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  <doc>
    <id>2615</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2007</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>338</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>359</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue>2</issue>
    <volume>23</volume>
    <type>article</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2018-10-01</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries</title>
    <abstract language="eng">This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the main pattern of budgetary institutions and their determinants across the EU 15 member states. Empirical evidence for the time period 1985–2004 suggests that the centralisation of budgeting procedures restrains public debt. In countries with one-party governments or coalition governments where parties are closely aligned and where political competition among them is low, this is achieved by the delegation of decision-making power to the minister of finance. Fiscal contracts that require countries to set multi-year targets and that reinforce those targets increase fiscal discipline in countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions and where parties regularly compete against each other.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">European Journal of Political Economy</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.11.005</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">1873-5703</identifier>
    <licence>Metadaten / metadata</licence>
    <author>Mark Hallerberg</author>
    <submitter>Olivia Pechtold</submitter>
    <author>Rolf Strauch</author>
    <author>Jürgen von Hagen</author>
    <thesisPublisher>Hertie School</thesisPublisher>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>2619</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2004</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>203</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>228</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition>Nº Extra 2004</edition>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>article</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2018-10-01</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Budgeting in Europe after Maastrichtpatterns of reform and their effectiveness</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Este trabajo analiza el desarrollo de las reglas e instituciones fiscales en los países europeos durante la última década. Hallamos que el grado de cambios de los procesos presupuestarios y de las reglas fiscales difiere mucho entre los distintos países. Se evalúa el patrón de los cambios con respecto a los diferentes tipos ideales de gobernabilidad fiscal. Nuestro análisis muestra que los países que adoptan reglas en consonancia con sus instituciones fiscales predichas consiguen mayores logros en el plano fiscal que otras naciones que no hacen eso. Tenemos, pues, una explicación parcial de por qué razón el efecto del marco fiscal europeo ha sido asimétrico en relación con los países miembros.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">Hacienda Publica Espanola</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="url">https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=1112074</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">0210-1173</identifier>
    <licence>Metadaten / metadata</licence>
    <author>Mark Hallerberg</author>
    <submitter>Olivia Pechtold</submitter>
    <author>Rolf Strauch</author>
    <author>Jürgen von Hagen</author>
    <thesisPublisher>Hertie School</thesisPublisher>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>275</id>
    <completedYear>2009</completedYear>
    <publishedYear>2009</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>230</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>book</type>
    <publisherName>Cambridge Univ. Press</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace>Cambridge [u.a.]</publisherPlace>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2009-12-31</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Fiscal Governance in Europe</title>
    <abstract language="eng">This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Based on original research, the book classifies European Union countries from 1985 to 2004. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.</abstract>
    <identifier type="isbn">9780521138260</identifier>
    <note>Available as print and ebook in your Hertie Library. &#13;
&#13;
Als Druckversion und eBook in der Hertie Bibliothek verfügbar.</note>
    <licence>Metadaten / metadata</licence>
    <author>Mark Hallerberg</author>
    <submitter>Hertie Library Hertie Library</submitter>
    <author>Rolf Rainer Strauch</author>
    <author>Jürgen von Hagen</author>
  </doc>
</export-example>
