@article{Sus, author = {Sus, Monika}, title = {How does delegation structure shape agent discretion in EU foreign policy? Evidence from the Normandy Format and the Contact Group on Libya}, series = {Contemporary Security Policy}, volume = {44}, journal = {Contemporary Security Policy}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1080/13523260.2022.2148942}, pages = {67 -- 96}, abstract = {Informal groupings have proliferated in EU foreign policy over the past decade, despite the enhanced role of the High Representative tasked with ensuring the coherence of this policy domain under the Lisbon Treaty. This article analyzes how the decision of select EU member states to act on certain policy issues through informal groupings, bypassing the EU framework, affects the High Representative's room for maneuver. Drawing on the principal-agent model, the emergence of informal groupings is conceptualized as a manifestation of pathological delegation, which undermines High Representative's role. The findings reveal two factors that may nevertheless increase the agent's discretion in cases of delegation anomalies: the low heterogeneity of member state preferences toward the informal grouping and the interaction between agents in the same domain, facilitating agent's performance. By examining agent's discretion when delegation anomalies arise, the article may be useful for scholars investigating delegation and agency in international organizations.}, language = {en} } @article{Sus, author = {Sus, Monika}, title = {Status-seeking in wartime: Poland's leadership aspirations and the response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine}, series = {The British Journal of Politics and International Relations}, journal = {The British Journal of Politics and International Relations}, publisher = {SAGE Publications}, doi = {10.1177/13691481251329767}, abstract = {Poland's response to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 was decisive, driven by strong leadership aspirations. While many European states reassessed their foreign policy priorities, Poland positioned itself as a key player in shaping the Western response. Providing military aid before the invasion and advocating for strong NATO and EU measures, Poland sought to assert its status as a regional leader. To explain Poland's response, this article employs neoclassical realism and argues that it was shaped by the concurrent presence of four domestic factors: Polish leaders' perception of their country's undervalued role in Europe, a strategic culture emphasizing deterrence and strong U.S. ties, a centralized institutional structure that enabled swift decision-making, and a broad societal consensus viewing Russia as an existential threat. By systematically analyzing primary sources - including official strategic and defense documents, speeches, and public statements - it demonstrates how these factors filtered systemic pressures from the invasion and reinforced Poland's status-seeking behavior. The study further shows that Poland's foreign policy stance persisted beyond the December 2023 government transition, highlighting the enduring influence of domestic factors. While the new government maintained strong support for Ukraine, it recalibrated Poland's status-seeking efforts by prioritizing closer European integration and adjusting its diplomatic posture. This article contributes to the literature on European security by illustrating how domestic variables influence state behavior during geopolitical crises. Additionally, examining Poland's case enhances our understanding of how middle powers navigate systemic pressures through domestic considerations, ultimately shaping their foreign policy direction.}, language = {en} } @article{MichaelsSus, author = {Michaels, Eva and Sus, Monika}, title = {(Not) Coming of age? Unpacking the European Union's quest for strategic autonomy in security and defence}, series = {European Security}, volume = {33}, journal = {European Security}, number = {3}, publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, doi = {10.1080/09662839.2024.2376603}, pages = {383 -- 405}, abstract = {Russia's large-scale aggression against Ukraine brought back the debate about the European Union's strategic autonomy ambitions in security and defence. The notion had slipped off the EU's radar following the post-2016 thematic shift in strategic autonomy discussions to global economic interdependencies. Our article contributes to an appraisal of the strategic autonomy debate in security and defence since Russia's full invasion of Ukraine, while also tracing the emergence and revival of the concept over the past 25 years. By unpacking the EU's quest for strategic autonomy as a process of maturation since the late 1990s, we examine the extent to which the EU has grown into an autonomous security and defence actor. We further discuss the implications of maturation for EU security and defence policy. Drawing on 20 semi-structured interviews with policymakers and foreign policy experts in seven member states, our study brings the underexplored aspect of national acceptability of EU external action to the fore. We show that significant progress has been made regarding both ideational and material aspects of EU security and defence policy. Yet, prevailing differences in underlying national beliefs, perceptions and goals about security and defence continue to hamper the Union's further maturation.