TY - JOUR A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean T1 - Comité de suivi du crédit d’impôt pour la compétitivité et l’emploi. Rapport 2015 JF - France Stratégie Y1 - 2015 VL - 2015 IS - Septembre PB - Comité de suivi du CICE CY - Paris ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean T1 - Rapport du Comité de suivi du Crédit d'impôt pour la compétitivité et l'emploi. Rapport 2014 JF - France Stratégie Y1 - 2014 VL - 2014 IS - Septembre CY - Paris ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean T1 - Impôt et cotisation: quel financement pour la protection sociale? JF - Actes du colloque 2014 du Conseil d'État Y1 - 2014 N1 - http://www.strategie.gouv.fr/sites/strategie.gouv.fr/files/atoms/files/intervention-cloture-2014-06-27.pdf CY - Paris ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean T1 - L'action collective face au changement climatique JF - Esprit Y1 - 2015 VL - 12 SP - 56 EP - 76 PB - Edition Esprit CY - Paris ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean T1 - Quelles politiques structurelles pour l'Europe? JF - Problèmes économiques Y1 - 2014 N1 - http://mailing.fpul-lyon.org/jeco/pb_eco_jeco2014.pdf VL - 2014 IS - Numéro spécial SP - 9 EP - 13 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean T1 - Euro area reform: An anatomy of the debate JF - CEPR Policy Insight No. 95 Y1 - 2018 UR - http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/201809_Eurodebate_CEPR_PolicyInsight_95.pdf ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean A1 - Demertzis, Maria A1 - Sapir, André A1 - Wieser, Thomas A1 - Wolff, Guntram T1 - One size does not fit all: European integration by differentiation JF - Policy Brief N2 - THE ISSUE Reforming the governance of the European Union has become urgent for three reasons: to better deal with politically-sensitive topics, to manage greater external challenges mand because future EU enlargement will increase the diversity of the bloc’s membership. The answer to disagreement typically has been qualified majority voting, but on sensitive topics, the EU has increasingly moved to unanimity and heavy European Council involvement, which has often not delivered results. The alternative answer has been a Europe of multiple speeds of integration with one shared goal for all, increasing political tensions. A different approach is now needed to move Europe forward. POLICY CHALLENGE Two options would be a Europe of concentric circles and a Europe of ‘clubs’, but the former would cement tensions between the inner and the outer circles, while the latter would lead to unclear structures and an end to cohesion. However, a governance model could combine the two approaches. The model would be based on a strong ‘bare-bones EU’ formed by the single market, trade and accompanying policies, the European institutions, treaties, rule of law and a commitment to fundamental EU values. Three policy areas would be completely moved into ‘clubs’ while remaining based on the bare-bones legal and institutional structure: economic and monetary union; Schengen and asylum policy; and foreign and security policy and neighbourhood policy. Club membership would be optional but once in, countries would have to accept the rules and there would be high hurdles to leaving. Finally, a ring of friends would surround the bare-bones EU, based on very close economic relationships and some multilateral discussion elements, but no formal votes. Y1 - 2018 UR - http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/09/PB-2018_03_final3.pdf VL - 3 SP - 1 EP - 12 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean T1 - Should we give up on global governance? JF - Bruegel Policy Contribution 17 N2 - The high point of global governance was reached in the mid-1990s around the creation of the World Trade Organisation. It was hoped that globalisation would be buttressed by a system of global rules and a network of specialised global institutions. Two decades later these hopes have been dashed by a series of global governance setbacks, the rise of economic nationalism and the dramatic change of attitude of the United States administration. From trade to the environment, a retreat from multilateralism is observable. The 2008 elevation of the G20 to leaders’ level was an exception to this trend. But the G20 is no more than a political steering body. The reasons for this retreat partially arise from political developments in individual countries. But such factors hide a series specific roadblocks to global governance: the growing number and diversity of countries involved; the mounting rivalry between the US and China; doubts about globalisation and the distribution of the associated benefits; the obsolescence of global rules and institutions; imbalances within the global governance regime; and increased complexity. What, then, should be the way forward? The demand for global governance has not diminished, but support for binding multilateral arrangements has. There is a need for alternative governance technologies that better accommodate the diversity of players, provide for more flexibility and rely less on compulsion. From competition to financial regulation, such arrangements have been developed in a series of fields already. They are often hailed as providing a solution to the governance conundrum. But their effectiveness should be assessed critically. Can they overcome the free-rider curse and enforcement problems? Usual game theory suggests not. Not all games are similar, however, and some collective action problems can be tackled without recourse to coercion. Against this background, multilateralists hesitate over the choice of a strategy. One option would be to seek to preserve the existing order to the greatest extent possible. Its downside is that it does not address the underlying problems. An alternative option is to try to redesign international arrangements, putting the emphasis on flexibility and voluntary participation. Its downside is that it risks overlooking the intrinsic problems of international or global collective action. A potentially more promising approach would be to define the minimum conditions that the multilateral framework must fulfil to provide a strong-enough basis for flexible, variable-geometry and possibly informal arrangements. In the end, we should neither cultivate the nostalgia of yesterday’s order nor invest our hopes in ineffective international cooperation. The narrow path ahead is to establish a sufficient, critical multilateral base for flexible arrangements and to equip policymakers with a precise toolkit for determining, on a field-by-field basis, the minimum requirements for effective collective action. Y1 - 2018 UR - http://bruegel.