TY - JOUR A1 - Towfigh, Emanuel A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Glöckner, Andreas T1 - Zur Benotung in der Examensvorbereitung und im ersten Examen: Eine empirische Analyse JF - Zeitschrift für Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft N2 - Bislang gibt es zu den Erfolgsfaktoren des staatlichen Teils der Ersten Juristischen Staatsprüfung wenig gesicherte, empirisch belastbare Erkenntnisse. Lediglich die von den Landesjustizprüfungsämtern jährlich veröffentlichten Überblicksdaten über das allgemeine Abschneiden der Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten sind bekannt. Das ver- wundert vor allem mit Blick darauf, dass die Staatsexamina seit Jahrzehnten und in allen Bundesländern in ähnlicher Form geprüft werden, dass sie für die spätere be- rufliche Entwicklung von Heerscharen von Juristen große Bedeutung haben, dass sich Jahr für Jahr Tausende Kandidatinnen und Kandidaten dieser Prüfung unter- ziehen und dass es mit den privaten Repetitorien eine ganze Industrie kommerzieller Examensvorbereiter gibt. Auch aus didaktischer Sicht ist der Mangel an Evidenz unbefriedigend. Gibt es identifizierbare Faktoren, die für den Erfolg in der Examens- prüfung eine Rolle spielen? Sind etwa „kluge Köpfe“ mit gutem Abitur auch die in der Staatsprüfung erfolgreicheren Juristen (B. II.)? Lohnt sich das Schreiben von Probeklausuren (B. I. 1.), und erwirbt man dabei fachspezifische Fähigkeiten, oder wirkt der Lernfortschritt fächerübergreifend; wie sieht die Lernkurve aus? Gibt es Unterschiede zwischen den Fakultäten (B. III. 2.)? Gibt es Unterschiede zwischen Männern und Frauen (B. I. 2. und II. 3.), Deutschen und Ausländern (B. II. 4.)? KW - Benotung Y1 - 2014 VL - 1/2014 SP - 8 EP - 27 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance JF - Journal of Public Economics KW - tax avoidance KW - welfare analysis KW - majority voting KW - median voter equilibrium Y1 - 2012 UR - http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/32229/1/605805970.pdf VL - 96 IS - 1-2 SP - 1 EP - 9 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Riener, Gerhard A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Norms, moods, and free lunch: Longitudinal evidence on payments from a Pay-What-You-Want restaurant JF - The Journal of Socio-Economics KW - Pay-What-You-Want KW - Moods KW - Weather KW - Social norms Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2011.07.003 VL - 41 IS - 4 SP - 476 EP - 483 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Winter, Joachim T1 - Survey evidence on conditional norm enforcement JF - European Journal of Political Economy KW - Norm enforcement KW - Law violation KW - Survey evidence KW - Social norms Y1 - 2012 UR - http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/104279/1/lmu-mdp_2009-01.pdf N1 - Free online Access / Freier online Zugriff: http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/104279/1/lmu-mdp_2009-01.pdf VL - 28 IS - 3 SP - 390 EP - 398 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Rincke, Johannes A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Enforcement Spillovers JF - Review of Economics and Statistics KW - Enforcement externalities KW - Law enforcement Y1 - 2011 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1162/REST_a_00128 N1 - Available as e-publication in your Hertie Library. Als elektronische Ausgabe in der Hertie Bibliothek verfügbar. http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=eoh&AN=1274037&site=eds-live VL - 93 IS - 4 SP - 1224 EP - 1234 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kube, Sebastian A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - The interaction of legal and social norm enforcement JF - Journal of Public Economic Theory KW - social sanctions KW - public goods KW - norm enforcement KW - laboratory experiment KW - legal sanctions Y1 - 2011 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-19884 N1 - Free online Access / Freier online Zugriff: http://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/38978/1/630012946.pdf This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of Public Economic Theory. The final authenticated version is available online at: DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2011.01515.x VL - 13 IS - 5 SP - 639 EP - 660 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Hurrelmann, Klaus A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Konsumieren, Wirtschaften, Vorsorgen – Ergebnisse der 3. MetallRente Jugendstudie JF - BetrAV Y1 - 2016 SN - 0005-9951 VL - 71 IS - 6 SP - 490 EP - 493 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Berger, Melissa A1 - Fellner-Röhling, Gerlinde A1 - Sausgruber, Rupert T1 - Higher Taxes, more Evasion? Evidence from Border Differentials in TV License Fees JF - Journal of Public Economics N2 - This paper studies the evasion of TV license