@article{HallerbergWolff2008, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Wolff, Guntram B.}, title = {Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {136}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, pages = {379 -- 396}, year = {2008}, abstract = {We investigate the effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the finance minister in the budget process and deficits on interest rate spreads of Eurozone countries. Deficits significantly increase risk premia measured by relative swap spreads. The effect of deficits is significantly lower under EMU. This effect partly results from neglecting the role of fiscal institutions. After controlling for institutional changes, fiscal policy remains a significant determinant of risk premia in EMU. Better institutions are connected with lower risk premia. Furthermore deficits matter less for risk premia in countries with better institutions. Markets acknowledge that better institutions reduce fiscal difficulties rendering the monitoring of annual developments less important.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergMarzinottoWolff, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Marzinotto, Benedicta and Wolff, Guntram}, title = {Explaining the evolving role of national parliaments under the European Semester}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, volume = {25}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, number = {2}, issn = {1466-4429}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2017.1363273}, pages = {250 -- 267}, abstract = {This contribution examines and explains the role of national parliaments in the European Semester process. It builds on original survey-based evidence and traces whether national parliaments discuss and vote on Stability/Convergence and on National Reform Programmes; how their involvement changed over time; and what might condition national varieties of parliamentary scrutiny over European Union (EU) affairs. We find significant cross-country variation in whether the debate is taking place at the parliamentary level; whether it is European Affairs or finance committees that are involved; and whether there is involvement ex ante (before submission) and/or ex post (after country-specific recommendations). From 2012 to 2015, finance committees played an increasingly prominent role. Traditional measures of the strength of parliament do not explain what we observe. We do find that non-euro area member states were most likely to monitor EU recommendations under the European Semester and that this effect increased over time.}, language = {en} } @article{EnderleinvonBogdandyCalliessetal., author = {Enderlein, Henrik and von Bogdandy, Armin and Calliess, Christian and Fratzscher, Marcel and Fuest, Clemens and Mayer, Franz C. and Schwarzer, Daniela and Steinbeis, Maximilian and Stelzenm{\"u}ller, Constanze and Wolff, Guntram and von Weizs{\"a}cker, Jakob}, title = {Aufbruch in die Euro-Union}, series = {ZRP: Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Rechtspolitik}, journal = {ZRP: Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Rechtspolitik}, number = {8}, publisher = {Beck}, address = {M{\"u}nchen [u.a.]}, issn = {0514-6496}, pages = {248 -- 250}, language = {de} } @article{PisaniFerryDemertzisSapiretal., author = {Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Demertzis, Maria and Sapir, Andr{\´e} and Wieser, Thomas and Wolff, Guntram}, title = {One size does not fit all: European integration by differentiation}, series = {Policy Brief}, volume = {3}, journal = {Policy Brief}, pages = {1 -- 12}, abstract = {THE ISSUE Reforming the governance of the European Union has become urgent for three reasons: to better deal with politically-sensitive topics, to manage greater external challenges mand because future EU enlargement will increase the diversity of the bloc's membership. The answer to disagreement typically has been qualified majority voting, but on sensitive topics, the EU has increasingly moved to unanimity and heavy European Council involvement, which has often not delivered results. The alternative answer has been a Europe of multiple speeds of integration with one shared goal for all, increasing political tensions. A different approach is now needed to move Europe forward. POLICY CHALLENGE Two options would be a Europe of concentric circles and a Europe of 'clubs', but the former would cement tensions between the inner and the outer circles, while the latter would lead to unclear structures and an end to cohesion. However, a governance model could combine the two approaches. The model would be based on a strong 'bare-bones EU' formed by the single market, trade and accompanying policies, the European institutions, treaties, rule of law and a commitment to fundamental EU values. Three policy areas would be completely moved into 'clubs' while remaining based on the bare-bones legal and institutional structure: economic and monetary union; Schengen and asylum policy; and foreign and security policy and neighbourhood policy. Club membership would be optional but once in, countries would have to accept the rules and there would be high hurdles to leaving. Finally, a ring of friends would surround the bare-bones EU, based on very close economic relationships and some multilateral discussion elements, but no formal votes.}, language = {en} } @techreport{PisaniFerryLeonardRibakovaetal., type = {Working Paper}, author = {Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Leonard, Mark and Ribakova, Elena and Wolff, Guntram}, title = {Redefining Europe's Sovereignty}, series = {Bruegel Policy Contribution}, journal = {Bruegel Policy Contribution}, abstract = {Executive summary Europeans like to believe the European Union has the collective economic size and capacity to determine its own economic destiny. But the behaviour of others global powers is increasingly calling this ability into question. China and the United States, especially, do not separate economic interests from geopolitical interests in the same way the EU does. They are increasingly using economic connections, from cyberspace to financial links, to gain geopolitical advantage or to serve geopolitical goals. Europe's economic sovereignty is at stake. The problem for Europe is real but manageable. This Policy Contribution examines the specific problems that China and the US pose for European economic sovereignty, and considers how the EU and its member states can better protect European economic sovereignty in a range of areas, including state aid to domestic industries, competition policy, investment screening, export controls, the international role of the euro, the role of European development banks, the European payments infrastructure and the global governance system. In each area, we recommend ways to improve the EU's capacity to wield economic power, without advocating increased protectionism or a retreat from globalisation. We make recommendations on how to adapt the EU and national policy systems to better integrate economic and geopolitical considerations. The next European Commission should develop an economic sovereignty strategy to boost Europe's research and scientific base, protect assets critical to national security from foreign interference, enforce a level playing field in domestic and international competition, and strengthen European monetary and financial autonomy. To guide the implementation of this strategy, an economic sovereignty committee should be established that will seek to integrate economic and security considerations within the European Commission. But the answer to this problem does not lie only in Brussels. We recommend a flexible implementation strategy that connects with member-state policy debates and makes use of 'mini-lateral' groups of member states.