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12438 VL - 61 IS - 1 SP - 46 EP - 66 ET - European Journal of Political Research ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Koop, Christel A1 - Reh, Christine T1 - Europe’s Bank and Europe’s Citizens: Accountability, transparency – legitimacy? JF - Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law N2 - Since the Eurozone crisis, critique of the European Central Bank (ECB) has centred on the Bank’s lack of acceptance by Europe’s citizens. One prominent strand of the debate argues that such acceptance can be enhanced by ensuring higher levels of compliance with the democratic standards of accountability and transparency. This article critically assesses this ‘standards-support nexus’ and its underlying assumptions. We suggest that three conditions need to be fulfilled for the argument to hold: (i) citizens are aware of the ECB and its design; (ii) citizens prioritise democratic standards over alternative motivations for acceptance; and (iii) citizens are able to differentiate between the ECB and the European Union’s wider multilevel system. Drawing from the established literature on support for European integration and trust in the ECB and from descriptive Eurobarometer data, we conclude that these three conditions are unlikely to bear out empirically. Moreover, increasing the ECB’s accountability and transparency in times of crisis and heightened politicisation could adversely affect the Bank’s policy-performance and public image. Hence, whilst not questioning the normative desirability of accountability and transparency, we caution against assuming too easily that such democratic standards alone will enhance citizen support, and against assuming that they come without trade-offs. Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/1023263X19827906 VL - 26 IS - 1 SP - 63 EP - 80 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bressanelli, Edoardo A1 - Koop, Christel A1 - Reh, Christine T1 - EU Actors under pressure: politicisation and depoliticisation as strategic responses JF - Journal of European Public Policy N2 - This contribution conceptualises bottom-up politicisation in Europe’s multi-level system. EU-level actors, we argue, respond strategically to the functional and political pressures ‘travelling up’ from the member states. Perceiving domestic dissensus as either constraining or enabling, actors display both self-restraint and assertiveness in their responses. Motivated by the survival of the EU as a system ‘under attack’, and by the preservation of their own substantive and procedural powers, actors choose to either politicise or depoliticise decision-making, behaviour and policy outcomes at the supranational level. As a collection, this Special Issue demonstrate that the choices actors make ‘under stress’ at the EU-level – ranging from ‘restrained depoliticisation’ to ‘assertive politicisation’ – are, indeed, conditional on how bottom-up pressures are perceived and processed. Y1 - 2020 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2020.1713193 VL - 27 IS - 3 SP - 329 EP - 341 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Koop, Christel A1 - Reh, Christine A1 - Bressanelli, Edoardo T1 - When politics prevails: Parties, elections and loyalty in the European Parliament JF - European Journal of Political Research N2 - In many political systems, legislators serve multiple principals who compete for their loyalty in legislative votes. This article explores the political conditions under which legislators choose between their competing principals in multilevel systems, with a focus on how election proximity shapes legislative behaviour across democratic arenas. Empirically, the effect of electoral cycles on national party delegations’ ‘collective disloyalty’ with their political groups in the European Parliament (EP) is analysed. It is argued that election proximity changes the time horizons, political incentives and risk perceptions of both delegations and their principals, ‘punctuating’ cost‐benefit calculations around defection as well as around controlling, sanctioning and accommodating. Under the shadow of elections, national delegations’ collective disloyalty with their transnational groups should, therefore, increase. Using a new dataset with roll‐call votes cast under legislative codecision by delegations between July 1999 and July 2014, the article shows that the proximity of planned national and European elections drives up disloyalty in the EP, particularly by delegations from member states with party‐centred electoral rules. The results also support a ‘politicisation’ effect: overall, delegations become more loyal over time, but the impact of election proximity as a driver of disloyalty is strongest in the latest parliament analysed (i.e., 2009–2014). Furthermore, disloyalty is more likely in votes on contested and salient legislation, and under conditions of Euroscepticism; by contrast, disloyalty is less likely in votes on codification files, when a delegation holds the rapporteurship and when the national party participates in government. The analysis sheds new light on electoral politics as a determinant of legislative choice under competing principals, and on the conditions under which politics ‘travels’ across democratic arenas in the European Union's multilevel polity. Y1 - 2018 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12252 SN - 1475-6765.12252 VL - 57 IS - 3 SP - 563 EP - 586 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Edoardo, Bressanelli A1 - Koop, Christel A1 - Reh, Christine T1 - The impact of informalisation: Early agreements and voting cohesion in the European Parliament JF - European Union Politics N2 - European Union legislative decision-making is increasingly shifted into informal secluded arenas. Scholars have explained this trend and analysed its consequences for bargaining success and democratic legitimacy. Yet, we know little about how informalisation affects legislative behaviour in the European Parliament. This article contributes to closing the gap, by theorising and analysing the impact of ‘early agreements’ on cohesion. Given the reputational, political and transaction costs of failing an early agreement in plenary, we expect political groups to invest heavily in discipline and consensus, and legislators to comply in votes. Using a new dataset, combining Hix et al.’s (2007) roll-call data with original codecision data (1999–2011), we show that informalisation increases cohesion but only for centrist parties. Rapporteurships and votes on ‘costly’ legislative resolutions also matter, but do not mediate the effect of early agreement. KW - Cohesion, early agreements, European Parliament, ordinary legislative procedure, political groups Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/1465116515608704 SN - 1465-1165 VL - 17 IS - 1 SP - 91 EP - 113 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Reh, Christine A1 - Héritier, Adrienne A1 - Bressanelli, Edoardo A1 - Koop, Christel T1 - The Informal Politics of Legislation JF - Comparative Polical Studies N2 - This article investigates a widespread yet understudied trend in EU politics: the shift of legislative decision making from public inclusive to informal secluded arenas and the subsequent adoption of legislation as “early agreements.” Since its introduction in 1999, “fast-track legislation” has increased dramatically, accounting for 72% of codecision files in the Sixth European Parliament. Drawing from functionalist institutionalism, distributive bargaining theory, and sociological institutionalism, this article explains under what conditions informal decision making is likely to occur. The authors test their hypotheses on an original data set of all 797 codecision files negotiated between mid-1999 and mid-2009. Their analysis suggests that fast-track legislation is systematically related to the number of participants, legislative workload, and complexity. These findings back a functionalist argument, emphasizing the transaction costs of intraorganizational coordination and information gathering. However, redistributive and salient acts are regularly decided informally, and the Council presidency’s priorities have no significant effect on fast-track legislation. Hence, the authors cannot confirm explanations based on issue properties or actors’ privileged institutional positions. Finally, they find a strong effect for the time fast-track legislation has been used, suggesting socialization into interorganizational norms of cooperation. KW - European Parliament, fast-track legislation, informal politics, functionalist institutionalism, distributive bargaining, socialization Y1 - 2013 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414011426415 SN - 0010-4140 VL - 46 IS - 9 SP - 1112 EP - 1142 ER -