fees in Austria. We exploit border differentials to identify the effect of fees on evasion. Comparing municipalities at the low- and high-fee side of state borders reveals that higher fees trigger significantly more evasion. Our preferred estimator indicates that a one percent increase in fees raises the evasion rate by 0.3 percentage points. The positive effect of fees on evasion is confirmed in different parametric and non-parametric approaches and survives several robustness checks. KW - Evasion KW - TV license fees KW - Border tax differentials KW - Regression discontinuity design Y1 - 2016 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21571 SN - 0047-2727 N1 - This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of Public Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at: DOI 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2016.01.007 VL - 135 SP - 74 EP - 86 PB - Elsevier B.V. ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Spichtig, Mathias T1 - Social Norms and the Indirect Evolution of Conditional Cooperation JF - Journal of Economics N2 - This paper develops a model of social norms and cooperation in large societies. Within this framework we use an indirect evolutionary approach to study the endogenous formation of preferences and the coevolution of norm compliance. Thereby we link the multiplicity of equilibria, which emerges in the presence of social norms, to the evolutionary analysis: Individuals face situations where many others cooperate as well as situations where a majority free-rides. The evolutionary adaptation to such heterogenous environments will favor conditional cooperators, who condition their pro-social behavior on the others' cooperation. As conditional cooperators react flexibly to their social environment, they dominate free-riders as well as unconditional cooperators. KW - Conditional Cooperation KW - Indirect Evolution KW - Heterogenous Environments KW - Social Norms Y1 - 2011 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21582 SN - 0931-8658 VL - 102 IS - 3 SP - 237 EP - 262 PB - Springer Vienna ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Slemrod, Joel T1 - Optimal Observability in a Linear Income Tax JF - Economics Letters N2 - We study the optimal observability of the tax base within the standard linear income tax problem, where observability is determined by the government's investment into the accurate measurement of the tax base. KW - Optimal linear income taxation KW - Observability KW - Tax enforcement Y1 - 2010 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21590 SN - 0165-1765 N1 - This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Economics Letters. The final authenticated version is available online at: DOI 10.1016/j.econlet.2010.04.044 VL - 108 IS - 2 SP - 105 EP - 108 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Social Norms and Conditional Cooperative Taxpayers JF - European Journal of Political Economy N2 - This paper incorporates tax morale into the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model of income tax evasion. Tax morale is modeled as a social norm for tax compliance. The strength of the norm is shaped endogenously, depending on the share of evaders in the society. Taxpayers act conditionally cooperative as their evasion depends on the others' compliance. We characterize the equilibrium which accounts for this interdependence and study the implications for tax and enforcement policies. The analysis is extended to the case of a society consisting of heterogenous communities. Individual evasion decisions are then embedded in a complex social structure and behavior is influenced by the norm compliance among morale reference groups. Within this framework, we highlight the role of belief management as an alternative policy tool. KW - Tax evasion KW - Social norms KW - Multiple equilibria KW - Conditional cooperation KW - Belief management Y1 - 2010 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21603 SN - 0176-2680 N1 - This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in European Journal of Political Economy. The final authenticated version is available online at: DOI 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2009.11.001 VL - 26 IS - 1 SP - 89 EP - 103 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Trautmann, Stefan T1 - Reserve Prices as Reference Points : Evidence from Auctions for Football Players at Hattrick.org JF - Journal of Economic Psychology N2 - We study the impact of sellers’ reserve prices on transfer prices in online auctions of virtual football players at Hattrick.org. We introduce an empirical model that distinguishes between two separate effects from public reserve prices: (1) a mechanical effect, which is driven by the design of the English auction and (2) a psychological reference-dependence effect through reserve prices serving