@book{WalterRayRedeker, author = {Walter, Stefanie and Ray, Ari and Redeker, Nils}, title = {The Politics of Bad Options: Why the Eurozone's Problems Have Been So Hard to Resolve}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {9780198857020}, doi = {10.1093/oso/9780198857013.001.0001}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {320}, abstract = {Why was the Eurozone crisis so difficult to resolve? Why was it resolved in a manner in which some countries bore a much larger share of the pain than other countries? Why did no country leave the Eurozone rather than implement unprecedented austerity? Who supported and opposed the different policy options in the crisis domestically, and how did the distributive struggles among these groups shape crisis politics? Building on macro-level statistical data, original survey data from interest groups, and qualitative comparative case studies, this book argues and shows that the answers to these questions revolve around distributive struggles about how the costs of the Eurozone crisis should be divided among countries, and within countries, among different socioeconomic groups. Together with divergent but strongly held ideas about the 'right way' to conduct economic policy and asymmetries in the distribution of power among actors, severe distributive concerns of important actors lie at the root of the difficulties of resolving the Eurozone crisis as well as the difficulties to substantially reform EMU. The book provides new insights into the politics of the Eurozone crisis by emphasizing three perspectives that have received scant attention in existing research: a comparative perspective on the Eurozone crisis by systematically comparing it to previous financial crises, an analysis of the whole range of policy options, including the ones not chosen, and a unified framework that examines crisis politics not just in deficit-debtor, but also in surplus-creditor countries.}, language = {en} } @article{RedekerWalter, author = {Redeker, Nils and Walter, Stefanie}, title = {We'd rather pay than change the politics of German non-adjustment in the Eurozone crisis}, series = {The Review of International Organizations}, volume = {15}, journal = {The Review of International Organizations}, issn = {Electronic ISSN 1559-744X, Print ISSN 1559-7431}, doi = {10.1007/s11558-020-09390-1}, pages = {573 -- 599}, abstract = {Germany's large current account surplus has been widely criticized, especially against the backdrop of the role of macroeconomic imbalances in the Eurozone crisis. We argue that Germany's resistance to reduce its massive current account surplus through an expansionary policy at home is rooted in distributive struggles about the design of possible adjustment policies. To explore this argument, we leverage original survey data from 135 German economic interest groups, qualitative interviews with interest group representatives and policymakers, and data from public opinion surveys. We show that while there is general support for internal adjustment among German interest groups, they disagree heavily about which specific policies should be implemented to achieve this goal. Together with a broad public and elite-based consensus to avoid a break-up of the Eurozone, this polarization turns financing into a politically attractive strategy. Rather than being rooted only in German ordoliberal ideas or Germany's export-oriented structure, distributive conflicts contribute significantly to Germany's resistance to reduce its large current-account surplus. Because similar dynamics can be observed in other surplus countries, we argue that distributive struggles within surplus countries played an important role in interstate conflicts about the management of the crisis.}, language = {en} }