@incollection{JoergesBohnenberger, author = {Joerges, Christian and Bohnenberger, Fabian}, title = {A Conflicts-law Response to the Precarious Legitimacy of Transnational Trade Governance}, series = {Research Handbook on The Sociology of International Law}, booktitle = {Research Handbook on The Sociology of International Law}, editor = {Hirsch, Moshe and Lang, Andrew}, publisher = {Edward Elgar}, address = {Cheltenham}, isbn = {9781783474486}, abstract = {This paper discusses the fundamental tensions between economic globalisation and democratic politics in the field of international trade. New bilateral and regional trade agreements increasingly incorporate other "trade-related" policy areas and threaten to constrain state action and democratic politics. The move towards deeper and more comprehensive trade deals has greatly accentuated grievances and is of exemplary importance in the realms of transnational governance. This article examines the decoupling of these agreements from national and democratic control and the resulting legitimacy impasses of transnational governance based upon the theoretical frameworks of Karl Polanyi and Dani Rodrik. Arguing that politics is not a mistake that gets in the way of markets, we submit our own conceptualisation of transnational legitimacy. In doing so, we suggest a new type of conflicts law which does not seek to overcome socio-economic and political diversity by some substantive transnational regime, but responds to diversity with procedural safeguards, thus ensuring space for co-operative problem-solving and the search for fair compromises.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Joerges, author = {Joerges, Christian}, title = {Was bleibt vom Projekt der Integration Europas durch Recht?}, series = {Kulturen des Rechts: Rechtstransfer und Pluralismus in globaler Perspektive}, booktitle = {Kulturen des Rechts: Rechtstransfer und Pluralismus in globaler Perspektive}, editor = {G{\"u}nther, Klaus and Kadelbach, Stefan}, publisher = {Campus}, address = {Frankfurt am Main [u.a.]}, isbn = {978-3593399812}, abstract = {Im Zentrum des Bandes stehen Austauschprozesse, Vermischungen sowie Konflikte zwischen verschiedenen Rechtskulturen. Dabei geht es um den Transfer von Rechtsordnungen, um lokale autonome Ordnungen in Bezug auf Ordnungen mit generellem Geltungsanspruch, um neue Formen der Hybridisierung in der wechselseitigen Rezeption von Rechtsgrunds{\"a}tzen oder um die Herausbildung transnationaler Rechtsordnungen und die Frage, ob diese sich als Prozesse der Konstitutionalisierung, der Durchsetzung universaler Rechtsprinzipien oder des Managements von Pluralit{\"a}t deuten lassen.}, language = {de} } @phdthesis{Freudlsperger, author = {Freudlsperger, Christian}, title = {More voice, less exit. Sub-federal Resistance to International Procurement Liberalisation in the European Union, the United States and Canada}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-2529}, school = {Hertie School}, pages = {302}, abstract = {Via an agenda of "deep trade", global trade governance has increasingly intruded into domestic regulatory space. This is all the more relevant in federally-organised polities in which competencies now subjected to international rule-setting are constituent units' prerogatives. In many federations, the field of public procurement is a case in point. At the same time, sub-federal executives' resistance to international procurement liberalisation has varied vastly across federations. While EU member states' resistance has remained low, US states' resistance has persisted and increased in recent years. The Canadian provinces, in turn, have only recently begun to open their procurement markets to foreign suppliers. In an attempt to explain this puzzling variance in sub-federal resistance, this Dissertation argues that federations' domestic institutional and procedural foundations bear an influence on policy outcomes in trade liberalisation. Relying on the concepts of "exit" and "voice" (Hirschman 1970), it posits that sub-federal executives' voice is inversely related to their reliance on exit. The more voice sub-federal executives are equipped with, the less they dispose of an incentive to exit from a system-wide policy or international commitment. Voice hinges, firstly, on a federation's institutional configuration. Council federalism, providing constituent units with a direct representation in federation-wide policy-making, endows sub-federal executives with more voice than senate federalism which relies on indirect forms of territorial representation. It depends, secondly, on the nature of vertical relations between both orders of government. Constituent units enjoy more voice when their relations with the federal level are collaborative, marked by formalised patterns of joint