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/PC-17-2018.pdf ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bénassy-Quéré, Agnès A1 - Brunnermeier, Markus A1 - Enderlein, Henrik A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean A1 - Farhi, Emmanuel A1 - Fratzscher, Marcel A1 - Fuest, Clemens A1 - Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier A1 - Martin, Philippe A1 - Rey, Hélène A1 - Schnabel, Isabel A1 - Véron, Nicolas A1 - Weder di Mauro, Béatrice A1 - Zettelmeyer, Jéromin T1 - Reconciling risk sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to Eurozone reform JF - CEPR Policy Insight No. 91 KW - banking union, capital markets, European governance, eurozone governance, finance & financial regulation, fiscal policy, monetary union, Sovereign debt Y1 - 2018 UR - https://cepr.org/active/publications/policy_insights/viewpi.php?pino=91 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean T1 - Can economic multilateralism survive? JF - Economic Affairs Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12331 VL - 39 IS - 1 SP - 3 EP - 24 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean T1 - Can economic multilateralism survive? JF - Economic Affairs Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/ecaf.12331 VL - 39 IS - 1 SP - 3 EP - 24 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Leonard, Mark A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean A1 - Ribakova, Elina A1 - Shapiro, Jeremy A1 - Wolff, Guntram T1 - Securing Europe’s Economic Sovereignty JF - Survival - Global Politics and Strategy N2 - To protect European economic independence, the EU needs to better integrate economic policy and geopolitics. Europeans like to believe that the European Union has the collective economic size and capacity to determine Europe’s economic destiny. They think the EU can determine its own rules for economic life, negotiate on an equal footing with partner economies, and even set economic standards and regulations for the rest of the world. But perhaps the EU has been lucky so far. Perhaps its apparent economic independence was always the result of the fortuitous absence of geopolitical interference. Perhaps it could only flourish under the benevolent aegis of a real superpower. Perhaps, in other words, its independence only endured because no serious power was willing to challenge it, and because the United States was willing to protect it. Now the behaviour of other powers is increasingly calling Europe’s economic sovereignty into question. China and the US, in particular, do not separate economic interests from geopolitical interests in the same way that the EU does. They are increasingly using economic connections, from cyberspace to financial links, to serve geopolitical goals. Europe’s economic sovereignty is now at stake. Until recently, the EU took for granted that the global system provided a functional framework for international economic relations, which could be regarded as separate from the sphere of geopolitics. Of course, the economic rules of the road were determined by power relations that arose in the wake of the Second World War. But in the years that followed, even the US largely followed them. The economic and geopolitical spheres often overlapped, particularly during the Cold War. But the US regarded the economic integration of ‘Western’ countries as conducive to the strength of the free world, and it stood by this principle even after the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The EU’s very construction reflected this disposition: most international economic powers were given to EU-level bodies, and most security and foreign-policy instruments were left to individual member states. Accordingly, the EU was able to conduct an international economic policy that was reasonably insulated from geopolitical concerns. This separation of the economic was always fragile. It now looks hopelessly outdated. The US and China have fundamentally different relationships with Europe, but neither separates economics from geopolitics. In general, national-security issues are gaining prominence everywhere, as is the relationship between economics and national security. Economic connections, from cyberspace to financial links, are becoming the primary areas of great-power competition and are at risk of being weaponised.1 Increasingly, the US and China follow neither the letter nor the spirit of the rules in their relationships with the EU and its member states. In the US case, its decision to make full use of the centrality of its currency and its financial system to enforce secondary sanctions against Iran was a major shock to European partners. Washington’s abandonment of core principles of the global multilateral trading system and withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change were also disruptive. As for China, the EU now accepts that Beijing is behaving as ‘an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance’.2 It is essential that Europeans respond to this challenge. The collective capacity of EU countries working together to preserve their economic independence underpins the value of European integration to European citizens. That value is further bolstered by the EU’s ability to participate in defining the rules of the game for the global economy – what Germans call Handlungsfähigkeit and the French call Europe puissance. The challenge for Europe is substantial but manageable. The EU and its member states should adopt an economic-sovereignty agenda to protect European economic independence through a variety of tools ranging from competition policy to the international role of the euro. To do so, the EU needs to better integrate economic policy and geopolitics. Y1 - 2019 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2019.1662148 VL - 61 IS - 5 SP - 75 EP - 98 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pisani-Ferry, Jean T1 - I nuovi imperialismi JF - Aspenia Y1 - 2019 UR - https://www.aspeninstitute.it/aspenia/numero/la-politica-dellalgoritmo VL - 85 SP - 126 EP - 131 ER -