TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Exposure to Law Enforcement and Deterrence JF - Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) N2 - This paper explores how direct and indirect exposure to law enforcement activities shape deterrent effects. Focusing on experimental and quasi-experimental research from economics (mainly from domains such as tax evasion, traffic violations, and financial crimes), I first summarize evidence showing how personal experiences shape perceptions about enforcement risks and sanctions, and deter future offenses. The paper then turns to the role of vicarious experiences. I discuss the growing body of evidence documenting enforcement spillovers, i.e., cases where individuals learn and adapt based on observations or experiences shared by peers, co-workers, or neighbors. The paper also highlights the importance of better understanding the underlying learning processes for deriving policy implications. Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1628/jite-2025-0005 VL - 181 IS - 1 SP - 81 EP - 95 PB - Mohr Siebeck ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Wolfert, Sabine A1 - Schneekloth, Ulrich A1 - Traxler, Christian ED - Müllerleile, Hansjörg ED - Schminke, Kerstin ED - Aprea, Carmela ED - Traxler, Christian T1 - Anforderungen an die Altersvorsorge T2 - Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen: MetallRente Studie 2025. Zwischen Handlungswille und Wissenslücke Y1 - 2025 SN - 978-3-7799-8859-5 SP - 55 EP - 59 PB - Beltz Juventa CY - Weinheim ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Wolfert, Sabine A1 - Schneekloth, Ulrich A1 - Traxler, Christian ED - Müllerleile, Hansjörg ED - Schminke, Kerstin ED - Aprea, Carmela ED - Traxler, Christian T1 - Sparen für die Altersvorsorge T2 - Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen: MetallRente Studie 2025. Zwischen Handlungswille und Wissenslücke Y1 - 2025 SN - 978-3-7799-8859-5 SP - 35 EP - 54 PB - Beltz Juventa CY - Weinheim ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Traxler, Christian ED - Müllerleile, Hansjörg ED - Schminke, Kerstin ED - Aprea, Carmela ED - Traxler, Christian T1 - Rentenreform: Die Präferenzen der jungen Menschen T2 - Jugend, Vorsorge, Finanzen: MetallRente Studie 2025. Zwischen Handlungswille und Wissenslücke Y1 - 2025 SN - 978-3-7799-8859-5 SP - 105 EP - 109 PB - Beltz Juventa CY - Weinheim ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Behavioural Insights for Health Governance T2 - The Governance Report 2019: Health Governance Y1 - 2019 UR - https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-governance-report-2019-9780198821502?q=The%20Governance%20Report%202019&lang=en&cc=de# SN - 9780198821502 SP - 135 EP - 148 PB - Oxford University Press CY - Oxford ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Pardo, Nicolas A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Salience, Incentives, and Timely Compliance: Evidence from Speeding Tickets T2 - MPI Collective Goods Discussion Paper N2 - This paper studies the enforcement of fines. We randomly assign 80,000 speeding tickets to treatments that increase the salience of the payment deadline, late penalties, or both. Stressing the penalties significantly and persistently increases payment rates. Emphasizing only the deadline is not effective. The findings from the RCT are consistent with a survey experiment which documents the treatments' impact on priors about parameters of the compliance problem. Exploiting discontinuous variation in fines, we then document a strong price responsiveness: a 1% increase in the payment obligation induces a 0.23 percentage point decrease in timely compliance. This semi-elasticity suggests that the impact of the salience nudges is equivalent to the effect of a 4-9% reduction in fines. Y1 - 2020 UR - https://ssrn.com/abstract=3600770 ET - No. 2020/9 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Learning from Law Enforcement JF - Journal of the European Economic Association N2 - This paper studies how punishment affects future compliance behavior and isolates deterrence effects mediated by learning. Using administrative data from speed cameras that capture the full driving histories of more than a million cars over several years, we evaluate responses to punishment at the extensive (receiving a speeding ticket) and intensive margins (tickets with higher fines). Two complementary empirical strategies—a regression discontinuity design and an event study—coherently document strong responses to receiving a ticket: The speeding rate drops by a third and re-offense rates fall by 70%. Higher fines produce a small but imprecisely estimated additional effect. All responses occur immediately and are persistent over time, with no backsliding toward speeding even two years after receiving a ticket. Our evidence rejects unlearning and temporary salience effects. Instead, it supports a learning model in which agents update their priors on the expected punishment