@book{Woll, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {The Power of Inaction: Bank Bailouts in Comparison}, publisher = {Cornell University Press}, isbn = {978-0-8014-7115-5}, publisher = {Hertie School}, abstract = {Bank bailouts in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the onset of the Great Recession brought into sharp relief the power that the global financial sector holds over national politics, and provoked widespread public outrage. In The Power of Inaction, Cornelia Woll details the varying relationships between financial institutions and national governments by comparing national bank rescue schemes in the United States and Europe. Woll starts with a broad overview of bank bailouts in more than twenty countries. Using extensive interviews conducted with bankers, lawmakers, and other key players, she then examines three pairs of countries where similar outcomes might be expected: the United States and United Kingdom, France and Germany, Ireland and Denmark. She finds, however, substantial variation within these pairs. In some cases the financial sector is intimately involved in the design of bailout packages; elsewhere it chooses to remain at arm's length. Such differences are often ascribed to one of two conditions: either the state is strong and can impose terms, or the state is weak and corrupted by industry lobbying. Woll presents a third option, where the inaction of the financial sector critically shapes the design of bailout packages in favor of the industry. She demonstrates that financial institutions were most powerful in those settings where they could avoid a joint response and force national policymakers to deal with banks on a piecemeal basis. The power to remain collectively inactive, she argues, has had important consequences for bailout arrangements and ultimately affected how the public and private sectors have shared the cost burden of these massive policy decisions.}, language = {en} } @book{Woll, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {Firm Interests: How Governments Shape Business Lobbying on Global Trade}, publisher = {Cornell University Press}, isbn = {9780801446092}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {208}, abstract = {Firms are central to trade policy-making. Some analysts even suggest that they dictate policy on the basis of their material interests. Cornelia Woll counters these assumptions, arguing that firms do not always know what they want. To be sure, firms lobby hard to attain a desired policy once they have defined their goals. Yet material factors are insufficient to account for these preferences. The ways in which firms are embedded in political settings are much more decisive. Woll demonstrates her case by analyzing the surprising evolution of support from large firms for liberalization in telecommunications and international air transport in the United States and Europe. Within less than a decade, former monopolies with important home markets abandoned their earlier calls for subsidies and protectionism and joined competitive multinationals in the demand for global markets. By comparing the complex evolution of firm preferences across sectors and countries, Woll shows that firms may influence policy outcomes, but policies and politics in turn influence business demands. This is particularly true in the European Union, where the constraints of multilevel decision-making encourage firms to pay lip service to liberalization if they want to maintain good working relations with supranational officials. In the United States, firms adjust their sectoral demands to fit the government's agenda. In both contexts, the interaction between government and firm representatives affects not only the strategy but also the content of business lobbying on global trade.}, language = {en} } @misc{JacquotWoll, author = {Jacquot, Sophie and Woll, Cornelia}, title = {Les usages de l'Europe : acteurs et transformations europ{\´e}ennes}, editor = {Jacquot, Sophie and Woll, Cornelia}, publisher = {L'Harmattan}, address = {Paris}, isbn = {9782747564991}, pages = {318}, abstract = {Comment s'impose l'Europe? Par sa production l{\´e}gislative et politique uniquement ou {\´e}galement gr{\^a}ce aux divers usages qui en sont faits? Ce livre s'attache {\`a} analyser qui s'implique dans l'int{\´e}gration europ{\´e}enne, comment et dans quels buts. En mettant en {\´e}vidence le r{\^o}le des acteurs en tant que vecteurs de transformations et en d{\´e}veloppant la notion d'usages de l'Europe, ce travail collectif entend apporter une perspective suppl{\´e}mentaire {\`a} l'agenda des recherches sur l'europ{\´e}anisation et l'impact de l'int{\´e}gration europ{\´e}enne.