@techreport{HallerbergYlaeoutinen2008, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Yl{\"a}outinen, Sami}, title = {Fiscal Governance in Central and Eastern Europe before and after European Union Accession: What Role Europeanisation?}, publisher = {Hertie School of Governance}, address = {Berlin}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-1667}, pages = {28}, year = {2008}, abstract = {Our paper focuses on the development of fiscal institutions in Central and East European countries from 1998 to 2007. Following the Europeanisation literature as well as the expectations that the European Union established in its dialogue with prospective members through annual "Preaccession Economic Programmes," one would anticipate that there would have been reform of fiscal institutions in the run-up to EU accession. Unlike in most other policy fields, there is an additional incentive to continue reform once a country has joined the EU, which is eurozone membership. This paper explains how we measure fiscal institutions and fiscal reforms. We provide time series data on the fiscal institutions each country has had in place, and, based on a new set of surveys and interviews we conducted, we compare the state of these fiscal institutions in 2007, or after the countries had acceded to the EU, with the institutions in place before accession. We find that preparations for the EU accession prior to 2004 did lead to some changes in budget process in this set of countries. The carrot of EMU membership after acceding to the EU, however, has so far not had the same effect--the pace of reform has since stalled, with most countries leaving the same fiscal institutions in place.In some countries further reforms to develop medium-term fiscal frameworks are either planned or are in a process of being initiated but it is too early to say if the reforms will truly materialise and transform the frameworks into a vehicle that would impose a serious constraint for government spending.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergYlaeoutinen2010, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Yl{\"a}outinen, Sami}, title = {Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe}, series = {Journal of Public Policy}, volume = {30}, journal = {Journal of Public Policy}, number = {1}, issn = {0143-814X}, doi = {10.1017/S0143814X09990213}, pages = {45 -- 62}, year = {2010}, abstract = {This paper considers the effects of fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 1998-2008. The first part makes predictions about which form of fiscal governance fits which form of government. Under multi-party coalition governments, fiscal contracts where governments make political commitments to multi-annual fiscal plans work well. In countries where two political blocks face off against one another, delegation based around a strong finance ministry should be most effective. The second part examines electoral and party systems, which affect the form of government in place. The third part documents norms, rules, and institutions in place. The final section considers the joint effects of fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. On balance, the underlying political climate is crucial for determining what types of fiscal norms, institutions, and rules function best. The more countries diverge from their expected form of fiscal governance, the greater the increase in a country's debt burden.}, language = {en} }