@article{MungiuPippidi, author = {Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina}, title = {Controlling Corruption Through Collective Action}, series = {Journal of Democracy}, volume = {24}, journal = {Journal of Democracy}, number = {1}, editor = {Diamond, Larry and Plattner, Marc F.}, publisher = {Johns Hopkins University Press}, address = {Baltimore}, issn = {1045-5736}, pages = {101 -- 115}, abstract = {Control of corruption in a society is an equilibrium between resources and costs which either empowers or constraints elites predatory behavior. While most research and practice focuses on legal constraints, this paper investigates normative constraints, deemed to be more important, especially civil society and the press. Fresh evidence—both historical and statistical—is found to support Tocqueville's assertions regarding the importance of collective action and the joint action of media and associations in not only creating a democratic society, but controlling corruption as well. However, little is known on how to build normative constraints.}, language = {en} } @article{MungiuPippidi, author = {Mungiu-Pippidi, Alina}, title = {Becoming Denmark: Historical Designs of Corruption Control}, series = {Social Research: An International Quarterly}, volume = {80}, journal = {Social Research: An International Quarterly}, number = {4}, editor = {Mack, Arien}, publisher = {The Johns Hopkins University Press}, address = {Baltimore}, issn = {0037-783X}, pages = {1259 -- 1286}, abstract = {This paper conceptualizes public corruption as part of a broader social order context. It argues that corruption should not be conceived of as a social 'malady' to be eradicated, but rather as a default governance regime. People naturally favor their own, be it family, clan, race or ethnic group: treating the rest of the world fairly seems to be a matter of extensive social evolution and sufficient resources. Very few societies have evolved from this natural state of affairs to produce a state which can be expected to treat everyone equally and fairly, and to put public above private interest, when entrusted with the management of common affairs and resources. The paper surveys the approaches to anticorruption of three distinct political regimes, monarchy, medieval republic and modern democracy to conclude that current anticorruption should be conceptualized as solving collective action problems rather than as repression of deviance.}, language = {en} }