TY - CHAP A1 - Bach, Tobias A1 - Jugl, Marlene A1 - Köhler, Dustin A1 - Wegrich, Kai T1 - Reputational threats and democratic responsiveness of regulatory agencies T2 - The Accountability of Expertise N2 - This chapter studies decision-making behaviour of independent regulatory agencies. Theoretical accounts of delegation to regulatory agencies emphasise that losses of political accountability of regulators are traded off against potential gains in regulatory efficiency. The theory of credible commitment suggests that independent (non-majoritarian) regulatory agencies are more effective in regulating markets than organisations under direct political control. However, independent regulatory agencies operate in a political context and need to demonstrate their benefit to a diverse set of stakeholders, including elected politicians. We are hence confronted with a ‘paradox of autonomisation’ according to which more autonomous public organisations have to take into consideration external demands to a greater degree than less autonomous organisations. Independent regulatory agencies will thus be subjected to high … Y1 - 2021 SN - 9781003175490 SP - 81 EP - 98 PB - Routledge CY - London, New York ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Bach, Tobias A1 - Jugl, Marlene A1 - Köhler, Dustin A1 - Wegrich, Kai T1 - Regulatory agencies, reputational threats, and communicative responses JF - Regulation & Governance N2 - A key claim in bureaucratic reputation literature is that reputation has several dimensions. This presents agencies with a difficult choice concerning which dimension(s) they should emphasize in the management of their reputation. This paper analyzes how regulatory agencies manage their reputation through communicative responses to public judgments, based on a singlecase study of the German financial regulator BaFin. Our theoretical argument underscores the importance of different reputational dimensions for regulatory agencies that simultaneously considers their distinct reputation reserves. Our main finding was that BaFin prioritizes responses to public judgments targeting reputational dimensions that are central to its mission and for which the agency has a weak reputation, as opposed to judgments targeting dimensions that are central to its mission and for which it has a strong reputation, or judgments targeting peripheral dimensions. The paper demonstrates the importance of agency missions for reputation management and suggests directions for further research. Y1 - 2021 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12421 SP - 1 EP - 16 ER -