as reference points. The psychological effect has recently been introduced in behavioral models of situations where agents are uncertain about their own willingness-to-pay, while the mechanical effect is well captured by standard auction theory. Controlling for censoring when players are not sold, both effects are observed. Once we account for the potential endogeneity of reserve prices, however, we do not find evidence for reference dependence in Hattrick auctions. KW - Reserve prices KW - Reference dependence KW - Auctions KW - Online games Y1 - 2010 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21619 SN - 0167-4870 N1 - This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in Journal of Economic Psychology. The final authenticated version is available online at: DOI 10.1016/j.joep.2009.08.004 VL - 31 IS - 2 SP - 230 EP - 240 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Voting over Taxes : The Case of Tax Evasion JF - Public Choice N2 - This paper studies majority voting on taxes when tax evasion is possible. We characterize the voting equilibrium where the agent with median taxed income is pivotal. Since the ranking of true incomes does not necessarily correspond to the ranking of taxed incomes, the decisive voter can differ from the median income receiver. In this case, we find unconventional patterns of redistribution, e.g., from the middle class to the poor and the rich. KW - Majority Voting KW - Tax Evasion KW - Welfare Analysis KW - Redistribution Y1 - 2009 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-21624 SN - 0048-5829 VL - 140 IS - 1-2 SP - 43 EP - 58 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Stöwhase, Sven T1 - Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy JF - International Tax and Public Finance N2 - This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region's choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient. KW - tax evasion KW - fiscal competition KW - fiscal equalization KW - auditing Y1 - 2005 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1007/s10797-005-1542-0 SN - 0927-5940 VL - 12 IS - 4 SP - 515 EP - 531 PB - Kluwer Academic Publishers ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Ludwig, Jens A1 - Entorf, Horst T1 - Special Issue on the Economics of Crime: Editorial JF - German Economic Review Y1 - 2012 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0475.2012.00581.x SN - 1468-0475 VL - 13 IS - 4 SP - 363 EP - 365 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Towfigh, Emanuel A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Glöckner, Andreas T1 - Geschlechts- und Herkunftseffekte bei der Benotung juristischer Staatsprüfungen JF - ZDRW Zeitschrift für Didaktik der Rechtswissenschaft Y1 - 2018 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-27385 SN - 2196-7261 VL - Jahrgang 5 IS - 2 SP - 115 EP - 142 ER - TY - GEN A1 - Hurrelmann, Klaus A1 - Karch, Heribert A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen BT - MetallRente Studie 2019 N2 - Die vorliegende MetallRente Studie untersucht, welchen Einfluss sozialer Hintergrund, Geschlecht und Bildung auf Einstellungen und Handlungen junger Menschen haben, wenn es um die wichtigen Themen Finanzen und Vorsorge geht. Nach bisher drei Erhebungswellen in den Jahren 2010, 2013 und 2016 ist dies die vierte Auflage der bundesweit repräsentativen Jugendstudie „Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen“. 2 500 Jugendliche und junge Erwachsene im Alter von 17 bis 27 Jahren wurden befragt. Erneut wurden auch Gastautorinnen und Gaustautoren aus Wissenschaft, Institutionen und Wirtschaft eingeladen, die Befragungsergebnisse mit ihren Analysen und Kommentaren zu ergänzen. Wie bewältigen junge Menschen das Spannungsfeld von eigener Verantwortung und staatlicher Regulierung? Welche Veränderungen werden gebraucht für eine zukunftsfeste Alterssicherung, die zur Lebenswirklichkeit der jungen Menschen passt? Auch die vierte MetallRente Studie geht mit dem Anspruch ans Werk, nicht nur zu analysieren, sondern Schlussfolgerungen zu formulieren sowie Forderungen und Vorschläge zu adressieren. KW - Altersvorsorge, Jugend, Finanzen Y1 - 2019 SN - 978-3-7799-3967-2 PB - Beltz Juventa CY - Weinheim ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Traxler, Christian ED - Hurrelmann, Klaus ED - Karch, Heribert ED - Traxler, Christian T1 - Boosting und Nudging in der Altersvorsorge - Eine verhaltensökonomische Einordnung der Studienergebnisse BT - MetallRente Studie 2019 T2 - Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen N2 - Die MetallRente Studie 2019 zeichnet ein zwiespältiges Bild. Zum einen betont mittlerweile jeder zweite junge Erwachsene, im „Hier und Heute“ zu leben – was die Zukunft bringt, wisse ohnehin niemand; im Jahr 2010 stimmte nur jeder Dritte dieser Aussage zu (siehe Kapitel 1 in diesem Buch, Abb. 10). Konsistent