in a coarse manner. Y1 - 2021 UR - https://academic.oup.com/jeea/article/20/2/739/6366238 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvab037 SN - 1542-4766 VL - 2 SP - 739 EP - 777 ET - 20 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bauernschuster, Stefan A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Tempolimit 130 auf Autobahnen: Eine evidenzbasierte Diskussion der Auswirkunge JF - Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik N2 - Welche Effekte würde ein allgemeines Tempolimit auf deutschen Autobahnen mit sich bringen? Stefan Bauernschuster und Christian Traxler versuchen, sich dieser oft emotional diskutierten Frage empirisch zu nähern. Die Autoren stoßen dabei rasch an Grenzen: Die Datenlage ist dürftig und kausale Evidenz ist rar. Gleichwohl skizzieren sie in ihrem Beitrag auf Basis der vorhandenen Daten und der internationalen Literatur eine Einschätzung, wie sich die Einführung eines Tempolimits 130 unter anderem auf Verkehrssicherheit, Emissionen und Zeitverluste auswirkt. Vieles spricht dafür, dass der Nutzen eines Tempolimits die möglichen Kosten übersteigt. Die Autoren rufen zu einer Stärkung der evidenzbasierten Verkehrspolitik auf. KW - Tempolimit KW - Verkehr Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1515/pwp-2021-0023 VL - 22 IS - 2 SP - 86 EP - 102 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Pardo, Nicolas T1 - Jak zlepšit výběr pokut? Experiment se zjednodušením informací Y1 - 2023 UR - https://www.prf.cuni.cz/aktuality/jak-zlepsit-vyber-pokut-experiment-se-zjednodusenim-informaci IS - Studie 2/2023 PB - Legal Data Hub ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Wegrich, Kai T1 - Attitudes on Urban Mobility Policies. Results from a Survey in Berlin N2 - Urban mobility policies and the discussion around them have gained traction in many European cities, including Berlin. This policy brief presents survey evidence examining the preferences of citizens of Berlin city on mobility policy changes. The survey covers the expansion of bike infrastructure, the creation of traffic-calmed neighborhoods (Kiezblocks akin to Barcelona’s superblocks), the implementation of a 30km/h speed limit on main roads, increased parking fees, and introduction of congestion charges. The results indicate majority support for more cycle paths and a further roll out of Kiezblocks. In contrast, only a third of respondents support an increase in parking fees and the introduction of a congestion charge. Support and opposition is strongly correlated with education, political attitudes and car (vs bike) ownership. KW - Mobility Transition Y1 - 2023 UR - https://www.hertie-school.org/en/news/detail/content/survey-majority-of-berliners-in-favour-of-expanding-bike-paths-and-low-traffic-neighbourhoods PB - Hertie School CY - Berlin ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Dušek, Libor T1 - Fines, Non-Payment, and Revenues: Evidence from Speeding Tickets T2 - Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers N2 - We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10% increase in the fine (i.e. the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60 cent increase in payments collected within 15 days. T3 - Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers - 23 Y1 - 2023 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-50461 UR - https://berlinschoolofeconomics.de/insights/bse-discussion-papers U6 - https://doi.org/10.48462/opus4-5046 ET - No. 23 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Altmann, Steffen A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Weinschenk, Philipp T1 - Deadlines and Memory Limitations JF - Management Science N2 - This paper presents the results of two natural field experiments at a dental clinic. Guided by a simple theoretical model, we exogenously vary deadlines and associated rewards for arranging check-up appointments. Our data show strong and systematic effects of deadlines on patients’ behavior. Imposing deadlines induces patients to act earlier and at a persistently higher frequency than without a deadline. We further document that individuals systematically respond to deadlines, even if these are not tied to explicit rewards. Several of our findings suggest that individuals’ responses to deadlines are shaped by limitations in memory and attention. Our results illustrate that deadlines can be a powerful management tool to encourage timely task completion and to increase the cost effectiveness of performance-contingent rewards. KW - Deadlines KW - memory limitations KW - limited attention KW - field experiment Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2021.4227 N1 - published online as article in advance on 15.12.2021 VL - 68 IS - 9 SP - 6733 EP - 6750 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Dušek, Libor A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Swiftness and Delay of Punishment T2 - Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers N2 - This paper studies how the swiftness