@techreport{KimLimSchweighoferKodritsch, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Kim, Jeongbin and Lim, Wooyoung and Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian}, title = {Patience Is Power: Bargaining and Payoff Delay}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 15}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-4946}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-49465}, pages = {56}, abstract = {We provide causal evidence that patience is a significant source of bargaining power. Generalizing the Rubinstein (1982) bargaining model to arbitrarily non-stationary discounting, we first show that dynamic consistency across bargaining rounds is sufficient for a unique equilibrium, which we characterize. We then experimentally implement a version of this game where bargaining delay is negligible (frequent offers, so dynamic consistency holds by design), while payoff delay is significant (a week or month per round of disagreement, with or without front-end delay). Our treatments induce different time preferences between subjects by randomly assigning individuals different public payoff delay profiles. The leading treatment allows to test for a general patience advantage, predicted independent of the shape of discounting, and it receives strong behavioral support. Additional treatments show that this advantage hinges on the availability of immediate payoffs and reject exponential discounting in favor of present-biased discounting.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BoenischKoenigSchweighoferKodritschetal., type = {Working Paper}, author = {B{\"o}nisch, Felix and K{\"o}nig, Tobias and Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian and Weizs{\"a}cker, Georg}, title = {Beliefs as a Means of Self-Control? Evidence from a Dynamic Student Survey}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 14}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-4945}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-49457}, pages = {41}, abstract = {We repeatedly elicit beliefs about the returns to study effort, in a large university course. A behavioral model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting and malleable beliefs predicts that the dynamics of beliefs mirrors the importance of exerting self-control, such that believed returns increase as the exam approaches, and drop post-exam. Exploiting variation in exam timing to control for common information shocks, we find this prediction confirmed: average believed study returns increase by about 20\% over the period before the exam, and drop by about the same amount afterwards. Additional analyses further support the hypothesized mechanism that beliefs serve as a means of self-control.}, language = {en} } @article{BarronDitlmannGehrigetal., author = {Barron, Kai and Ditlmann, Ruth K. and Gehrig, Stefan and Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian}, title = {Explicit and Implicit Belief-Based Gender Discrimination: A Hiring Experiment}, series = {Management Science}, journal = {Management Science}, issn = {0025-1909 (print)}, doi = {10.1287/mnsc.2022.01229}, abstract = {This paper studies a key element of discrimination, namely, when stereotypes translate into discriminatory actions. Using a hiring experiment, we rule out taste-based discrimination by design and test for the presence of two types of belief-based gender discrimination. We document evidence of explicit discriminators—individuals who are willing to discriminate even when their hiring choices are highly revealing of their gender-biased beliefs. Crucially, we also identify implicit discriminators—individuals who do not discriminate against women when taking a discriminatory action is highly revealing of their biased beliefs, but do discriminate against women when their biased motive is obscured. Our analysis highlights the central role played by features of the choice environment in determining whether and how discrimination will manifest. We conclude by discussing the implications for policy design.}, language = {en} } @techreport{SchweighoferKodritschStrausz, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian and Strausz, Roland}, title = {Principled Mechanism Design with Evidence}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 30}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5207}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-52074}, pages = {63}, abstract = {We cast mechanism design with evidence in the framework of Myerson (1982), whereby his generalized revelation principle directly applies and yields standard notions of incentive compatible direct mechanisms. Their specific nature depends on whether the agent's (verifiable) presentation of evidence is contractually controllable, however. For deterministic implementation, we show that, in general, such control has value, and we offer two independent conditions under which this value vanishes, one on evidence (WET) and another on preferences (TIWO). Allowing for fully stochastic mechanisms, we also show how randomization generally has value and clarify to what extent this value vanishes under the common assumption of evidentiary normality (NOR). While, in general, the value of control extends to stochastic implementation, neither control nor randomization have any value if NOR holds together with WET or TIWO.}, language = {en} } @techreport{BarronDitlmannGehrigetal., type = {Working Paper}, author = {Barron, Kai and Ditlmann, Ruth K. and Gehrig, Stefan and Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian}, title = {Explicit and Implicit Belief-Based Gender Discrimination: A Hiring Experiment}, edition = {No. 35}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5361}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-53610}, pages = {73}, abstract = {This paper studies a key element of discrimination, namely when stereotypes translate into discriminatory actions. Using a hiring experiment, we rule out taste-based discrimination by design and test for the presence of two types of belief-based gender discrimination. We document evidence of explicit discriminators—individuals who are willing to discriminate even when their hiring choices are highly revealing of their gender-biased beliefs. Crucially, we also identify implicit discriminators—individuals who do not discriminate against women when taking a discriminatory action is highly revealing of their biased beliefs, but do discriminate against women when their biased motive is obscured. Our analysis highlights the central role played by features of the choice environment in determining whether and how discrimination will manifest. We conclude by discussing the implications for policy design.}, language = {en} } @techreport{SchweighoferKodritsch, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian}, title = {Bounded Rationality, Beliefs, and Behavior}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 37}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5363}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-53637}, pages = {36}, abstract = {This chapter presents a microeconomic, behavioral perspective on bounded rationality and beliefs. It begins with an account of how research on belief biases, in particular via probabilistic belief elicitation, has become mainstream in economics only relatively recently and late, even in behavioral economics (aka "psychology and economics"). The chapter then offers a review of the decision-theoretic foundations of modeling and eliciting (subjective) beliefs as probabilities, as well as selected—both classic and recent—evidence on humans' bounded rationality from related research in psychology and economics. In doing so, it connects the historical debates within decision theory, on the one hand, and within psychology, on the other, concerning the normative status of expected utility and Bayesianism, as well as its methodological implications. A conclusion draws lessons for the practice of belief elicitation and future research.}, language = {en} } @techreport{SchweighoferKodritschHuckHumphreys, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian and Huck, Steffen and Humphreys, Macartan}, title = {Political salience and regime resilience}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 31}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5208}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-52085}, pages = {21}, abstract = {We introduce political salience into a canonical model of attacks against political regimes, as scaling agents' expressive payoffs from taking sides. Equilibrium balances heterogeneous expressive concerns with material bandwagoning incentives, and we show that comparative statics in salience characterize stability. As main insight, when regime sanctions are weak, increases from low to middling salience can pose the greatest threat to regimes - ever smaller shocks suffice to drastically escalate attacks. Our results speak to the charged debates about democracy, by identifying conditions under which heightened interest in political decision-making can pose a threat to democracy in and of itself.}, language = {en} } @techreport{SchweighoferKodritschBarronDitlmannetal., type = {Working Paper}, author = {Schweighofer-Kodritsch, Sebastian and Barron, Kai and Ditlmann, Ruth K. and Gehrig, Stefan}, title = {Explicit and Implicit Belief-Based Gender Discrimination: A Hiring Experiment}, series = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, journal = {Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers}, edition = {No. 35}, doi = {10.48462/opus4-5359}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-53592}, pages = {73}, abstract = {This paper studies a key element of discrimination, namely when stereotypes translate into discriminatory actions. Using a hiring experiment, we rule out taste-based discrimination by design and test for the presence of two types of belief-based gender discrimination. We document evidence of explicit discriminators—individuals who are willing to discriminate even when their hiring choices are highly revealing of their gender-biased beliefs. Crucially, we also identify implicit discriminators—individuals who do not discriminate against women when taking a discriminatory action is highly revealing of their biased beliefs, but do discriminate against women when their biased motive is obscured. Our analysis highlights the central role played by features of the choice environment in determining whether and how discrimination will manifest. We conclude by discussing the implications for policy design.}, language = {en} }