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  <doc>
    <id>2911</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2015</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>workingpaper</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2019-05-07</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Towards a comprehensive mapping of information on public procurement tendering and its actors across Europe</title>
    <abstract language="eng">This report presents the results of a comprehensive mapping exercise of the scope and quality of public procurement and linked information in 35 European jurisdictions: 28 European Union member states, 6 EU neighbouring countries and the European Commission. Part I analyses the public procurement information hosted in national platforms and made available online for the average user. This analysis enables the classification and comparison of countries along a series of dimensions, such as the amount of historical data on individual tenders, the scope of tender documentation publicly available, the fragmentation of procurement information sources, and the degree of machine-readability of tender announcements, among several others. Parts II and III of the report complement the information on procurement processes and outcomes with information on the two main actors involved in these processes: bidders and buyers. In this context, part II maps existing relevant data on private companies and part III follows with data on the governmental units acting as contracting authorities in each of our 35 jurisdiction. Discussing information linked to public procurement tendering data goes beyond the description of this deliverable in the Description of Work.</abstract>
    <identifier type="url">http://digiwhist.eu/publications/towards-a-comprehensive-mapping-of-information-on-public-procurement-tendering-and-its-actors-across-europe/</identifier>
    <licence>Metadaten / metadata</licence>
    <author>Luciana Cingolani</author>
    <submitter>Caroline Forscht</submitter>
    <author>Mihály Fazekas</author>
    <author>Roberto Martinez Barranco Kukutschka</author>
    <author>Bence Tóth</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>public procurement</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>national regulatory framework</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Europe</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>data quality</value>
    </subject>
    <thesisPublisher>Hertie School</thesisPublisher>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>2889</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2018</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>154</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>185</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>bookpart</type>
    <publisherName>Oxford University Press</publisherName>
    <publisherPlace>Oxford</publisherPlace>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2019-04-26</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Innovations in objectively measuring corruption in public procurement</title>
    <parentTitle language="eng">Governance Indicators: Approaches, Progress, Promise</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="isbn">9780198817062</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.doi.autoCreate">false</enrichment>
    <enrichment key="opus.urn.autoCreate">true</enrichment>
    <licence>Metadaten / metadata</licence>
    <author>Mihály Fazekas</author>
    <submitter>Caroline Forscht</submitter>
    <editor>Helmut K. Anheier</editor>
    <author>Luciana Cingolani</author>
    <editor>Matthias Haber</editor>
    <author>Bence Tóth</author>
    <editor>Mark A. Kayser</editor>
    <thesisPublisher>Hertie School</thesisPublisher>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>2891</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2017</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>76</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>116</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue>1</issue>
    <volume>95</volume>
    <type>article</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2019-04-26</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Breaking the Cycle? How (Not) to Use Political Finance Regulations to Counter Public Procurement Corruption</title>
    <abstract language="eng">There are widespread perceptions and countless documented cases of tight-knit networks of politicians and businessmen colluding in the allocation of public procurement contracts in return for political party donations. In the absence of systematic evidence, neither the magnitude of the problem nor the effectiveness of policies curbing such corruption is well-understood. In order to advance our understanding of these phenomena, this paper tests whether political financing regulations can contribute to controlling corruption in public procurement. We utilize aggregated official micro-level data on almost 3 million contracts awarded across twenty-nine European countries from 2009 to 2014 to measure the risk of high-level institutionalized corruption using novel proxy indicators. Legislation regulating political finances is directly measured by coding national laws from 2009 to 2014. In cross-country panel regression and difference-in-difference models, we find that introducing additional political financing restrictions does not have a measurable negative impact on public procurement corruption risks. In fact, the observed effect is positive in most models. The observed relationship remains the same for most constitutive components of political financing regulations. Several challenges remain for a conclusive judgement on political party financing regulations’ effectiveness in curbing corruption, such as measuring implementation rather than legislation, allowing for a longer lead-time for regulatory impact, or considering institutional inter-dependencies.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">The Slavonic and East European Review</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.5699/slaveasteurorev2.95.1.0076</identifier>