policy-making, rather than competitive, pursuing a delineation of federal and subfederal spheres of competence. In case studies of the United States, Canada and the European Union, the Dissertation finds that the posited inverse relationship between sub-federal voice and exit holds and that resistance among sub-federal executives has indeed evolved systematically. In the US senate federation, effective means of joint policy-making have not evolved in the noncoercive field of procurement. In the Canadian case, increasing vertical collaboration has compensated provinces for senate federalism's low voice. In comparison, the EU case proves peculiar for constituent units' decisive role in its second chamber federalism and the dense regime of trusting vertical collaboration it accommodates. Member states' low resistance is a manifestation of the EU trade regime's comparatively effective workings. Eventually, the dissertation's findings hint at an appropriate institutional and procedural design for international rule-setting in multi-level settings. If federal executives seek to subject sub-federal prerogatives to international constraints, they should allow for constituent units' continuous, systematic and collaborative inclusion.}, language = {en} } @article{Dawson, author = {Dawson, Mark}, title = {New governance and the displacement of Social Europe: the case of the European Semester}, series = {European Constitutional Law Review}, volume = {14}, journal = {European Constitutional Law Review}, number = {1}, issn = {1574-0196}, doi = {10.1017/S1574019618000081}, pages = {191 -- 209}, abstract = {Has the European Semester led to a displacement of Social Europe, or to the development of social policy through fiscal processes and actors? - Potential for Semester to increase soft law's binding effects or 'socialise' EU policy-making - Positive effects severely limited by the Semester's overall goals: fiscal stabilisation and the creation of increasingly uniform economic policies - Dilemma for Social Europe: how can an autonomous EU social policy be (re) established without risking marginalisation?}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Kreilinger, author = {Kreilinger, Valentin}, title = {National parliaments in Europe's post-crisis economic governance}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-2730}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-27309}, school = {Hertie School}, pages = {279}, abstract = {This dissertation provides a comprehensive account of the role of national parliaments in Europe's post-crisis economic governance. It examines national parliaments in the European Semester, in relation to the European Stability Mechanism and the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination and Governance and challenges the view that the Euro crisis has only reduced the influence of national parliaments. The analysis moves beyond prerogatives and institutional capacities to actual parliamentary involvement. Scrutinising the different stages of the European Semester remains a challenge for many national parliaments that have been marginalised by this multilevel coordination and surveillance process. In case of the third rescue package for Greece, the overall involvement by national parliaments exceeded what legal provisions would have demanded. But both economic governance domains suffer from asymmetries between those national parliaments that are willing and able to become actually involved and those that are not. One possible remedy against these asymmetries would be to involve national parliaments into economic governance collectively. The provision of Article 13 TSCG and the Interparliamentary Conference established on this basis, however, fall short of collective involvement or joint scrutiny and the experience of negotiating the institutional design of the new Conference even suggests that any kind of joint parliamentary body for the Euro area would be very difficult to realise. As a general overhaul of the Economic and Monetary Union seems indispensable to make the common currency weather-proof, a more symmetric involvement of national parliaments is necessary to strengthen the legitimacy that they supply. In the European Semester this could be achieved via minimum standards for parliamentary involvement, but the tangled web of procedures for ESM rescue packages is likely to persist and interparliamentary cooperation can only be developed incrementally.