}, language = {fr} } @article{Woll, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {Politics in the Interest of Capital: A Not-So-Organized Combat}, series = {Politics \& Society}, volume = {44}, journal = {Politics \& Society}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1177/0032329216655318}, pages = {373 -- 391}, abstract = {In recent debates about inequality, many have pointed to the predominant position of the finance. This article highlights that structural power, not lobbying resources, are key to explaining variations across countries. It examines finance-government negotiations over national bank rescue schemes during the recent financial crisis. Given the structural power of finance, the variation in bank bailouts across countries cannot be explained by lobbying differences. Instead of observing organized interest intermediation, we can see that disorganization was crucial for the financial industry to get off the hook and let the government carry the burden of stabilizing the economy. Put differently, structural power is strongest when finance remains collectively inactive. In contrast to traditional accounts of the lobbying influence of finance, the comparison highlights that the lack of organization can have crucial redistributive consequences.}, language = {en} } @article{Woll, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {Bank Rescue Schemes in Continental Europe: The Power of Collective Inaction}, series = {Government and Opposition}, volume = {49}, journal = {Government and Opposition}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1017/gov.2014.5}, pages = {426 -- 451}, abstract = {Comparing bank rescue schemes in France and Germany during the banking crisis of 2008-9, this article argues that collective inaction is a little-studied aspect in the exercise of power in business-government relations. Contrary to studies that focus on lobbying, structural power or the influence of beliefs, the comparison highlights that governments depend on contributions from the financial industry during crisis management. In the negotiations to design bank support schemes, some countries, such as France, succeeded in engaging their financial sector collectively. Such public-private burden-sharing arrangements alleviate the public budget and increase mutual surveillance between banks during government support. In other countries, such as Germany, a collectively organized industry response failed, which forced the government to design an entirely public support scheme. The German government reacted to this perceived imbalance by imposing tighter banking regulation to avoid a repetition of the impotence it experienced in 2008.}, language = {en} } @article{Woll, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {National business associations under stress: Lessons from the French case}, series = {West European Politics}, volume = {29}, journal = {West European Politics}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1080/01402380600619819}, pages = {489 -- 512}, abstract = {Since its reform in 1998, the national association of French employers and industry, MEDEF, appears to be an example of strong interest organisation. Unlike trade unions, the peak business organisation has been stable and unified, especially in terms of membership density. Through a study of the collective action of businesses in France, this article sheds doubt on such an impression and argues that the national business association has been put severely under stress in recent years. Like all encompassing associations, MEDEF comprises a great variety of interests and constantly has to manage its internal heterogeneity. An analysis of the historical and institutional context of its recent reform demonstrates that MEDEF's forceful media campaign should not be understood as a display of actual strength and coherence; rather it is the last resort of collective action that the association can claim legitimately as its responsibility.}, language = {en} } @article{Woll, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {Lobbying in the European Union: From sui generis to a comparative perspective}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {13}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1080/13501760600560623}, pages = {456 -- 469}, abstract = {This article reviews the literature on lobbying in the European Union. After initial surveys of the landscape of non-governmental actor participation, theoretical investigations have focused on the modes of network governance and later on the phenomenon of Europeanization. Yet studies have increasingly moved away from considering EU lobbying as a sui generis phenomenon. Normalizing the study of interest group participation in the EU and understanding the opportunities and constraints that are characteristic for it has led more and more scholars to adopt a comparative perspective. The most interesting parallels exist between Washington and Brussels, but unfortunately there have been very few attempts to explore the connection between the American literature on lobbying and EU studies. This article makes a first step towards such a comparison and points to concepts common in comparative politics that could provide considerable insight into the study of EU lobbying.