}, language = {en} } @article{AmadioVicereSus, author = {Amadio Vicer{\´e}, Maria Giulia and Sus, Monika}, title = {Organizing European security through informal groups: insights from the European Union's response to the Russian war in Ukraine}, series = {International Politics}, journal = {International Politics}, publisher = {Springer Science and Business Media LLC}, issn = {1384-5748}, doi = {10.1057/s41311-024-00657-7}, abstract = {In addition to joint activities undertaken via the EU institutional framework in response to the Russian war in Ukraine, EU countries also shaped the broader European security architecture through informal groups. These groups, which lack formal institutional structures, allow EU member states to coordinate activities to pursue common objectives. Despite the rapidly growing literature on informal groups, their occurrence and relevance in the wake of the outbreak of war in Ukraine remain understudied. This study examines informal groups' compositions, motivations, and reflects on their relevance for the European security architecture. It suggests that by resorting to informal groups, EU member states have organized the European security order functionally and geographically into several formats. By doing so, they have fostered compartmentalized multilateralism, contributing to functional relations between various layers of European security order.}, language = {en} } @techreport{AdebahrSazCarranzaSus, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Adebahr, Cornelius and Saz-Carranza, {\´A}ngel and Sus, Monika}, title = {How to make the EU's defence commissioner work}, number = {August 1, 2024}, language = {en} } @article{Sus, author = {Sus, Monika}, title = {Dare scholars look to the future? Academia and strategic foresight for the European Union's foreign policy}, series = {European Law Journal}, volume = {30}, journal = {European Law Journal}, number = {3}, publisher = {Wiley}, doi = {10.1111/eulj.12523}, pages = {434 -- 442}, abstract = {Drawing on examples of foresight projects situated at the interface between academia and foreign policy practice, this article reflects on the role of academics in informing the practice of foreign policy-making in the EU. The study explores why academics have rarely engaged in foresight over the past two decades and why this has changed in recent years. It argues that this shift is triggered, on the one hand, by the strategic blunders of the last decade and, on the other hand, by the conceptual developments within the disciplines of political science or international relations. After demonstrating the growing trend of scholarly engagement in foresight with a series of illustrative examples, the article discusses the added value and limitations of academic-generated foresight for EU foreign policy. Taking these into account, the analysis indicates best practice solutions, such as foresight exercises, with the joint involvement of researchers and policymakers.}, language = {en} } @article{BorońskaHryniewieckaSus, author = {Borońska-Hryniewiecka, Karolina and Sus, Monika}, title = {The illusion of convergence? Exploring the patterns of (de-) politicisation of Russia's war against Ukraine in the European Parliament}, series = {Journal of European Integration}, volume = {48}, journal = {Journal of European Integration}, number = {2}, publisher = {Informa UK Limited}, doi = {10.1080/07036337.2026.2619425}, pages = {209 -- 227}, abstract = {The full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 not only reshaped national security considerations but also influenced debates in the European Parliament (EP). This article examines how this external shock shaped supranational political discourse in the EP between 2022 and 2024. While crises often generate temporary depoliticising effects, we find that these were conditional and context-dependent. Based on a thematic discourse analysis of EP plenary debates, we show that support for Ukraine remained depoliticised, marked by broad cross-party consensus. However, politicisation re-emerged when the war was framed as an opportunity for EU institutional reform. Unusually, it was mainstream rather than challenger actors who used this strategic window to promote deeper integration. By demonstrating that crises do not automatically generate convergence but instead produce selective politicisation across issues, our findings advance debates on EU crisis governance. We show that even existential security shocks may strengthen coordination without prompting far-reaching institutional change.}, language = {en} }