@article{HaasD'ErmanSchulzetal., author = {Haas, J{\"o}rg and D'Erman, Valerie and Schulz, Daniel and Verdun, Amy}, title = {Economic and fiscal policy coordination after the crisis: is the European Semester promoting more or less state intervention?}, series = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {42}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, number = {3}, issn = {1477-2280}, doi = {10.1080/07036337.2020.1730356}, pages = {327 -- 344}, abstract = {The European Union (EU) - and its Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in particular - is often criticized as a predominantly market-oriented project. We analyse to what extent such claims can be substantiated by focusing on one key aspect of the EU's post-crisis framework for economic governance: the country-specific recommendations (CSRs) that the EU has been issuing annually since 2011. Based on an original dataset, we analyse more than 1300 CSRs, which show that the EU does not push uniformly for less state intervention. Rather, the CSRs tend to suggest fiscal restraint and less protection for labour market insiders, while simultaneously promoting measures that benefit vulnerable groups in society. During the second decade of EMU, CSRs have gradually become more permissive of higher public spending and more in favour of worker protection, while the share of recommendations advocating more social protection has stagnated at a high level.}, language = {en} } @article{Cova, author = {Cova, Joshua}, title = {Reconsidering the drivers of country-specific recommendations: The Commission's ideological preferences on wage policies}, series = {European Union Politics}, journal = {European Union Politics}, doi = {10.1177/14651165221102696}, abstract = {As part of the European Semester, the European Commission issues country-specific recommendations for all member states. I contribute to the literature on this political instrument, by considering the determinants of recommendations calling for greater wage moderation and enhanced cost competitiveness. For the most part, research on European economic governance has either understood the European Commission as a politicized and 'ideological' institution or as a de-politicized, technocratic actor. My analysis shows that the European Commission's ideological preferences on labour markets and wage bargaining institutions are more convincing predictors than explanations based on economic indicators. By testing a series of multilevel models, I find that irrespective of developments in competitiveness, countries with stronger social actors are more likely to be recipients of country-specific recommendations calling for wage restraint.}, language = {en} }