}, language = {en} } @article{Woll, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {La r{\´e}forme du Medef : chronique des difficult{\´e}s de l'action collective patronale}, series = {Revue fran{\c{c}}aise de science politique}, volume = {56}, journal = {Revue fran{\c{c}}aise de science politique}, number = {2}, doi = {10.3917/rfsp.562.0255}, pages = {255 -- 279}, abstract = {Depuis sa r{\´e}forme en 1998, le Mouvement des entreprises de France (Medef) appara{\^i}t comme une association puissante et unifi{\´e}e. En {\´e}tudiant l'action collective patronale en France, cet article met en doute cette impression. Contrairement aux apparences, l'organisation centrale du patronat fran{\c{c}}ais se trouve face {\`a} des d{\´e}fis comparables {\`a} la d{\´e}syndicalisation des salari{\´e}s. En tant que f{\´e}d{\´e}ration, le Medef est constitu{\´e} d'une multitude d'int{\´e}r{\^e}ts divers et doit g{\´e}rer cette h{\´e}t{\´e}rog{\´e}n{\´e}it{\´e} interne avant de pouvoir agir politiquement. L'analyse du contexte historique et institutionnel de sa r{\´e}forme r{\´e}cente montre que la nouvelle strat{\´e}gie de communication politique du Medef n'atteste pas de la puissance ou de la coh{\´e}rence de l'organisation ; elle est plut{\^o}t le dernier domaine d'action publique que l'association peut assumer pleinement sans perdre sa l{\´e}gitimit{\´e} aux yeux de ses membres.}, language = {fr} } @article{Woll, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {The road to external representation: the European Commission's activism in international air transport}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {13}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1080/13501760500380734}, pages = {52 -- 69}, abstract = {This article argues that the role the Commission plays in European foreign policies goes beyond the execution of the competences delegated by the member states. The Commission is not just the external negotiator of the EU, it can also use its powers as the guardian of the Treaties to expand its foreign policy competences. The case study of international air transport illustrates how the Commission was able to obtain an external negotiation mandate in June 2003 to which member states were originally opposed. The analysis draws particular attention to the Commission's reliance on the European Court of Justice and to a cognitive strategy centred on the United States. By means of these two tools, the Commission was able to affect the default condition of member state preferences and reorient the focal point of intergovernmental negotiations.}, language = {en} } @article{Woll, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {Vers des comp{\´e}tences externes : l'activisme de la commission europ{\´e}enne en mati{\`e}re d'aviation internationale}, series = {Politique europ{\´e}enne}, volume = {17}, journal = {Politique europ{\´e}enne}, number = {3}, doi = {10.3917/poeu.017.0137}, pages = {137 -- 158}, abstract = {Pour analyser le r{\^o}le jou{\´e} par la Commission dans les politiques {\´e}trang{\`e}res europ{\´e}ennes, nous montrons comment la Commission peut {\´e}largir ses comp{\´e}tences en utilisant ses droits en tant que gardienne des trait{\´e}s. L'{\´e}tude de cas de la politique europ{\´e}enne en mati{\`e}re d'aviation internationale illustre comment la Commission a pu obtenir un mandat de n{\´e}gociation externe que les Etats membres lui avaient auparavant refus{\´e}. Pour cela la Commission s'est appuy{\´e}e sur des recours juridictionnels et a employ{\´e} une strat{\´e}gie cognitive qui inscrit la question de l'aviation civile dans la concurrence avec les Etats-Unis. Par ces deux moyens, la Commission a su changer les pr{\´e}f{\´e}rences des Etats membres et r{\´e}orienter le point focal des n{\´e}gociations intergouvernementales.