@techreport{EdenhoferFlachslandMarschinski, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Edenhofer, Ottmar and Flachsland, Christian and Marschinski, Robert}, title = {Towards a Global CO2 Market : An economic analysis ; Expertise for the Policy Planning Staff in the Federal Foreign Office}, volume = {May, 2007}, pages = {46 S.}, language = {en} } @article{FlachslandMarschinskiJakob, author = {Flachsland, Christian and Marschinski, Robert and Jakob, Michael}, title = {Sectoral Linking of carbon markets: A trade-theory analysis}, series = {Resource and Energy Economics}, volume = {34}, journal = {Resource and Energy Economics}, number = {4}, publisher = {Elsevier}, address = {Mexico}, issn = {1873-0221}, doi = {10.1016/j.reseneeco.2012.05.005}, pages = {585 -- 606}, abstract = {The linking of emission trading systems (ETS) is a widely discussed policy option for future international cooperation on climate change. Benefits are expected from efficiency gains and the alleviation of concerns over competitiveness. However, from trade-theory it is known that due to general equilibrium effects and market distortions, linking may not always be beneficial for all participating countries. Following-up on this debate, we use a Ricardo-Viner type general equilibrium model to study the implications of sectoral linking on carbon emissions ('leakage'), competitiveness, and welfare. By comparing pre- and post-linking equilibria, we show analytically how global emissions can increase if one of the 'linked' countries lacks an economy-wide emissions cap, although in case of a link across idiosyncratic sectors a decrease of emissions ('anti-leakage') is also possible. If - as a way to address concerns about competitiveness - a link between the EU ETS and a hypothetical US system is established, the partial emission coverage of the EU ETS can lead to the creation of new distortions between the non-covered domestic and international sector. Finally, we show how the welfare effect from linking can be decomposed into gains-from-trade and terms-of-trade contributions, and how the latter can make the overall effect ambiguous.}, language = {en} } @incollection{FlachslandMarschinskiEdenhofer, author = {Flachsland, Christian and Marschinski, Robert and Edenhofer, Ottmar}, title = {Developing the international carbon market post-2012: Options and the cost of delay}, series = {Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency and Adaptiveness}, booktitle = {Global Climate Governance Beyond 2012: Architecture, Agency and Adaptiveness}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, address = {Cambridge}, isbn = {9780521180924}, language = {en} } @article{FlachslandMarschinskiEdenhofer, author = {Flachsland, Christian and Marschinski, Robert and Edenhofer, Ottmar}, title = {Global Trading versus Linking: Architectures for international emissions trading}, series = {Energy Policy}, volume = {37}, journal = {Energy Policy}, pages = {1637 -- 1647}, language = {en} } @article{FlachslandMarschinskiEdenhofer, author = {Flachsland, Christian and Marschinski, Robert and Edenhofer, Ottmar}, title = {To link or not to link: Benefits and disadvantages of linking cap-and-trade systems}, series = {Climate Policy}, journal = {Climate Policy}, number = {9}, pages = {358 -- 372}, language = {en} }