}, language = {en} } @article{KoopRehBressanelli, author = {Koop, Christel and Reh, Christine and Bressanelli, Edoardo}, title = {When politics prevails: Parties, elections and loyalty in the European Parliament}, series = {European Journal of Political Research}, volume = {57}, journal = {European Journal of Political Research}, number = {3}, issn = {1475-6765.12252}, doi = {10.1111/1475-6765.12252}, pages = {563 -- 586}, abstract = {In many political systems, legislators serve multiple principals who compete for their loyalty in legislative votes. This article explores the political conditions under which legislators choose between their competing principals in multilevel systems, with a focus on how election proximity shapes legislative behaviour across democratic arenas. Empirically, the effect of electoral cycles on national party delegations' 'collective disloyalty' with their political groups in the European Parliament (EP) is analysed. It is argued that election proximity changes the time horizons, political incentives and risk perceptions of both delegations and their principals, 'punctuating' cost-benefit calculations around defection as well as around controlling, sanctioning and accommodating. Under the shadow of elections, national delegations' collective disloyalty with their transnational groups should, therefore, increase. Using a new dataset with roll-call votes cast under legislative codecision by delegations between July 1999 and July 2014, the article shows that the proximity of planned national and European elections drives up disloyalty in the EP, particularly by delegations from member states with party-centred electoral rules. The results also support a 'politicisation' effect: overall, delegations become more loyal over time, but the impact of election proximity as a driver of disloyalty is strongest in the latest parliament analysed (i.e., 2009-2014). Furthermore, disloyalty is more likely in votes on contested and salient legislation, and under conditions of Euroscepticism; by contrast, disloyalty is less likely in votes on codification files, when a delegation holds the rapporteurship and when the national party participates in government. The analysis sheds new light on electoral politics as a determinant of legislative choice under competing principals, and on the conditions under which politics 'travels' across democratic arenas in the European Union's multilevel polity.}, language = {en} } @incollection{NaurinReh, author = {Naurin, Daniel and Reh, Christine}, title = {Deliberative Negotiation}, series = {The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy}, booktitle = {The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy}, editor = {B{\"a}chtiger, Andre and Dryzek, John S. and Mansbridge, Jane and Warren, Mark}, publisher = {Oxford UP}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {9780198747369}, doi = {10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198747369.001.0001}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {728 -- 741}, abstract = {Deliberative democracy has been the main game in contemporary political theory for two decades and has grown enormously in size and importance in political science and many other disciplines, and in political practice. The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy takes stock of deliberative democracy as a research field, as well as exploring and creating links with multiple disciplines and policy practice around the globe. It provides a concise history of deliberative ideals in political thought while also discussing their philosophical origins. It locates deliberation in a political system with different spaces, publics, and venues, including parliament and courts but also governance networks, protests, mini-publics, old and new media, and everyday talk. It documents the intersections of deliberative ideals with contemporary political theory, involving epistemology, representation, constitutionalism, justice, and multiculturalism. It explores the intersections of deliberative democracy with major research fields in the social sciences and law, including social and rational choice theory, communications, psychology, sociology, international relations, framing approaches, policy analysis, planning, democratization, and methodology. It engages with practical applications, mapping deliberation as a reform movement and as a device for conflict resolution. It documents the practice and study of deliberative democracy around the world, in Asia, Latin America, Africa, Europe, and global governance. And it provides reflections on the field by pioneering thinkers.