}, language = {fr} } @article{WollBalme, author = {Woll, Cornelia and Balme, Richard}, title = {Europe and the Transformation of French Policy-Making: a Cross-Sectoral Approach}, series = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Staats- und Europawissenschaften}, volume = {3}, journal = {Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Staats- und Europawissenschaften}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1515/zfse.2005.3.3.388}, pages = {388 -- 409}, abstract = {This article sheds light on the "Europeanisation" of French policy-making - defined as the national adjustment to European integration - and asks whether different policy domains experience the same kind of pressure to adjust. Four sectors representing different policy types are examined: monetary and budgetary policies, public services, agricultural policy and equal employment. This cross-sectional approach reveals different degrees of change and patterns of adaptation, whilst in no case the EU fully supplanted national decision-making. The authors' conclusion suggests that regulative and redistributive policies are less conflicting with European integration than distributive policies at the core of the French welfare state, but that the latter are also strongly resilient and resistant to radical changes. Patterns of policy changes are highly complex and diversified, and their "path-dependency" is rooted in the political feasibility of public policy at the domestic level.}, language = {en} } @article{WollJacquot, author = {Woll, Cornelia and Jacquot, Sophie}, title = {Usage of European Integration - Europeanisation from a Sociological Perspective}, series = {European Integration online Papers (EIoP)}, volume = {7}, journal = {European Integration online Papers (EIoP)}, number = {12}, abstract = {The effect of European integration on its member states constitutes the new research agenda within the study of European integration. Marked by the "the institutionalist turn" of Anglo-Saxon political sciences, the most dominant theories on europeanisation focus on structural arrangements. Institutional incompatibility between the European and the national level, so the hypothesis, creates pressures for change. Actors are often only considered as mediators of these pressures. Consequentially, few approaches try to explain adaptational change initiated by policy actors in the absence of institutional pressures. Using a political sociology approach, the central concern of this paper is to insist on the political discretion of national actors in translation of European requirements. We believe that understanding not only "adaptation to" but also "usage of" the process of European integration is important to understanding the transformation of European member states. By insisting on usage, we aim at analysing both the strategic interaction of rational actors with the European institutions and the more sociological effect of "usage" - as "daily practice" - on the interest and identities of the actors.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Woll, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {La politique de concurrence}, series = {Politiques europ{\´e}ennes}, booktitle = {Politiques europ{\´e}ennes}, editor = {Dehousse, Renaud}, publisher = {Presses de Sciences Po}, address = {Paris}, isbn = {978-2-7246-1132-8}, doi = {10.3917/scpo.dehou.2009.03.0171}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {171 -- 188}, abstract = {POLITIQUES EUROPEENNES offre une vue d'ensemble du syst{\`e}me institutionnel, des acteurs, du jeu politique et des modes d'action de l'Union, {\`a} la fois dans les domaines o{\`u} son intervention est ancienne et dans ceux o{\`u} son influence est plus r{\´e}cente. Agriculture, monnaie, concurrence, mais aussi commerce, enseignement sup{\´e}rieur, social, environnement ou m{\^e}me politique {\´e}trang{\`e}re : l'influence de l'Europe se fait sentir dans un grand nombre de domaines, et pourtant son action reste largement m{\´e}connue. Fruit d'une coop{\´e}ration entre politistes, juristes, {\´e}conomistes et sociologues, tous enseignants {\`a} Sciences Po, ce manuel sans {\´e}quivalent en langue fran{\c{c}}aise donne les cl{\´e}s pour mettre en perspective les dynamiques de la construction europ{\´e}enne depuis ses origines et pour comprendre les d{\´e}fis auxquels elle fait face aujourd'hui. Con{\c{c}}u comme un support pour des enseignements d'introduction {\`a} l'int{\´e}gration europ{\´e}enne, il propose un panorama clair et synth{\´e}tique des politiques europ{\´e}ennes et de leur d{\´e}veloppement. Enrichi de nombreux encadr{\´e}s, zooms, documents et r{\´e}f{\´e}rences bibliographiques, il s'adresse aux {\´e}tudiants, chercheurs et enseignants des premiers et deuxi{\`e}mes cycles en science politique, droit, {\´e}conomie, administration publique et administration {\´e}conomique et sociale.}, language = {fr} } @incollection{Woll, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {Trade Policy Lobbying in the European Union: Who Captures Whom?