@techreport{Sorg, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Sorg, Alexander}, title = {Nuclear weapons in Germany: mitigating a hypothetical end of the nuclear-sharing arrangements}, series = {NDC Research Paper No. 22 - December 2021}, journal = {NDC Research Paper No. 22 - December 2021}, abstract = {There is a good deal of scepticism about nuclear weapons deployments in Germany, and it has probably been growing in recent years. Predicting what will happen is difficult, yet the scenario of Germany pulling out from the nuclear-sharing arrangement within NATO cannot be ruled out. The paper is agnostic about this choice, but advances policy recommendations the German government would have to adopt to mitigate any negative effects, were such a decision taken. These policy courses are neither widely popular nor easy to implement. The German government would probably still have to contribute to the elaboration of NATO's nuclear strategy. It would likely have to dramatically increase its defence expenditure in order to signal its commitment to burden sharing. The country would also have to leave the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, into which billions of investments have been poured. Finally, Germany would need to try to strike a major multilateral agreement to bring Russia back into compliance with previous arms control treaties. This list of actions is by no means exhaustive, and opponents of nuclear sharing will have to spend much time on developing ideas that can help to accommodate the concerns of proponents of the current posture. Ending nuclear sharing without offering any concessions would undoubtedly harm Germany's, or any other host state's, international posture and diplomatic relations.}, language = {en} } @techreport{SorgWucherpfennig, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Sorg, Alexander and Wucherpfennig, Julian}, title = {Before deploying more U.S. forces to Europe, consider the consequences}, series = {War on the Rocks}, journal = {War on the Rocks}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Sorg, author = {Sorg, Alexander}, title = {Understanding Foreign Deployed Nuclear Weapons}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5086}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-50862}, school = {Hertie School}, pages = {vii, 144}, abstract = {This dissertation delves into the complex dynamics of U.S. nuclear weapon deployments. Scholarly work on nuclear weapons has predominantly focused on strategic forces. However, many escalation scenarios foresee the use of tactical nuclear weapons as a precursor, which could eventually lead to an all-out nuclear war. These are exactly the weapons that the United States has deployed across the world, and we know little about their strategic causes and consequences. My study addresses this gap in the literature. The first part of this dissertation investigates the causes of U.S. nuclear weapon deployments. It emphasizes the importance of assurance, which has commonly been neglected or subsumed under non-proliferation. Through a comprehensive conceptualization, I distinguish assurance from other strategies of interstate interaction, explaining how the U.S. uses nuclear weapon deployments to assure allies and maintain its sphere of influence. Utilizing an original dataset, I find evidence that largely confirms my assurance hypotheses. With regard to alternative explanations, the power projection hypotheses are supported, but the extended deterrence hypotheses are not. These results contribute to the underdeveloped literature on assurance and provide valuable insights into the strategic considerations underlying U.S. nuclear weapon deployments. The second part, which is co-authored with Julian Wucherpfennig, examines the consequences of U.S. military deployments, both conventional and nuclear. The theory of free-riding in military alliances postulates that member states piggyback on security commitments by guardian states. We argue that free-riding critically implies that foreign military deployments positively affect subjective feelings of security - in other words: that they assure. In contrast, if citizens hold skeptical views of the guardian or do not subscribe to the (extended) deterrence logic, they might experience an increase in threat perception. We investigate how foreign military deployments impact attitudes toward defense policies in host states through an observational data analysis and a survey experiment. While nuclear and conventional troop deployments decrease citizens' subjective need for defense, they do not necessarily increase their sense of protection, challenging the logic of free-riding. Taken together, my findings suggest a mismatch between objectives and outcomes. While I find evidence that nuclear weapons are deployed to assure allies, this aim does not appear to be effective at the micro-level.}, language = {en} }