}, language = {en} } @incollection{PapaconstantinouPisaniFerryWolff, author = {Papaconstantinou, George and Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Wolff, Guntram}, title = {Extraterritoriality and Cooperation in Competition Policy. Seminar insights}, series = {Global Governance: Demise or Transformation? Progress report on the Transformation of Global Governance Project 2018-2019}, booktitle = {Global Governance: Demise or Transformation? Progress report on the Transformation of Global Governance Project 2018-2019}, publisher = {EUI}, address = {Florence}, isbn = {78-92-9084-788-5}, doi = {10.2870/310247}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {35 -- 36}, language = {en} } @article{LeonardPisaniFerryRibakovaetal., author = {Leonard, Mark and Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Ribakova, Elina and Shapiro, Jeremy and Wolff, Guntram}, title = {Securing Europe's Economic Sovereignty}, series = {Survival - Global Politics and Strategy}, volume = {61}, journal = {Survival - Global Politics and Strategy}, number = {5}, doi = {10.1080/00396338.2019.1662148}, pages = {75 -- 98}, abstract = {To protect European economic independence, the EU needs to better integrate economic policy and geopolitics. Europeans like to believe that the European Union has the collective economic size and capacity to determine Europe's economic destiny. They think the EU can determine its own rules for economic life, negotiate on an equal footing with partner economies, and even set economic standards and regulations for the rest of the world. But perhaps the EU has been lucky so far. Perhaps its apparent economic independence was always the result of the fortuitous absence of geopolitical interference. Perhaps it could only flourish under the benevolent aegis of a real superpower. Perhaps, in other words, its independence only endured because no serious power was willing to challenge it, and because the United States was willing to protect it. Now the behaviour of other powers is increasingly calling Europe's economic sovereignty into question. China and the US, in particular, do not separate economic interests from geopolitical interests in the same way that the EU does. They are increasingly using economic connections, from cyberspace to financial links, to serve geopolitical goals. Europe's economic sovereignty is now at stake. Until recently, the EU took for granted that the global system provided a functional framework for international economic relations, which could be regarded as separate from the sphere of geopolitics. Of course, the economic rules of the road were determined by power relations that arose in the wake of the Second World War. But in the years that followed, even the US largely followed them. The economic and geopolitical spheres often overlapped, particularly during the Cold War. But the US regarded the economic integration of 'Western' countries as conducive to the strength of the free world, and it stood by this principle even after the Soviet Union ceased to exist. The EU's very construction reflected this disposition: most international economic powers were given to EU-level bodies, and most security and foreign-policy instruments were left to individual member states. Accordingly, the EU was able to conduct an international economic policy that was reasonably insulated from geopolitical concerns. This separation of the economic was always fragile. It now looks hopelessly outdated. The US and China have fundamentally different relationships with Europe, but neither separates economics from geopolitics. In general, national-security issues are gaining prominence everywhere, as is the relationship between economics and national security. Economic connections, from cyberspace to financial links, are becoming the primary areas of great-power competition and are at risk of being weaponised.1 Increasingly, the US and China follow neither the letter nor the spirit of the rules in their relationships with the EU and its member states. In the US case, its decision to make full use of the centrality of its currency and its financial system to enforce secondary sanctions against Iran was a major shock to European partners. Washington's abandonment of core principles of the global multilateral trading system and withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on climate change were also disruptive. As for China, the EU now accepts that Beijing is behaving as 'an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance'.2 It is essential that Europeans respond to this challenge. The collective capacity of EU countries working together to preserve their economic independence underpins the value of European integration to European citizens. That value is further bolstered by the EU's ability to participate in defining the rules of the game for the global economy - what Germans call Handlungsf{\"a}higkeit and the French call Europe puissance. The challenge for Europe is substantial but manageable. The EU and its member states should adopt an economic-sovereignty agenda to protect European economic independence through a variety of tools ranging from competition policy to the international role of the euro. To do so, the EU needs to better integrate economic policy and geopolitics.}, language = {en} } @techreport{PisaniFerryWolff, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Pisani-Ferry, Jean and Wolff, Guntram}, title = {The threats to the European Union's Economic Sovereignty}, series = {Bruegel Policy Brief}, journal = {Bruegel Policy Brief}, pages = {15}, abstract = {Economics used to play a limited role in foreign policy, which was about wars, conflicts and human disasters - and how to avoid them. But neither China nor the United States now separates economics from geopolitics. The competition between them is simultaneously an economic competition and a security competition. This is a threat to the multilateral system the European Union has relied on for nearly seven decades and to the EU's separation of external economic relationships from geopolitics. You and your Commission colleagues must redefine for the EU its concept of economic sovereignty and the instruments it needs to defend and promote it.}, language = {en} }