and delay of punishment affect behavior. Using rich administrative data from automated speed cameras, we exploit two (quasi-)experimental sources of variation in the time between a speeding offense and the sending of a ticket. At the launch of the speed camera system, administrative challenges caused delays of up to three months. Later, we implemented a protocol that randomly assigned tickets to swift or delayed processing. We identify two different results. First, delays have a negative effect on payment compliance: the rate of timely paid fines diminishes by 7 to 9% when a ticket is sent with a delay of four or more weeks. We also find some evidence that very swift tickets – sent on the first or second day following the offense – increase timely payments. These results align with the predictions of expert scholars that we elicited in a survey. Second, speeding tickets cause a strong, immediate, and persistent decline in speeding. However, we do not detect any robust, differential effects of swiftness or delay on speeding. This challenges widely held beliefs, as reflected in our survey. Yet, we document large mechanical benefits of swift punishment and provide a theoretical framework of learning and updating that explains our findings. T3 - Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers - 32 KW - Economics Y1 - 2024 UR - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-52391 UR - https://berlinschoolofeconomics.de/insights/discussion-papers U6 - https://doi.org/10.48462/opus4-5239 ET - No. 32 ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Haan, Peter A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - An Evaluation of Montenegro's 2022 Minimum Wage and Income Tax Reform N2 - Between 2018 and 2022, Montenegro introduced a series of significant policy reforms. The reforms affected economic, educational, and social policies, ranging from the introduction of a universal child allowance to major changes in its labour market regulations and tax rules. From an economic policy perspective, the most significant reform package was implemented in January 2022. It was composed of a huge increase in Montenegro’s statutory minimum wage, alongside a new income tax regime and the abolishment of mandatory health insurance contributions. According to the Government, the reform package aimed at increasing the living standards of citizens and promoting a more sustainable and inclusive growth model. This report evaluates the conjoint impact of this reform package. KW - Economics Y1 - 2023 UR - https://www.esap.online/docs/213/ilo-esap-2-an-evaluation-of-montenegros-2022-minimum-wage-and-income-tax-reform SN - 9789220402009 PB - International Labour Organization CY - Geneva ER - TY - RPRT A1 - Aydin, Eren A1 - Gehrsitz, Markus A1 - Traxler, Christian T1 - Greener Fleet, Cleaner Air: How Low Emission Zones Reduce Pollution N2 - Using a stacked differences-in-differences approach, we study the effects of Low Emission Zones (LEZs) in Germany. The implementation of stage 1 and 2 LEZs, which banned the most pollution-intensive vehicles from city centers, significantly reduced PM10 concentrations. The most restrictive third stage had no detectable, additional effect. Analyzing the mechanisms behind these improvements, we find weak evidence of a 2% traffic decline inside LEZs. Exploiting novel data, our main results document small but precisely estimated effects on the local fleet composition: LEZs induced the replacement of 50,000 older, emission-intensive diesel vehicles with newer, less polluting gasoline cars. Our estimates suggest that LEZs had lower social costs than previously estimated. KW - low emission zones KW - vehicle fleet composition KW - emission standards Y1 - 2024 UR - https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/17144/greener-fleet-cleaner-air-how-low-emission-zones-reduce-pollution IS - IZA DP No. 17144 PB - IZA – Institute of Labor Economics CY - Bonn ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Traxler, Christian A1 - Dušek, Libor T1 - Fines, nonpayment, and revenues: evidence from speeding tickets JF - The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization N2 - We estimate the effect of the level of fines on payment compliance and revenues collected from speeding tickets. Exploiting discontinuous increases in fines at speed cutoffs and reform-induced variation in these discontinuities, we implement two complementary regression discontinuity designs. The results consistently document small payment responses: a 10% increase in the fine (i.e., the payment obligation) induces a 1.2 percentage point decline in timely payments. The implied revenue elasticity is about 0.9. Expressed in absolute terms, a one-dollar increase in the fine translates into a roughly 60-cent increase in payments collected within 15 days (JEL H27, H26, K42). Y1 - 2025 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1093/jleo/ewad025 N1 - Published: 11 November 2023 VL - 41 IS - 2 SP - 381 EP - 401 ER -