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    <abstract language="eng">This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors’ costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these extensions do not dissolve inc-dec gaming, which already occurs in our setup of two regions. We also benchmark market-based redispatch against grid investment, cost-based redispatch, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The comparison highlights a significant inefficiency of market-based redispatch and inflated redispatch payments. Finally, we study seven variations of our basic model to assess whether different market fundamentals or market design changes mitigate inc-dec gaming. None of these variations eliminate inc-dec gaming entirely.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">The Energy Journal</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1177/01956574251365606</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <licence>Metadaten / metadata</licence>
    <author>Karl-Martin Ehrhart</author>
    <submitter>Alex Karras</submitter>
    <author>Anselm Eicke</author>
    <author>Lion Hirth</author>
    <author>Fabian Ocker</author>
    <author>Marion Ott</author>
    <author>Ingmar Schlecht</author>
    <author>Runxi Wang</author>
    <collection role="HertieResearch" number="">Centre for Sustainability</collection>
    <collection role="AY-25-26" number=""/>
    <thesisPublisher>Hertie School</thesisPublisher>
  </doc>
</export-example>