damit sinkt auch der Anteil jener, die die Altersvorsorge als Grund zum Sparen angeben. Unter den regelmäßig Sparenden, d. h., bei jungen Erwachsenen, deren ökonomische Situation das Sparen ermöglicht, war die Altersversorge im Jahr 2010 noch für 66 % der Befragten ein wichtiges Sparmotiv, während dieser Wert 2019 um zehn Prozentpunkte gesunken ist (siehe Kapitel 1, Abb. 15). Zum anderen scheint bei jungen Erwachsenen sehr wohl ein klares und immer starker ausgeprägtes Problembewusstsein vorhanden zu sein: 82 % der Befragten erkennen, dass der demografische Wandel die gesetzlichen Rentenkassen zunehmend unter Druck setzt; 85 % rechnen damit, noch weit über ihr 67. Lebensjahr arbeiten zu müssen, und 86 % stimmen der Aussage zu, dass ohne eine eigenständige private Vorsorge deutlich mehr Menschen von Altersarmut betroffen sein werden (siehe Kapitel 1, Abb. 23). Damit, so konnte man meinen, ist den Jugendlichen und jungen Erwachsenen die Bedeutung der dritten Säule in der Altersvorsorge klar. Die Studienergebnisse zeigen jedoch, dass die private Altersvorsorge weiterhin an Attraktivität einbüßt. KW - Altersvorsorge, Jugend, Finanzen Y1 - 2019 SN - 978-3-7799-3967-2 SP - 77 EP - 85 PB - Beltz Juventa CY - Weinheim ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Drago, Francesco A1 - Mengel, Friederike A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Compliance Behavior in Networks: Evidence from a Field Experiment JF - American Economic Journal: Applied Economics N2 - This paper studies the spread of compliance behavior in neighborhood networks in Austria. We exploit a field experiment that varied the content of mailings sent to potential evaders of TV license fees. The data reveal a strong treatment spillover: untreated households are more likely to switch from evasion to compliance in response to mailings received by their network neighbors. Digging deeper into the properties of the spillover, we find that it is concentrated among close neighbors of the targets and increases with the treated households' diffusion centrality. Local concentration of equally treated households implies a lower spillover. KW - Economics KW - Consumer Economics KW - Economic Sociology Y1 - 2020 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-33890 SN - 1945-7782 (Print) / 1945-7790 (Online) N1 - This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedit version of an article published in American Economic Journal: Applied Economics. The final authenticated version is available online at DOI: 10.1257/app.20170690 VL - 12 IS - 2 SP - 96 EP - 133 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Dušek, Libor T1 - Fines, Non-Payment, and Revenues: Evidence from Speeding Tickets T2 - Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers N2 - We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10% increase in the fine (i.e. the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60 cent increase in payments collected within 15 days. T3 - Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers - 23 Y1 - 2023 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-50461 UR - https://berlinschoolofeconomics.de/insights/bse-discussion-papers ET - No. 23 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Swiftness and Delay of Punishment T2 - Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers N2 - This paper studies how the swiftness and delay of punishment affect behavior. Using rich administrative data from automated speed cameras, we exploit two (quasi-)experimental sources of variation in the time between a speeding offense and the sending of a ticket. At the launch of the speed camera system, administrative challenges caused delays of up to three months. Later, we implemented a protocol that randomly assigned tickets to swift or delayed processing. We identify two different results. First, delays have a negative effect on payment compliance: the rate of timely paid fines diminishes by 7 to 9% when a ticket is sent with a delay of four or more weeks. We also find some evidence that very swift tickets – sent on the first or second day following the offense – increase timely payments. These results align with the predictions of expert scholars that we elicited in a survey. Second, speeding tickets cause a strong, immediate, and persistent decline in speeding. However, we do not detect any robust, differential effects of swiftness or delay on speeding. This challenges widely held beliefs, as reflected in our survey. Yet, we document large mechanical benefits of swift punishment and provide a theoretical framework of learning and updating that explains our findings. T3 - Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers - 32 KW - Economics Y1 - 2024 UR - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-52391 UR - https://berlinschoolofeconomics.de/insights/discussion-papers ET - No. 32 ER -