@techreport{JansenJaegerRedeker, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Jansen, Jannik and J{\"a}ger, Philipp and Redeker, Nils}, title = {For climate, profits, or resilience? Why, where and how the EU should respond to the Inflation Reduction Act}, pages = {27}, abstract = {The US Inflation Reduction Act (IRA) has rekindled European fears of missing out in the global green technology race. However, EU member states still disagree on whether the greater risk lies in doing too much or too little. At heart, there remains significant confusion on which European sectors stand to lose competitiveness; how much the EU should fret about these losses; and whether there is a need for joint support from the EU level to avoid economic divergence. We take a first stab at the existing sectoral evidence. Our results suggest that the IRA will undercut European production costs in several sectors. This does not mean the EU must mimic the US program. However, it does mean that the EU needs to turn its piecemeal Green Deal Industrial Plan into a coherent strategy. This requires a greater focus on green industries in which Europe can develop a competitive edge and more joint financing at the EU level.}, language = {en} } @techreport{LindnerRedeker, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Lindner, Johannes and Redeker, Nils}, title = {"It's the politics, stupid" - don't squander this golden opportunity for reforming the fiscal rules}, pages = {10}, abstract = {On the reform of fiscal rules, the EU risks letting a once-in-a-decade opportunity slip. The time window for a successful reform is tight. And the Commission's current proposal is economically sound but politically overconfident. This risks drawing the Commission into political fights it cannot win, and would repeat some of the mistakes of the last reform process. At the same, current rules remain impossible to apply. Those who romanticize the old framework therefore need to realize that a retreat to the old system is not an option. The EU thus needs a compromise and needs it fast. To get there in the little time left, we propose four improvements: first, the system needs some numerical benchmarks for debt reduction in the adjustment period; second, it should include a clear definition of the scope of possible deviations through growth-oriented reforms and investments; third it should come with explicit carve-outs for national expenditures linked to some EU programs; and fourth, it needs credible enforcement through better ownership not only at the national but also at the European level.}, language = {en} } @techreport{LindnerRedeker, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Lindner, Johannes and Redeker, Nils}, title = {Germany Needs a Europe Pact}, pages = {3}, abstract = {German Chancellor Olaf Scholz recently presented a new "Germany-Pact" to advance the country, following media reporting that has portrayed Germany as the "sick man of Europe" due to its waning economy. However, as Johannes Lindner and Nils Redeker observe, Europe does not play a big role in this pact. In this op-ed, originally published in Handelsblatt, they explain why Germany should refocus on the EU single market and develop an overall strategy for modernising the country and Europe.}, language = {en} } @article{LindnerRedeker, author = {Lindner, Johannes and Redeker, Nils}, title = {Gastkommentar: Warum Deutschland jetzt einen Europa-Pakt braucht}, series = {Handelsblatt}, journal = {Handelsblatt}, abstract = {Deutschland schw{\"a}chelt und sollte sich wieder st{\"a}rker auf den EU-Binnenmarkt konzentrieren, meinen Johannes Lindner und Nils Redeker. Sie fordern eine Modernisierungsstrategie.}, language = {de} } @techreport{Redeker, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Redeker, Nils}, title = {Chasing Shadows: What the Net Zero Industry Act Teaches Us About EU Industrial Policy}, pages = {4}, abstract = {The Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) was touted as the EU's big response to the US Inflation Reduction Act. After a year of negotiations, it will finally hit the legislative books. In his policy position, Nils Redeker analyses what has become of the EU's green industrial policy ambitions, what the NZIA teaches us about Europe's role in the clean tech race, and what the next Commission needs to do to formulate a constructive answer to the global return of industrial policy.}, language = {en} } @techreport{AbouChadiJansenKollbergetal., type = {Working Paper}, author = {Abou-Chadi, Tarik and Jansen, Jannik and Kollberg, Markus and Redeker, Nils}, title = {Debunking the Backlash - Uncovering European Voters' Climate Preferences}, pages = {22}, abstract = {The notion of a broad green backlash is set to dominate this year's European election campaign. Based on new survey data from more than 15.000 respondents in Germany, France and Poland, we show that it is largely overblown. A majority of voters still wish for a more ambitious climate policy and would support a raft of concrete measures to bring down emissions. However, supporting pivotal voters in the middle will require a stronger focus on green investment and industrial policy and offsetting measures for effective but unpopular policies like carbon pricing. Parties should not waste the coming months outbidding each other over how to cater to imagined climate fatigue but compete over concrete recipes to green the economy.