}, series = {Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors, and Issues}, booktitle = {Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors, and Issues}, editor = {Coen, David and Richardson, Jeremy}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {978-0-19-920735-0}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {277 -- 297}, abstract = {What role do firms play in the making of EU trade policy? This chapter surveys the policy domain and lays out the instruments firms can employ to influence decisions on trade. It underlines that European trade policy is characterized by a high degree of institutional complexity, which firms have to manage in order to be successful. In particular, the European Commission works intensively to solicit business input in order to gain bargaining leverage vis-{\`a}-vis third countries and the EU member states. This reverse lobbying creates a two-channel logic of trade policy lobbying in the EU. Corporate actors have a very good chance of working closely with the European Commission if they can propose pan-European trade policy solutions. This can be either trade liberalization or EU-wide regulatory restrictions on trade. Demands for traditional protectionist measures, especially those that reveal national interest divergences, are difficult to defend at the supranational level. Protectionist lobbying therefore goes through the national route, with corporate actors working to block liberalization by affecting the consensus in the Council of Ministers. The chapter illustrates this two-channel logic by studying business-government interactions in agricultural trade, textiles and clothing, financial services, and telecommunication services.}, language = {en} } @techreport{Woll, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {Politics in the Interest of Capital. A Not-So-Organized Combat.}, series = {MaxPo Discussion Paper}, volume = {15}, journal = {MaxPo Discussion Paper}, number = {2}, pages = {28}, abstract = {The rise in inequality has been explained with reference to organized groups and the lobbying of the financial sector. This article argues that the image of politics as organized combat is contradicted by empirical evidence on lobbying in the United States, and does not travel well to Europe. The power of finance does not operate through organized political influence. Rather, politics in the interest of capital unfolds as a structural feature of advanced economies over time. Tellingly, at the height of the financial crisis, one of the most promising strategies of institutions seeking government support was not organizing for combat, but collective inaction. Our challenge, then, is to explain how the power of finance has built up and is playing out in creating inequality. A more structural, less agency-focused perspective highlights how the rise of finance has been supported by actors that few would accuse of being finance-friendly, such as the European center-left parties and consumers. Reconceptualizing the power of finance has important implications for political solutions to rising inequality.}, language = {en} } @techreport{WollFourcadeSteineretal., type = {Working Paper}, author = {Woll, Cornelia and Fourcade, Marion and Steiner, Philippe and Streeck, Wolfgang}, title = {Moral Categories in the Financial Crisis}, series = {MaxPo Discussion Paper}, volume = {13}, journal = {MaxPo Discussion Paper}, number = {1}, pages = {33}, abstract = {Karl Marx observed long ago that all economic struggles invite moral struggles, or masquerade as such. The reverse may be true as well: deep moral-political conflicts may be waged through the manipulation of economic resources. Using the recent financial and Eurozone crises as empirical backgrounds, the four papers gathered here propose four different perspectives on the play of moral judgments in the economy, and call for broader and more systematic scholarly engagement with this issue. Focusing on executive compensation, bank bailouts, and the sovereign debt crisis, the symposium builds on a roundtable discussion held at the opening of the Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo) in Paris on November 29, 2012.}, language = {en} } @techreport{WollGrossman, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Woll, Cornelia and Grossman, Emiliano}, title = {Saving the Banks: The Political Economy of Bailouts}, series = {Open Forum CES Paper Series}, volume = {8}, journal = {Open Forum CES Paper Series}, pages = {24}, abstract = {How much leeway did governments have in designing bank bailouts and deciding on the height of intervention during the 2007-2009 financial crisis? This paper analyzes comparatively what explains government responses to banking crises. Why does the type of intervention during financial crises vary to such a great extent across countries? By analyzing the variety of bailouts in Europe and North America, we will show that the strategies governments use to cope with the instability of financial markets does not depend on economic conditions alone. Rather, they take root in the institutional and political setting of each country and vary in particular according to the different types of business-government relations banks were able to entertain with public decision-makers. Still, "crony capitalism" accounts overstate the role of bank lobbying. With four case studies of the Irish, Danish, British and French bank bailout, we show that countries with close one-on-one relationships between policy-makers and bank management tended to develop unbalanced bailout packages, while countries where banks have strong interbank ties and collective negotiation capacity were able to develop solutions with a greater burden sharing from private institutions.