TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas T1 - We Don’t Need No Institution - What the Eurozone requires is not a treasury but a common fiscal policy N2 - Does the Eurozone need a “treasury”? The answer is no: The Eurozone needs a common fiscal policy to complement the ECB’s monetary policy. But it does not need a new institution to take fiscal policy decisions or to execute such decisions. The EU institutional framework is well-equipped to perform these functions. Hence, the focus of political energy should be on getting the right policies and instruments in place, not on building new shiny institutions. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-32881 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Mack, Sebastian T1 - Building EU green bonds that deserve their name N2 - The EU should seize the day: It should issue parts of the Recovery Instrument debt as green bonds and thereby boost that burgeoning market. But it is important to manage expectations: Issuing green bonds alone will not ‚green‘ recovery spending. This will depend on the criteria for climate-friendly spending in the legal texts governing the Recovery Instrument – and these so far lack teeth. So, there is a substantial risk that EU green bonds will set the wrong precedent now if backed by weak criteria. This would pre-empt future legislative work on the final EU green bond standard. If the criteria for climatefriendly spending are not strengthened, the Commission should scale back its ambition and should only issue green bonds for measures that fully match the criteria set out in the EU Taxonomy Regulation. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-36885 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas T1 - Time to come home - If the ESM is to stay relevant, it should be reinvented inside the EU N2 - When restarting work on reforming the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the Eurogroup should heed the lessons of the pandemic: The ESM has become politically unviable while there is apparently a lot more flexibility within the EU treaties than previously thought. Therefore, this policy brief argues that the old reform plans should be put to one side and the ESM should be reinvented inside the EU legal order if it is to remain relevant. Such a reinvention would create a coherent crisis management framework that would be politically sustainable in the long run. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-36962 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Hemker, Johannes A1 - Tordoir, Sander T1 - Everything will be different: How the pandemic is changing EU economic governance N2 - The pandemic will completely shake up the EU‘s economic governance in five ways: EU debt is possible and will become a reality; the EU and the Eurozone get a fiscal capacity; the European Semester will be history; the crisis managament architecture is politically questioned; and the Eurozone loses its relevance for EU decision-making. Taken together, these five lessons from the pandemic will render the old pre-pandemic Eurozone reform agenda obsolete. EU institutions should use the coming 18 months to prepare a new reform agenda for EU economic governance that can deliver tangible results before the next EU long-term budget will be negotiated. Y1 - 2021 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-37344 U6 - https://doi.org/10.48462/opus4-3734 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Nguyen, Thu T1 - How to spend it right - A more democratic governance for the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility N2 - The Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) will be the core of the EU’s new Recovery Instrument to fight the economic fallout of the pandemic. Under the RRF, 310 billion euros in additional EU spending will be allocated by the European Commission to member states based on individual Recovery and Resilience Plans (RRPs). In this Policy Brief, we argue that the proposed governance to decide on the assessment of RRPs lacks democratic elements as parliaments are largely sidelined. This should be changed to ensure necessary political ownership at national and European level; to include a second pair of European eyes to prevent misspending; and to avoid a roll-back of EU democracy. Therefore, we propose that the European Parliament get a veto over the Commission decision assessing individual RRPs and allocating funds. National parliaments should also have a say in the adoption of the RRP of the respective member state. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-35594 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/de/publikationen/detail/publication/how-to-spend-it-right-a-more-democratic-governance-for-the-eu-recovery-and-resilience-facility ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas T1 - A political enigma: Four open questions about the Conference on the Future of Europe N2 - The Conference on the Future of Europe remains an enigma just five months before its projected end. In this policy brief, Lucas Guttenberg outlines the four main open questions that will determine the outcome of the conference and whether it will be judged a success: What level of ambition will the conference aim for? Who is calling the shots when it comes to the conference’s outcome document? What will happen next after the end of the conference? And how will the conference impact the EU’s institutional fabric in the long run? KW - Conference on the Future of Europe Y1 - 2021 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-42528 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/a-political-enigma ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Mack, Sebastian A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas T1 - After the German election: What's next in EU economic governance? N2 - The new German government will face a number of unresolved issues of varying urgency when it comes to EU economic governance. In the case of the fiscal rules, there is an urgent need for a decision on how to proceed after 2022. In the medium term, the future of EU finances and economic policy coordination is open; both have undergone drastic changes as a result of the Recovery Instrument. Last but not least, the new German government must decide whether and how to break the deadlock in negotiations on completing the banking union and breathe new life into the capital markets union. KW - German 2021 elections; economic governance Y1 - 2021 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-42434 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/what-next-in-european-fiscal-politics ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Nguyen, Thu T1 - Nach der Wahl: Wie weiter mit der Rechtstaatlichkeit in der EU? N2 - Der Rechtsstaat ist in vielen Mitgliedstaaten der EU unter Druck. Insbesondere Polen und Ungarn stellen durch eine immer systematischere Aushöhlung rechtsstaatlicher Prinzipien den Grundkonsens der EU als Rechtsgemeinschaft zur Disposition. Mit dem Urteil des polnischen Verfassungstribunals vom 7. Oktober 2021 erreichte diese Entwicklung ihren bisherigen Höhepunkt. Dieser Policy Brief erklärt die Hintergründe des Konflikts, zeigt Handlungsmöglichkeiten für die Europäische Kommission auf und erläutert, welche Rolle die nächste Bundesregierung bei der Wahrung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in der EU spielen kann. KW - German 2021 elections; rule of law Y1 - 2021 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-42457 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/rule-of-law ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Gnath, Katharina A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Deutschland und die Stabilität der Wirtschafts-und Währungsunion T2 - Handbuch zur deutschen Europapolitik N2 - Die Corona-Pandemie stellt die zweite große Bewährungsprobe für die Eurozone seit ihrem Bestehen dar. Nachdem die Wirtschafts-und Währungsunion (WWU) aus der Eurokrise der Jahre 2010 bis 2015 mit einigen Narben, aber doch weitestgehend intakt und handlungsfähig hervorgegangen ist, sah sie sich ab Anfang 2020 erneut einer potenziell existenzgefährdenden Krise ausgesetzt. Die Antworten, die die Mitgliedstaaten bis Ende Juli 2020 auf die Pandemie gefunden haben, unterscheiden sich von der Politik in der Eurokrise: Während der Fokus zur Krisenrettung zuvor auf der Vergabe von Krediten gegen Auflagen und einem punktuellen Umbau der Euro-Architektur im Bereich der Bankenaufsicht und-abwicklung lag, stand im Sommer 2020 ein umfassendes schuldenfinanziertes EU-Wiederaufbauinstrument im Zentrum der Krisenbekämpfung. Es ging nicht mehr um Kredite, sondern um gemeinsame … Y1 - 2021 UR - https://www.nomos-elibrary.de/10.5771/9783748909514-287/deutschland-und-die-stabilitaet-der-wirtschafts-und-waehrungsunion?page=1 SN - ISBN print: 978-3-8487-6852-3, ISBN online: 978-3-7489-0951-4 U6 - https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748909514-287 SP - 287 EP - 300 PB - Nomos CY - Baden-Baden ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas T1 - How the EU should turn the tables on Hungary and Poland N2 - The EU should counter blackmail attempts by the governments in Warsaw and Budapest with calm determination. As long as Poland and Hungary maintain their vetoes, there should not be any agreements on new EU spending programmes, from which these two countries benefit the most. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/how-the-eu-should-turn-the-tables-on-hungary-and-poland ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Hemker, Johannes T1 - Corona: A European Safety Net for the Fiscal Response N2 - In order to avoid permanent scars from the economic impact of the Coronavirus in Europe, a determined fiscal response will be necessary. We argue that there should be a clear division of labor between Europe and national governments: the latter will have to provide stimulus with targeted measures, while Europe needs to build a safety net so that member states will not lose access to bond markets due to speculative attacks. This safety net should have three components: A commitment by member states to use ESM instruments without conditionality; a commitment by the ECB to use all of its tools; and a number of flanking measures to underscore member states’ commitments. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-35107 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Grund, Sebastian A1 - Odendahl, Christian T1 - Sharing the fiscal burden of the crisis - A Pandemic Solidarity Instrument for the EU N2 - EU member states must share the burden of the fiscal costs of the COVID-19 pandemic. The Pandemic Solidarity Instrument delivers such burden sharing: The EU would borrow 440 billion euros in the market and would give it as grants to member states for specific spending in areas such as health care, short-time works schemes or stimulus packages; it would also give guarantees to the European Investment Bank to provide liquidity to European companies. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-35141 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - How to defend Europe without risking another euro crisis N2 - Europe intends to rapidly and strongly increase its defense spending. It should do so without risking Europe’s fiscal sustainability and financial stability at a time of great danger. We argue that the Commission’s current plan to use the flexibility built in the EU’s fiscal rules will not achieve this: On the one hand, this will not lead to the long-term certainty over available resources for defense spending that is now needed. On the other hand, relying on the flexibility and in particular the use of the national escape clause would likely amount to an unplugging of the rules that could stoke strong market reactions. Therefore, the best way to create the necessary fiscal space is a targeted and temporary exemption of defense spending from the fiscal rules. We outline how this could be done through a change of the legal texts. Finally, we explain how common borrowing could complement a rule change if member states agree to pool decision-making powers in defense policy matters. Y1 - 2025 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/how-to-defend-europe-without-risking-another-euro-crisis ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas A1 - Redeker, Nils T1 - Luft nach oben: Wieso die EU-Fiskalregeln Spielraum für eine Reform der Schuldenbremse lassen N2 - In Deutschland hat sich eine rege Debatte darüber entsponnen, ob und wie die Schuldenbremse zu reformieren sei, um wichtige Investitionsbedarfe stemmen zu können. Gegen eine Reform wird allerdings immer wieder vorgebracht, die gerade erst reformierten EU-Fiskalregeln seien für Deutschland im Ergebnis restriktiver als die Schuldenbremse. Träfe dies zu, wäre eine Reform der Schuldenbremse entweder wertlos oder aber der neu geschaffene Spielraum könnte nur zum Preis des Bruchs europäischer Regeln genutzt werden. In diesem Policy Brief untersuchen wir die Interaktion zwischen den EU-Fiskalregeln und der Schuldenbremse und kommen zu einem differenzierten Ergebnis: Erstens enthalten die europäischen Regeln systematisch mehr Spielraum für schuldenfinanzierte Ausgaben als die Schuldenbremse. Dieser zusätzliche Spielraum ergibt sich sowohl bei der Festlegung des mehrjährigen Ausgabenpfades wie auch danach bei der Überwachung der Regeln. Der Spielraum wächst zweitens dadurch, dass schuldenfinanzierte Ausgaben für die Stärkung von Wachstum und Wachstumspotenzial genutzt und sie von Reformen begleitet werden, die das Wachstumspotenzial anheben. Drittens beschränken die europäischen Regeln die Ausweitung konsumtiver Ausgaben deutlich. Eine Ausnahme hiervon bilden allerdings Verteidigungsausgaben. Y1 - 2024 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/de/publikationen/detail/publication/wieso-die-eu-fiskalregeln-spielraum-fuer-eine-reform-der-schuldenbremse-lassen PB - Jacques Delors Centre, Bertelsmann Stiftung ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Tordoir, Sander A1 - Redeker, Nils A1 - Guttenberg, Lucas T1 - How buy-European rules can help save Europe’s car industry N2 - Europe’s car industry faces a perfect storm. Chinese car exports are surging, European producers are being squeezed out of global markets, US tariffs are rising, and domestic demand remains 20% below pre-pandemic levels. Instead of sliding into a costly muddle of regulatory rollbacks, bailouts, and fragmented national subsidies, the EU should harness its single market - 450 million consumers and a vast corporate sector - to drive demand for Europe-made vehicles. That means co-ordinating consumer subsidies with a buy-European clause, applying it to both private and corporate fleets, and using it as a platform for reciprocal EV-subsidy agreements with trusted trade partners. A window for action is open: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain all need to renew their EV-support schemes in the coming months. Together, they represent 70% of EU car registrations—and could launch broader European coordination. Y1 - 2025 UR - https://www.delorscentre.eu/en/publications/detail/publication/how-buy-european-rules-can-help-save-europes-car-industry PB - Bertelsmann Stiftung CY - Gütersloh ER -