}, language = {en} } @article{DawsonBobićMaricutAkbik, author = {Dawson, Mark and Bobić, Ana and Maricut-Akbik, Adina}, title = {Reconciling Independence and accountability at the European Central Bank: The false promise of Proceduralism}, series = {European Law Journal}, volume = {25}, journal = {European Law Journal}, number = {1}, issn = {1468-0386}, doi = {10.1111/eulj.12305}, pages = {75 -- 93}, abstract = {This article revisits the balancing act between independence and accountability at the European Central Bank (ECB). It contrasts procedural and substantive concepts of accountability, and challenges the mainstream idea that independence and accountability can be reconciled through narrow mandates, the indiscriminate increase of transparency, the creation of multiple channels of accountability, and the active use of judicial review. These assumptions form the pillars of a procedural type of accountability that promises to resolve the independence/accountability dilemma but fails to do so in practice. The article brings evidence to show how ECB accountability has become a complex administrative exercise that focuses on the procedural steps leading up to monetary and supervisory decisions while simultaneously limiting substantive accountability. The failure to acknowledge the trade-off between independence and accountability (said to be 'two sides of the same coin') has resulted in a tendency to privilege the former over the latter.}, language = {en} } @article{DawsonAugensteinThielboerger, author = {Dawson, Mark and Augenstein, Daniel and Thielb{\"o}rger, Pierre}, title = {The UNGPs in the European Union: The Open Coordination of Business and Human Rights?}, series = {Business and Human Rights Journal}, volume = {3}, journal = {Business and Human Rights Journal}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1017/bhj.2017.30}, pages = {1 -- 22}, abstract = {The article examines the implementation of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UNGPs) in the European Union via National Action Plans (NAPs). We argue that some of the shortcomings currently observed in the implementation process could effectively be addressed through the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) - a governance instrument already used by the European Union (EU) in other policy domains. The article sketches out the polycentric global governance approach envisaged by the UNGPs and discusses the institutional and policy background of their implementation in the EU. It provides an assessment of EU member states' NAPs on business and human rights, as benchmarked against international NAP guidance, before relating experiences with the existing NAP process to the policy background and rationale of the OMC and considering the conditions for employing the OMC in the business and human rights domain. Building on a recent opinion of the EU Fundamental Rights Agency, the article concludes with a concrete proposal for developing an OMC on business and human rights in the EU.}, language = {en} } @article{BenassyQuereBrunnermeierEnderleinetal., author = {B{\´e}nassy-Qu{\´e}r{\´e}, Agn{\`e}s and Brunnermeier, Markus and Enderlein, Henrik and Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Farhi, Emmanuel and Fratzscher, Marcel and Fuest, Clemens and Gourinchas, Pierre-Olivier and Martin, Philippe and Rey, H{\´e}l{\`e}ne and Schnabel, Isabel and V{\´e}ron, Nicolas and Weder di Mauro, B{\´e}atrice and Zettelmeyer, J{\´e}romin}, title = {Reconciling risk sharing with market discipline: A constructive approach to Eurozone reform}, series = {CEPR Policy Insight No. 91}, journal = {CEPR Policy Insight No. 91}, language = {en} } @article{GenschelJachtenfuchs, author = {Genschel, Philipp and Jachtenfuchs, Markus}, title = {From Market Integration to Core State Powers. The Eurozone Crisis, the Refugee Crisis and Integration Theory}, series = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, volume = {56}, journal = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1111/jcms.12654}, pages = {178 -- 196}, abstract = {The Eurozone crisis and the refugee crisis are showcases of the problems associated with the EU's shift from market integration to the integration of core state powers. The integration of core state powers responds to similar demand factors as market integration (interdependence, externalities and spillover) but its supply is more tightly constrained by a high propensity for zero-sum conflict, a functional requirement for centralized fiscal, coercive and administrative capacities, and high political salience. We show how these constraints structured the initial design of Economic and Monetary Union and of Schengen, made them vulnerable to crisis, and shaped policy options during the crises: they made horizontal differentiation unattractive, re-regulation ineffective, centralized risk and burden-sharing unfeasible, and the externalization of adjustment burdens to non-EU actors necessary by default. In conclusion, we explore possible escape routes from the trap.}, language = {en} } @article{DawsonBobić, author = {Dawson, Mark and Bobić, Ana}, title = {Quantitative easing at the Court of Justice - Doing whatever it takes to save the euro: Weiss and Others}, series = {Common Market Law Review}, volume = {56}, journal = {Common Market Law Review}, number = {4}, issn = {0165-0750}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-30368}, pages = {1005 -- 1040}, language = {en} } @techreport{Dawson, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Dawson, Mark}, title = {Juncker's Political Commission: Did it Work?