<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<export-example>
  <doc>
    <id>1993</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2013</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>128</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume>1</volume>
    <type>bookeditorship</type>
    <publisherName>Budrich</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace>Opladen</publisherPlace>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>1</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2013-09-01</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Controlling Corruption in Europe</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Corruption has an impact. It is about time that anticorruption starts having an impact, too.&#13;
 &#13;
This is the first annual policy report of the European Seventh Framework Research Project ANTICORRP, which has started in 2012 and will continue until 2018. Based on the work of 21 different research centers and universities gathering original data, ANTICORRP offers yearly updates on the latest from corruption research, analyzing both the consequences of corruption and the impact of policies attempting to curb it.&#13;
 &#13;
This first report offers a methodology to evaluate corruption risk and quality of government at country, region and sector level by means of corruption indicators that are sensitive to change and policy intervention. The aim of the project is to offer testable, easy to handle policies which reduce corruption risk.&#13;
 &#13;
Corruption distorts market competition, bolsters deficits on behalf of discretionary spending, hurts real investment in public health and education, reduces tax collection, detriments the absorption rate of EU funds, and generates vulnerable employment and brain drain. This study estimates that if EU member states would all manage to control corruption at the Danish level, tax collection in Europe would increase by 323 billion Euro per year – double of the EU budget for 2013.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="deu">The Anticorruption Report</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-3-8474-0125-4</identifier>
    <licence>Metadaten / metadata</licence>
    <author>Alina Mungiu-Pippidi</author>
    <editor>Alina Mungiu-Pippidi</editor>
    <submitter>Geraldine Endrizzi</submitter>
    <author>Roxana Bratu</author>
    <author>Nicholas Charron</author>
    <author>Valentina Dimulescu</author>
    <author>Madalina Doroftei</author>
    <author>Mihály Fazekas</author>
    <author>Aare Kasemets</author>
    <author>Lawrence Peter King</author>
    <author>Roberto Martinez Barranco Kukutschka</author>
    <author>Raluca Pop</author>
    <author>István János Tóth</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Anticorruption, European Union, transformative power</value>
    </subject>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>1994</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2015</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>126</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume>3</volume>
    <type>bookeditorship</type>
    <publisherName>Budrich</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace>Opladen</publisherPlace>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>1</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2015-10-01</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Government Favouritism in Europe</title>
    <abstract language="eng">This volume on Government Favouritism in Europe reunites the fieldwork of 2014-2015 in the ANTICORRP project. It is entirely based on objective indicators and offers both quantitative and qualitative assessments of the linkage between political corruption and organised crime using statistics on spending, procurement contract data and judicial data. The methodology used in the analysis of particularism of public resource distribution is applicable to any other country where procurement data can be made available and opens the door to a better understanding and control of both systemic corruption and political finance.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="deu">The Anticorruption Report</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">978-3-8474-0795-9</identifier>
    <licence>Metadaten / metadata</licence>
    <editor>Alina Mungiu-Pippidi</editor>
    <submitter>Geraldine Endrizzi</submitter>
    <author>Acar Muhittin</author>
    <author>Elizabeth David-Barrett</author>
    <author>Valentina Dimulescu</author>
    <author>Madalina Doroftei</author>
    <author>Uğur Emek</author>
    <author>Mihály Fazekas</author>
    <author>Stefan Karaboev</author>
    <author>Péter András Lukács</author>
    <author>Roberto Martínez Barranco Kukutschka</author>
    <author>Alina Mungiu-Pippidi</author>
    <author>Munir Podumljak</author>
    <author>Salvatore Sberna</author>
    <author>Ruslan Stefanov</author>
    <author>István János Tóth</author>
    <author>Alberto Vannucci</author>
    <author>Andrew Wilson</author>
    <author>Todor Yalamov</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>corruption, government favouritism, public procurement</value>
    </subject>
  </doc>
</export-example>
