@article{HallerbergBasinger, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Basinger, scott}, title = {Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom}, series = {American Political Science Review}, volume = {98}, journal = {American Political Science Review}, number = {2}, issn = {1537-5943}, doi = {10.1017/S0003055404001133}, pages = {261 -- 276}, abstract = {This paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital, using the analogy of a "tournament" as a substitute for the "race-to-the-bottom" model. Our key insight is that political costs that accompany legislating have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood and scale of reforms. While countries with higher political costs are less likely themselves to enact reforms, the presence of these costs also reduces competing countries' incentives to reform regardless of their own political costs. Domestic politics therefore mitigates the pressures for downward convergence of tax policy despite increased capital mobility. We examine the capital tax policies in OECD countries during the period from 1980 to 1997 and find that states are sensitive to tax reforms in competitor countries, although their responses to reforms are mediated by their own domestic costs to reform. We define two potential sources of political costs of reform: transaction costs, due to the presence of multiple veto players in the legislative process, and constituency costs, due to ideological opposition to policy changes that benefit capital. Our evidence reveals that a reduction in these costs either domestically or abroad increases the likelihood that a country enacts tax reforms.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergBasinger, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Basinger, Scott}, title = {Globalization and Tax Reform: An Updated Case for the Importance of Veto Players}, series = {Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift}, volume = {40}, journal = {Politische Vierteljahreszeitschrift}, number = {4}, issn = {2364-9976}, pages = {618 -- 627}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergBasinger, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Basinger, Scott}, title = {Internationalization and Changes in Tax Policy in OECD Countries}, series = {Comparative Political Studies}, volume = {31}, journal = {Comparative Political Studies}, number = {3}, issn = {1552-3829}, doi = {10.1177/0010414098031003003}, pages = {321 -- 353}, abstract = {This article examines the role that economic and political factors played in tax reform in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries from 1986 to 1990. Some writers argue that economic integration forced states to reform their tax systems. The authors' findings indicate that economic openness had an indirect effect on the level of change in marginal tax rates. The institutional structure of a country was most important—countries that had only one veto player or only one institution or party whose approval was necessary for a bill to become law enacted more sweeping reform than states that had more than one veto player. These results suggest that even when international or domestic economic factors might dictate a change in policy, reform will not be as sweeping in countries in which agreement among several institutions and/or parties is necessary.}, language = {en} }