@article{HallerbergStrauchvonHagen, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Strauch, Rolf and von Hagen, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {23}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {1873-5703}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.11.005}, pages = {338 -- 359}, abstract = {This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the main pattern of budgetary institutions and their determinants across the EU 15 member states. Empirical evidence for the time period 1985-2004 suggests that the centralisation of budgeting procedures restrains public debt. In countries with one-party governments or coalition governments where parties are closely aligned and where political competition among them is low, this is achieved by the delegation of decision-making power to the minister of finance. Fiscal contracts that require countries to set multi-year targets and that reinforce those targets increase fiscal discipline in countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions and where parties regularly compete against each other.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Who Provides Signals to Voters about Government Competence on Fiscal Matters? The Importance of Independent Watchdogs}, series = {Policy Instruments for Sound Fiscal Policies}, booktitle = {Policy Instruments for Sound Fiscal Policies}, editor = {Ayuso-i-Casals, Joaquim and Deroose, Servaas and Flores, Elena and Moulin, Laurent}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-230-27179-1}, doi = {10.1057/9780230271791_11}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {241-255}, abstract = {The Maastricht Treaty set a series of convergence criteria that Member States have to meet to join the euro area. The Treaty is not specific, however, about how to prevent free-riding fiscal behaviour once Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is in place. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) represents an institutional response.1 Its design includes preventive and corrective mechanisms. The emphasis for the preventive arm rests on the monitoring of Member State behaviour. Euro-area Member States produce Stability Programme updates yearly in the autumn. The European Commission, for its part, assesses the programmes and makes recommendations to the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (henceforth 'ECOFIN') on whether the programmes meet European fiscal objectives, which in particular includes the achievement of budget positions 'close to balance or in surplus'. In order to move to the formal corrective arm of the Pact, a Member State would have to be found to have an 'excessive deficit'.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Calı, author = {{\c{C}}al{\i}, Ba{\c{s}}ak}, title = {The limits of international justice at the European Court of Human Rights: between legal cosmopolitanism and a society of states}, series = {Paths to international justice: social and legal perspectives}, booktitle = {Paths to international justice: social and legal perspectives}, editor = {Dembour, Marie-B{\´e}n{\´e}dicte and Kelly, Tobias}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, address = {Cambridge}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {111 -- 133}, language = {en} } @incollection{Calı, author = {{\c{C}}al{\i}, Ba{\c{s}}ak}, title = {Human Rights discourse and domestic Human Rights NGOs}, series = {Human Rights in Turkey}, booktitle = {Human Rights in Turkey}, editor = {Arat, Zehra F. Kabasakal}, publisher = {University of Pennsylvania Press}, address = {Philadelphia}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {217 -- 232}, abstract = {Turkish domestic human rights organizations (HROs) have played a major role in developing a human rights discourse by using human rights as an interpretive framework to criticize, resist, and reform domestic political, social, and economic arrangements. This chapter contends that since 1986, domestic Turkish HROs have been major actors in the development of a domestically grown human rights perspective in Turkish politics. They have introduced framing issues as human rights issues and paved the way in fostering a culture of minimum guarantees and protections that any individual ought to enjoy within the Turkish political community.}, language = {en} }