TY - JOUR A1 - Flachsland, Christian A1 - Grosjean, G. A1 - Acworth, W. A1 - Marschinski, R. T1 - After Monetary Policy, Climate Policy: Is Delegation Key to EU ETS reform? JF - Climate Policy N2 - Since the crash of carbon prices in phase II of the European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), many have argued that the low price mirrors structural failures requiring intervention. A wide range of reform options have been suggested, including delegating the governance of the carbon market to an independent authority. This article analyses the debate by reconstructing the various arguments for or against reform. Three possible drivers of the price decline are investigated: (1) exogenous shocks; (2) insufficient credibility; and (3) market imperfections. It is argued that the extent to which a low price is problematic and warrants reform depends on the specific objectives associated with the EU ETS and the perception on the functioning of the market. A two-dimensional EU ETS Reform Space, comprising the degree of price certainty within the EU ETS and the level of delegation, is devised. Within the Reform Space, EU ETS reform options currently discussed are mapped. This descriptive structure offers a framework to clarify whether delegation responds to various concerns with respect to the EU ETS. Delegation might enhance flexibility under unforeseen circumstances, decrease policy uncertainty, and increase the credibility of long-term policy commitments. However, higher degrees of delegation face challenges including democratic legitimacy and political feasibility. KW - Carbon authority KW - Carbon central bank KW - Carbon price KW - Delegation KW - EU Emissions Trading System KW - Market stability reserve Y1 - 2016 U6 - https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2014.965657 VL - 16 IS - 1 SP - 1 EP - 25 PB - Taylor & Francis ER -