}, series = {SIEPS - Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies}, journal = {SIEPS - Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies}, abstract = {The 'political Commission' may be the defining idea of the Juncker Presidency. But did it work? This paper is devoted to analysing how the notion of a political Commission has framed the organization and policy-making of the Juncker Commission. The idea of the political Commission was to allow the Commission to streamline its agenda and focus on a narrower number of proposals. In the words of the 2018 State of the Union address: to be 'bigger on the big things and smaller on the small things'. In reality, external constraints, and in particular the divergent preferences and electoral cycles of national governments, have frustrated this promise. The Commission's confinement to a relatively narrow set of regulatory (rather than distributive) tools limits its ability to be politically responsive to the main challenges the Union currently faces. At the same time, the political Commission undermines some elements of the Commission's regulatory legitimacy - for example, its promise to be a neutral arbiter in the enforcement of competition, internal market and rule of law norms. While the political Commission continues to be a normatively attractive idea, it has fitted poorly with the institutional and political constraints surrounding the Juncker Presidency. This carries implications for the next Commission and the fate of the Spitzenkandidaten process.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Dawson, author = {Dawson, Mark}, title = {How Can EU Law Contain Economic Discretion?}, series = {EU Executive Discretion and the Limits of Law}, booktitle = {EU Executive Discretion and the Limits of Law}, editor = {Mendes, Joana}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, isbn = {9780198826668}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-29889}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {64 -- 84}, language = {en} } @incollection{Dawson, author = {Dawson, Mark}, title = {The Impact of Brexit on British Law and Democracy: Four Effects}, series = {Brexit - and What it Means}, booktitle = {Brexit - and What it Means}, editor = {Kadelbach, Stefan}, publisher = {Nomos}, isbn = {9783848760121}, doi = {10.5771/9783748901327-47}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {47 -- 56}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Koenig, author = {K{\"o}nig, Franca}, title = {EU Police Cooperation (1976 - 2016). State Preferences in the Context of Differentiated Integration}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-3107}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-31074}, school = {Hertie School}, pages = {297}, abstract = {European internal security has become increasingly relevant in recent years. Various incidents across EU Member States have demonstrated the transnationalisation of terrorism and organised crime as well as the need to work together to safeguard security in a progressively borderless Europe. Governments and citizens have consistently called for a growing role of the EU and coordinating at this level. In this light, it appears striking that different cooperation initiatives continue to mushroom inside and outside the EU framework. Their parallel emergence duplicates efforts at best but can also obstruct information exchange and produce security failures. This dissertation sets out to investigate why Member States acknowledge the benefits of integration, yet advance differentiation as well. Concretely, it studies the formation of state preferences in the still largely intergovernmental field of EU police cooperation. It asks which factors shape government positions and how they drive Member States to favour integration. In particular, the influence of cross-country interdependencies, politicisation and policy entrepreneurship might help explain processes of integration and differentiation in this policy area. Their relative importance as drivers of state preferences is studied across the institutional development of EU police cooperation between 1976 and 2016. The analysis is organised around four 'milestones' in the integration of this field: 1) the 1976 intergovernmental Trevi Group; 2) the 1995 Europol Convention establishing the European Police Office (Europol); (3) the 2009 Europol Council Decision establishing Europol as official EU agency; and (4) the 2016 Europol Regulation. This dissertation finds that interdependencies in the fight against common threats mattered most as driver of state integration preferences in the early stages of European police cooperation. More recently, supranational policy entrepreneurship has emerged as key influence of pro-integration attitudes among Member States and can be expected to grow in importance. Politicisation, against it, provides windows of opportunity to this end and acts rather as amplifier of integration pressure from interdependencies and policy entrepreneurs. In sum, the asymmetrical effects of all three drivers explains the formation of diverging governmental attitudes towards integration and can thus help account for the persistence of parallel processes of differentiation and integration.