@book{HallerbergStrauchvonHagen2009, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Strauch, Rolf Rainer and von Hagen, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Fiscal Governance in Europe}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press}, address = {Cambridge [u.a.]}, isbn = {9780521138260}, pages = {230}, year = {2009}, abstract = {This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Based on original research, the book classifies European Union countries from 1985 to 2004. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergStrauchvonHagen, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Strauch, Rolf and von Hagen, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {23}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {1873-5703}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.11.005}, pages = {338 -- 359}, abstract = {This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the main pattern of budgetary institutions and their determinants across the EU 15 member states. Empirical evidence for the time period 1985-2004 suggests that the centralisation of budgeting procedures restrains public debt. In countries with one-party governments or coalition governments where parties are closely aligned and where political competition among them is low, this is achieved by the delegation of decision-making power to the minister of finance. Fiscal contracts that require countries to set multi-year targets and that reinforce those targets increase fiscal discipline in countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions and where parties regularly compete against each other.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergStrauchvonHagen, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Strauch, Rolf and von Hagen, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Budgeting in Europe after Maastrichtpatterns of reform and their effectiveness}, series = {Hacienda Publica Espanola}, journal = {Hacienda Publica Espanola}, edition = {Nº Extra 2004}, issn = {0210-1173}, pages = {203 -- 228}, abstract = {Este trabajo analiza el desarrollo de las reglas e instituciones fiscales en los pa{\´i}ses europeos durante la {\´u}ltima d{\´e}cada. Hallamos que el grado de cambios de los procesos presupuestarios y de las reglas fiscales difiere mucho entre los distintos pa{\´i}ses. Se eval{\´u}a el patr{\´o}n de los cambios con respecto a los diferentes tipos ideales de gobernabilidad fiscal. Nuestro an{\´a}lisis muestra que los pa{\´i}ses que adoptan reglas en consonancia con sus instituciones fiscales predichas consiguen mayores logros en el plano fiscal que otras naciones que no hacen eso. Tenemos, pues, una explicaci{\´o}n parcial de por qu{\´e} raz{\´o}n el efecto del marco fiscal europeo ha sido asim{\´e}trico en relaci{\´o}n con los pa{\´i}ses miembros.}, language = {en} }