TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Pardo, Nicolas T1 - Salience and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets JF - Journal of Policy Analysis and Management N2 - This paper studies the enforcement of fines, and, in particular, the effects of simplification and salience nudges on timely payments. In a randomized controlled trial, we add cover letters to 80,000 payment notifications for speeding. The letters increase the salience of the payment deadline, the late penalty, or both. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. Stressing the late penalty significantly and persistently increases payment rates. The effect is largest if both parameters are made salient. The most effective treatment yields a net revenue gain that covers approximately 25 percent of the labor costs of the ticket administration personnel. A survey experiment documents how the salience nudges alter prior (mis)perceptions about the communicated parameters. The survey results rationalize the differential effects of the treatments and, together with the evidence from the RCT, offer a broader framework for explaining why certain nudges are effective in some contexts but fail in others. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1002/pam.22387 VL - 2 SP - 426 EP - 449 ET - 41 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Dušek, Libor T1 - Fines, Non-Payment, and Revenues: Evidence from Speeding Tickets N2 - We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs, we implement a regression discontinuity design. The results document small payment responses: a 10 percent increase in the fine (i.e. the payment obligation) induces a 1 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one euro increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60 cent increase in payments collected. Y1 - 2022 U6 - https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4281384 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Pardo, Nicolas A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Salience, Incentives, and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets T2 - MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper N2 - This paper studies the enforcement of fines. We randomly assign 80,000 speeding tickets to treatments that increase the salience of the payment deadline, late penalties, or both. Stressing the penalties significantly and persistently increases payment rates. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. The findings from the RCT are consistent with a survey experiment which documents the treatments' impact on priors about parameters of the compliance problem. Exploiting discontinuous variation in fines, we then document a strong price responsiveness: a 1% increase in the payment obligation induces a 0.23 percentage point decrease in timely compliance. This semi-elasticity suggests that the impact of the salience nudges is equivalent to the effect of a 4-9% reduction in fines. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://ssrn.com/abstract=3600770 ET - No. 2020/9 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Learning from Law Enforcement JF - Journal of the European Economic Association N2 - This paper studies how punishment affects future compliance behavior and isolates deterrence effects mediated by learning. Using administrative data from speed cameras that capture the full driving histories of more than a million cars over several years, we evaluate responses to punishment at the extensive (receiving a speeding ticket) and intensive margins (tickets with higher fines). Two complementary empirical strategies—a regression discontinuity design and an event study—coherently document strong responses to receiving a ticket: The speeding rate drops by a third and re-offense rates fall by 70%. Higher fines produce a small but imprecisely estimated additional effect. All responses occur immediately and are persistent over time, with no backsliding toward speeding even two years after receiving a ticket. Our evidence rejects unlearning and temporary salience effects. Instead, it supports a learning model in which agents update their priors on the expected punishment in a coarse manner. Y1 - 2021 UR - https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article/20/2/739/6366238 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab037 SN - 1542-4766 VL - 2 SP - 739 EP - 777 ET - 20 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Pardo, Nicolas T1 - Jak zlepšit výběr pokut? Experiment se zjednodušením informací Y1 - 2023 UR - https://www.prf.cuni.cz/aktuality/jak-zlepsit-vyber-pokut-experiment-se-zjednodusenim-informaci IS - Studie 2/2023 PB - Legal Data Hub ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Dušek, Libor T1 - Fines, nonpayment, and revenues: evidence from speeding tickets JF - The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization N2 - We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform-induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10% increase in the fine (i.e., the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one-dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60-cent increase in payments collected within 15 days (JEL H27, H26, K42). Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad025 N1 - Published: 11 November 2023 VL - 41 IS - 2 SP - 381 EP - 401 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Swiftness and delay of punishment JF - The Economic Journal N2 - We study how the swiftness and delay of punishment affect behaviour in the context of speeding offences. Using rich administrative data from automated speed cameras, we exploit two quasi-experimental sources of variation in the lag between an offence and the sending of a ticket. At the launch of the speed camera system, administrative bottlenecks created delays of up to three months. Later, we implemented a protocol that randomly assigned tickets to either swift or delayed processing. We present two main results. First, delays reduce payment compliance: timely payments fall by 7 to 9% when tickets are sent with delays of four or more weeks. We also provide evidence suggesting that very swift tickets – sent on the first or second day after the offence – increase timely payments. These findings align with predictions from expert scholars elicited through a survey. Second, speeding tickets cause a strong, immediate, and persistent decline in speeding. Although swift tickets generate sizable mechanical benefits, we find no robust differential effects of swiftness or delay on subsequent speeding behaviour. This challenges widely held beliefs, as reflected in our survey. Finally, we outline a simple framework of learning and updating that explains our findings. Y1 - 2026 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/ej/ueag035 PB - Oxford University Press (OUP) ER -