}, language = {en} } @techreport{Redeker, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Redeker, Nils}, title = {Brexit: Bereit f{\"u}r Phase 2? Wie es nach dem Austritt weitergeht}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-32875}, pages = {6}, abstract = {Fast f{\"u}nf Jahrzehnte nachdem das Vereinigte K{\"o}nigreich der Union beigetreten ist und dreieinhalb Jahre nachdem sich die Briten in einem Referendum mit knapper Mehrheit f{\"u}r den Brexit entschieden haben, beendet Großbritannien am 31. Januar um Mitternacht deutscher Zeit offiziell seine Mitgliedschaft. Die direkten Folgen des Austritts halten sich dennoch zun{\"a}chst in Grenzen. Noch bis zum Jahresende l{\"a}uft eine {\"U}bergangsfrist, w{\"a}hrend der sich Großbritannien weiterhin an alle EU-Standards halten muss, Teil des Binnenmarkts und der Zollunion bleibt und Beitr{\"a}ge in den EU-Haushalt zahlt. Erst am Ende dieser Frist wird Großbritannien nicht nur formal und institutionell, sondern auch faktisch aus der EU ausscheiden. Beiden Seiten bleiben damit elf Monate, um ihre k{\"u}nftigen Beziehungen zu regeln und ein umfassendes Freihandelsabkommen zu vereinbaren. Gelingt das nicht, drohen die Einf{\"u}hrung von Z{\"o}llen, Importquoten und anderen Handelsbeschr{\"a}nkungen. Die wirtschaftlichen Folgen w{\"a}ren mit denen eines No-Deal Brexits durchaus vergleichbar. Das Ringen um den Brexit geht also in die n{\"a}chste Runde. Drei Fragen werden dabei in den kommenden Monaten entscheidend sein. Erstens, ist ein Abkommen innerhalb der gesetzten Frist {\"u}berhaupt zu erreichen? Zweitens, wie breit k{\"o}nnte so ein erstes Abkommen werden? Und drittens, wie geschlossen wird die EU in den kommenden Verhandlungen auftreten k{\"o}nnen?}, language = {de} } @techreport{Guttenberg, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Guttenberg, Lucas}, title = {We Don't Need No Institution - What the Eurozone requires is not a treasury but a common fiscal policy}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-32881}, pages = {5}, abstract = {Does the Eurozone need a "treasury"? The answer is no: The Eurozone needs a common fiscal policy to complement the ECB's monetary policy. But it does not need a new institution to take fiscal policy decisions or to execute such decisions. The EU institutional framework is well-equipped to perform these functions. Hence, the focus of political energy should be on getting the right policies and instruments in place, not on building new shiny institutions.}, language = {en} } @techreport{Koenig, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Koenig, Nicole}, title = {Qualified Majority Voting in EU Foreign Policy: Mapping Preferences}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-32897}, pages = {6}, abstract = {The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is one of the EU's last bastions of unanimous decision-making. The idea of introducing qualified majority Voting (QMV) is as old as the policy area itself.}, language = {en} } @techreport{Dittrich, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Dittrich, Paul-Jasper}, title = {Data sharing: A European challenge? Why the EU should make data sharing a piority}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-32902}, pages = {6}, abstract = {Data sharing refers to transactions in which personal or nonpersonal data from the public or private sector is made available for other organisations (public or private) for use and re-use. Data sharing can occur for free or data can be made available for profit. Data sharing in the EU has a lot of untapped value potential both for individuals and for the economy at large. New rules and institutions that can enable data sharing in a trusted manner and give citizens more control over when and how they share their private data need to be built at the European level. The question is how? The EU should work towards a stronger culture of data sharing and help build the necessary infrastructure with a focus on two areas: Building infrastructure for data sharing and access for companies and extending the right to portability of personal data (Art. 20 GDPR).}, language = {en} }