}, language = {en} } @techreport{Woll, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Woll, Cornelia}, title = {Beyond Ideological Battles: A Strategic Analysis of Hedge Fund Regulation in Europe}, series = {Les Cahiers europ{\´e}ens de Sciences Po}, volume = {2}, journal = {Les Cahiers europ{\´e}ens de Sciences Po}, pages = {20}, abstract = {The highly politicized debate about the recent Alternative Investment Fund Manager (AIFM) Directive of the European Union led many observers to suspect an ideological battle between countries seeking to impose transnational regulation on financial service industries such as hedge funds and liberal market economies insisting on the benefits of market discipline in order to protect their financial centers. The battle that appeared to particularly pit France against the United Kingdom can thus be interpreted as an example of a regulatory paradigm shift in the aftermath of the crisis. This article cautions against such an ideas-centered account of financial regulation and points to the economic interests that drove the French and German agendas. However, contrary to the assumptions of traditional political economy approaches, national preferences were not simply defined by the aggregate of a country's economic interests. Rather, industry success in shaping government positions on alternative investment regulation crucially depended on how a given industry fit into the government's overarching geo-political agenda. By highlighting this feedback loop between government strategy and industry lobbying, the paper proposes a strategic analysis of financial regulation, as opposed to accounts that consider positions to be pre-determined by ideas or socioeconomic structures.}, language = {en} } @article{WollJacquot, author = {Woll, Cornelia and Jacquot, Sophie}, title = {Action publique Europ{\´e}enne : les acteurs strat{\´e}giques face a l'Europe}, series = {Politique europ{\´e}enne}, volume = {25}, journal = {Politique europ{\´e}enne}, number = {2}, doi = {10.3917/poeu.025.0161}, pages = {161 -- 192}, abstract = {Cet article s'int{\´e}resse {\`a} l'influence de la sociologie dans l'analyse de l'action publique europ{\´e}enne. Nous revenons notamment sur la notion "d'usage" que nous avons d{\´e}velopp{\´e}e auparavant et plaidons pour une prise en compte plus syst{\´e}matique de l'action strat{\´e}gique dans l'analyse des transformations europ{\´e}ennes. Nous analysons les {\´e}volutions r{\´e}centes des {\´e}tudes europ{\´e}ennes vers une prise en compte plus syst{\´e}matique de l'imbrication sociale des acteurs, ce qui permet d'{\´e}tudier leur rationalit{\´e} sans tomber dans certains pi{\`e}ges des approches du choix rationnel trop r{\´e}ductrices. L'analyse de l'action intentionn{\´e}e permet de mettre en lumi{\`e}re trois dimensions sp{\´e}cifiques des transformations europ{\´e}ennes : (1) les processus non contraignants et informels, (2) les effets de la circulation des acteurs entre les diff{\´e}rents niveaux du syst{\`e}me europ{\´e}en, et (3) l'importance des coalitions ambigu{\"e}s et parfois inattendues qui se forment, souvent malgr{\´e} des divergences profondes sur les objectifs {\`a} atteindre.}, language = {fr} } @article{WollArtigas, author = {Woll, Cornelia and Artigas, Alvaro}, title = {When trade liberalization turns into regulatory reform: The impact on business-government relations in international trade politics}, series = {Regulation \& Governance}, volume = {1}, journal = {Regulation \& Governance}, number = {2}, doi = {10.1111/j.1748-5991.2007.00010.x}, pages = {121 -- 138}, abstract = {Business-government relations on trade issues are generally characterized as protectionist lobbying or - less often - lobbying for the liberalization of markets. However, with the evolution of the trading system, negotiations today concern not just market opening, but also the regulatory frameworks that structure international trade. This transformation has important consequences for the ways in which private interests can contribute to trade negotiations. Instead of simply trying to exert pressure, businesses and other private actors now form working relationships with governments based on expertise, learning, and information exchange. This article illustrates these new forms of public-private interactions with examples from the USA, the European Union, and Brazil.}, language = {en} }