TY - JOUR A1 - Enderlein, Henrik A1 - Trebesch, Christoph A1 - von Daniels, Laura T1 - Sovereign Debt Disputes: A Database on Government Coerciveness During Debt Crises JF - Journal of International Money and Finance N2 - This paper measures “debt disputes” between governments and foreign private creditors in periods of sovereign debt crises. We construct an index of government coerciveness, consisting of 9 objective sub-indicators. Each of these sub-indicators captures unilateral government actions imposed on foreign banks and bondholders. The results provide the first systematic account of debt crises that goes beyond a binary categorization of default versus non-default. Overall, government behavior and rhetoric show a strong variability, ranging from highly confrontational to very smooth crisis resolution processes. In a preliminary analysis on the determinants of coercive behavior, we find political institutions to be significant, while economic and financial factors play a lesser role. These results open up an agenda for future research. KW - Sovereign default KW - Debt restructuring KW - Crisis resolution Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2011.11.011 SN - 0261-5606 VL - 31 IS - 2 SP - 250 EP - 266 PB - Elsevier CY - Amsterdam ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Enderlein, Henrik A1 - Daniel, Laura von A1 - Trebesch, Christoph T1 - Governance in Sovereign Debt Crises: Analyzing Creditor-Debtor Interactions T2 - Governance without a state? : policies and politics in areas of limited statehood Y1 - 2011 SN - 978-0-231-52187-1 SP - 171 EP - 196 PB - Columbia University Press CY - New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Enderlein, Henrik A1 - Trebesch, Christoph A1 - Schumacher, Julian T1 - What explains sovereign debt litigation? JF - The Journal of Law and Economics N2 - We study the occurrence of holdout litigation in the context of sovereign defaults. The number of creditor lawsuits against foreign governments has strongly increased over the past decades, but there is a large variation across crisis events. Why are some defaults followed by litigation and others not? What explains the general increase in lawsuits? We address these questions using an economic model of litigation and a new data set capturing the near universe of cases filed against defaulting sovereigns. We find that creditors are more likely to litigate when debt restructurings are large, when governments impose high losses (haircuts), and when the defaulting country is more vulnerable to litigation (open economies and those with a low legal capacity). We conclude that sovereign debt lawsuits can be predicted reasonably well with a simple framework from the law and economics literature. Y1 - 2015 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1086/684228 SN - 1537-5285 VL - 58 IS - 3 SP - 585 EP - 623 PB - University of Chicago Press CY - Chicago ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Enderlein, Henrik A1 - Schumacher, Julian A1 - Trebesch, Christoph T1 - Sovereign Defaults in Court: The Rise of Creditor Litigation 1976-2010 Y1 - 2014 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schumacher, Julian A1 - Trebesch, Christoph A1 - Enderlein, Henrik T1 - Sovereign defaults in court JF - Journal of International Economics N2 - For centuries, defaulting governments were immune from legal action by foreign creditors. This paper shows that this is no longer the case. Building a dataset covering four decades, we find that creditor lawsuits have become an increasingly common feature of sovereign debt markets. The legal developments have strengthened the hands of creditors and raised the cost of default for debtors. We show that legal disputes in the US and the UK disrupt government access to international capital markets, as foreign courts can impose a financial embargo on sovereigns. The findings are consistent with theoretical models with creditor sanctions and suggest that sovereign debt is becoming more enforceable. We discuss how the threat of litigation affects debt management, government willingness to pay, and the resolution of debt crises. Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2020.103388 SN - 0022-1996 VL - 131 PB - Elsevier BV ER -