@techreport{EhrhartEickeHirthetal., type = {Working Paper}, author = {Ehrhart, Karl-Martin and Eicke, Anselm and Hirth, Lion and Ocker, Fabian and Ott, Marion and Schlecht, Ingmar and Wang, Runxi}, title = {Congestion Management Games in Electricity Markets}, publisher = {ZEW - Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"u}r Europ{\"a}ische Wirtschaftsforschung GmbH}, address = {Mannheim}, doi = {10.2139/ssrn.4300874}, pages = {36}, abstract = {This paper proposes a game-theoretic model to analyze the strategic behavior of inc-dec gaming in market-based congestion management (redispatch). We extend existing models by considering incomplete information about competitors' costs and a finite set of providers. We find that these extensions do not dissolve inc-dec gaming, which already occurs in our setup of two regions. We also benchmark market-based redispatch against grid investment, cost-based redispatch, and the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The comparison highlights a significant inefficiency of market-based redispatch and inflated redispatch payments. Finally, we study seven variations of our basic model to assess whether different market fundamentals or market design changes mitigate inc-dec gaming. None of these variations eliminate inc-dec gaming entirely.}, language = {en} }