    <licence>Metadaten / metadata</licence>
    <author>Mihály Fazekas</author>
    <submitter>Caroline Forscht</submitter>
    <author>Luciana Cingolani</author>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Political corruption</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Political parties</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Political regulation</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Donations</value>
    </subject>
    <subject>
      <language>eng</language>
      <type>uncontrolled</type>
      <value>Government corruption</value>
    </subject>
    <thesisPublisher>Hertie School</thesisPublisher>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>4411</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2017</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst/>
    <pageLast/>
    <pageNumber>30</pageNumber>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume/>
    <type>workingpaper</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2022-04-26</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">Administrative capacities that matter: organisational drivers of public procurement competitiveness in 32 European countries</title>
    <abstract language="eng">In spite of the many efforts in the pursuit of a European single market, many barriers continue to lie ahead, as the field of public procurement illustrates. In 2015, around 40% of all high-value procurement tenders in a large pool of European countries attracted only 2 bidders or less, and only 3% of all winning companies had their offices outside the procuring country. This paper explores a rather unaccounted dimension behind the competitiveness of tenders: the administrative capacities of contracting authorities. For this, we first build a theoretically-informed multidimensional framework of administrative capacities and subsequently test the effect of these capacities on competitiveness, by using a comprehensive and curated database of more than 120.000 procurement contracts in 32 European countries. The findings show that most administrative measures robustly explain a portion of competitiveness, in particular administrative aspects related to the choice of instruments and procedures to conduct the bidding calls, such as electronic procurement. Findings also show that the behaviour of these relationships is counterintiuitive at times, and highly dependent on the national context, suggesting that organizational path-dependency undermines convergence under EU regulation.</abstract>
    <identifier type="urn">urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-44115</identifier>
    <enrichment key="opus.source">publish</enrichment>
    <licence>Creative Commons - CC BY - 4.0 International</licence>
    <author>Luciana Cingolani</author>
    <submitter>Nadja Starke</submitter>
    <author>Mihály Fazekas</author>
    <thesisPublisher>Hertie School</thesisPublisher>
    <file>https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/files/4411/The_administrative_capacities_behind.pdf</file>
  </doc>
  <doc>
    <id>3467</id>
    <completedYear/>
    <publishedYear>2020</publishedYear>
    <thesisYearAccepted/>
    <language>eng</language>
    <pageFirst>545</pageFirst>
    <pageLast>563</pageLast>
    <pageNumber/>
    <edition/>
    <issue/>
    <volume>33</volume>
    <type>article</type>
    <publisherName/>
    <publisherPlace/>
    <creatingCorporation/>
    <contributingCorporation/>
    <belongsToBibliography>0</belongsToBibliography>
    <completedDate>2020-05-13</completedDate>
    <publishedDate>--</publishedDate>
    <thesisDateAccepted>--</thesisDateAccepted>
    <title language="eng">The role of agencification in achieving value-for-money in public spending</title>
    <abstract language="eng">Agencification has been pursued globally under the promise of increasing public administration performance. In spite of ample theoretical arguments, the empirical evidence on the causal link between agencification and performance remains scarce and methodologically contested. We contribute to this debate by empirically testing the impacts of agencification across Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom on value‐for‐money, competitiveness, and timeliness during the period 2006–2016. We use unique administrative datasets, enabling objective and granular measurements of reforms and their effects, employing quasi‐experimental methods. Findings suggest heterogeneous effects both across countries and outcomes. On average, value‐for‐money improves by 2.8% or 1.7 billion EUR over a decade, while outputs and processes change only marginally. Recently agencified organizations barely improve their performance, while older agencies achieve substantial improvements. The three countries' heterogeneous administrative contexts play a critical role as mediating factors, with the biggest changes occurring in higher new public management take‐up countries.</abstract>
    <parentTitle language="eng">Governance - An International Journal of Policy, Administration, and Institutions</parentTitle>
    <identifier type="doi">10.1111/gove.12452</identifier>
    <identifier type="issn">1468-0491</identifier>
    <identifier type="urn">urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-34674</identifier>
    <licence>Metadaten (öffentlich), Volltext (zugriffsbeschränkt)</licence>
    <author>Luciana Cingolani</author>
    <submitter>Nadja Starke</submitter>
    <author>Mihály Fazekas</author>
    <thesisPublisher>Hertie School</thesisPublisher>
    <file>https://opus4.kobv.de/opus4-hsog/files/3467/Cingolani_2020_The_role_of_agencification.pdf</file>
  </doc>
</export-example>