}, language = {en} } @techreport{JaegerRedeker, type = {Working Paper}, author = {J{\"a}ger, Philipp and Redeker, Nils}, title = {Delivering on Draghi - How to finally get real about the EU's clean industrial strategy}, pages = {12}, abstract = {With the Clean Industrial Deal (CID), the European Commission has pledged to finally get real about a common clean industrial policy. This would be a first. Previous attempts resulted in an industrial policy in name only. In practice, they suffered from a lack of sectoral focus, poor coordination across policy fields, and insufficient financial backing. New data from 280,000 state aid awards shows that of the €353 billion granted on the supply side since 2019, only 12\% targeted sectors the EU identified as strategically important. To move beyond half-measures, the CID should now act fast and pragmatically on three fronts: First, it should clearly define what specific sectors to support and why. Second, rather than waiting for new coordination frameworks, it should deploy existing EU tools—such as trade policy, procurement rules, and regulation—to develop sector-specific strategies. And third, as our new data indicates that fragmentation risks in clean industries remain limited, it should make full use of state aid instruments to direct national subsidies toward priority industries.}, language = {en} } @techreport{GuttenbergRedeker, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Guttenberg, Lucas and Redeker, Nils}, title = {How to defend Europe without risking another euro crisis}, pages = {12}, abstract = {Europe intends to rapidly and strongly increase its defense spending. It should do so without risking Europe's fiscal sustainability and financial stability at a time of great danger. We argue that the Commission's current plan to use the flexibility built in the EU's fiscal rules will not achieve this: On the one hand, this will not lead to the long-term certainty over available resources for defense spending that is now needed. On the other hand, relying on the flexibility and in particular the use of the national escape clause would likely amount to an unplugging of the rules that could stoke strong market reactions. Therefore, the best way to create the necessary fiscal space is a targeted and temporary exemption of defense spending from the fiscal rules. We outline how this could be done through a change of the legal texts. Finally, we explain how common borrowing could complement a rule change if member states agree to pool decision-making powers in defense policy matters.}, language = {en} } @techreport{GuttenbergRedeker, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Guttenberg, Lucas and Redeker, Nils}, title = {Luft nach oben: Wieso die EU-Fiskalregeln Spielraum f{\"u}r eine Reform der Schuldenbremse lassen}, publisher = {Jacques Delors Centre, Bertelsmann Stiftung}, pages = {12}, abstract = {In Deutschland hat sich eine rege Debatte dar{\"u}ber entsponnen, ob und wie die Schuldenbremse zu reformieren sei, um wichtige Investitionsbedarfe stemmen zu k{\"o}nnen. Gegen eine Reform wird allerdings immer wieder vorgebracht, die gerade erst reformierten EU-Fiskalregeln seien f{\"u}r Deutschland im Ergebnis restriktiver als die Schuldenbremse. Tr{\"a}fe dies zu, w{\"a}re eine Reform der Schuldenbremse entweder wertlos oder aber der neu geschaffene Spielraum k{\"o}nnte nur zum Preis des Bruchs europ{\"a}ischer Regeln genutzt werden. In diesem Policy Brief untersuchen wir die Interaktion zwischen den EU-Fiskalregeln und der Schuldenbremse und kommen zu einem differenzierten Ergebnis: Erstens enthalten die europ{\"a}ischen Regeln systematisch mehr Spielraum f{\"u}r schuldenfinanzierte Ausgaben als die Schuldenbremse. Dieser zus{\"a}tzliche Spielraum ergibt sich sowohl bei der Festlegung des mehrj{\"a}hrigen Ausgabenpfades wie auch danach bei der {\"U}berwachung der Regeln. Der Spielraum w{\"a}chst zweitens dadurch, dass schuldenfinanzierte Ausgaben f{\"u}r die St{\"a}rkung von Wachstum und Wachstumspotenzial genutzt und sie von Reformen begleitet werden, die das Wachstumspotenzial anheben. Drittens beschr{\"a}nken die europ{\"a}ischen Regeln die Ausweitung konsumtiver Ausgaben deutlich. Eine Ausnahme hiervon bilden allerdings Verteidigungsausgaben.}, language = {de} } @techreport{TordoirRedekerGuttenberg, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Tordoir, Sander and Redeker, Nils and Guttenberg, Lucas}, title = {How buy-European rules can help save Europe's car industry}, publisher = {Bertelsmann Stiftung}, address = {G{\"u}tersloh}, pages = {18}, abstract = {Europe's car industry faces a perfect storm. Chinese car exports are surging, European producers are being squeezed out of global markets, US tariffs are rising, and domestic demand remains 20\% below pre-pandemic levels. Instead of sliding into a costly muddle of regulatory rollbacks, bailouts, and fragmented national subsidies, the EU should harness its single market - 450 million consumers and a vast corporate sector - to drive demand for Europe-made vehicles. That means co-ordinating consumer subsidies with a buy-European clause, applying it to both private and corporate fleets, and using it as a platform for reciprocal EV-subsidy agreements with trusted trade partners. A window for action is open: Germany, France, Italy, and Spain all need to renew their EV-support schemes in the coming months. Together, they represent 70\% of EU car registrations—and could launch broader European coordination.}, language = {en} }