@book{DoeringHallerberg, author = {D{\"o}ring, Herbert and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Patterns of parliamentary behavior : Passage of legislation across Western Europe}, publisher = {Ashgate}, address = {Aldershot [u.a.]}, isbn = {0-7546-3936-3}, pages = {IX, 240 S.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerberg, author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Statistical Agencies and Responses to Financial Crises : Eurostat, Bad Banks and the ESM}, series = {West European Politics}, journal = {West European Politics}, language = {en} } @article{StolfiHallerberg, author = {Stolfi, Francesco and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Clientelistic budget cycles: evidence from health policy in the Italian regions}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2015.1075577}, pages = {1 -- 18}, language = {en} } @techreport{FocantiHallerbergScartascini, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Focanti, Diego and Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Tax Reforms in Latin America in an Era of Democracy IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-457}, language = {en} } @article{ClarkHallerbergKeiletal., author = {Clark, William R. and Hallerberg, Mark and Keil, Manfred and Willett, Thomas D.}, title = {Measures of financial openness and interdependence}, series = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, volume = {4}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, number = {1}, issn = {1757-6385}, doi = {10.1108/17576381211206497}, pages = {58 -- 75}, language = {en} } @article{BurdekinBanaianHallerbergetal., author = {Burdekin, Richard C.K. and Banaian, King and Hallerberg, Mark and Siklos, Pierre L.}, title = {Fiscal and monetary institutions and policies: onward and upward?}, series = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, volume = {3}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, number = {4}, issn = {1757-6385}, doi = {10.1108/17576381111182918}, pages = {340 -- 354}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergWehner, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Wehner, Joachim}, title = {When do you get Economists as Policy-Makers?}, series = {British Journal of Political Science}, journal = {British Journal of Political Science}, issn = {1469-2112}, doi = {10.1017/S0007123417000801}, pages = {1 -- 13}, abstract = {We analyze when economists become top-level "economic policy-makers", focusing on financial crises and the partisanship of a country's leader. We present a new dataset of the educational and occupational background of 1200 political leaders, finance ministers, and central bank governors from 40 developed democracies from 1973 to 2010. We find that left leaders appoint economic policy-makers who are more highly trained in economics and finance ministers who are less likely to have private finance backgrounds but more likely to be former central bankers. Finance ministers appointed during financial crises are less likely to have a financial services background. A leader's exposure to economics training is also related to appointments. This suggests one crucial mechanism for affecting economic policy is through the selection of certain types of economic policy-makers.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergGandrud, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Gandrud, Christopher}, title = {The Measurement of Real-Time Perceptions of Financial Stress: Implications for Political Science}, series = {British Journal of Political Science}, journal = {British Journal of Political Science}, doi = {10.1017/S0007123417000291}, pages = {1 -- 13}, abstract = {How do politicians and voters respond to financial market stress, and with what political effects? Previous research addressing these questions lacks a crucial variable: a continuous, real-time indicator of the level of financial market stress that policy makers and voters perceived. We need a measure of actors'contemporary perceptions of financial market conditions to understand why they made a given choice and with what effects. Previous binary crisis measures are constructed post hoc, so tend to be biased towards severe crises and away from circumstances in which governments effectively responded to emerging trouble. As such, they suffer from clear selection bias. Annual post hoc measures do not necessarily capture conditions as they were perceived at the time of events such as elections. As dichotomous indicators, they do not measure crisis severity or how it varies over time. They use ad hoc methods to determine when crises have ended. Previous continuous measures of financial market stress are less common and suffer from other problems. They capture quantities whose importance, measurement, and reporting varies significantly across countries and over time. To overcome these issues, we develop a continuous measure of real-time perceptions of financial market stress with a kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) of detailed qualitative data, namely monthly Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) reports. We call it the EIU Perceptions of Financial Market Stress Index, or FinStress for short. FinStress enables new political research possibilities. As a continuous measure, it could be used to examine which policies can effectively prevent or reduce extreme stress, and which political conditions are conducive to implementing these policies. As a comparable continuous monthly indicator, FinStress could be used to test hypotheses that rely on sub-annual data and follow the intensity of stress over time. Here we provide examples for studying the impact of financial market stress on voters'choices and on revisions to European Union government budget figures. We thus contribute to the wider methodological toolkit by showing how KPCA can be used to summarize vast quantities of similarly formatted qualitative texts into continuous cross-sectional time-series indicators.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergGandrud, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Gandrud, Christopher}, title = {Explaining variation and change in supervisory confidentiality in the European Union}, series = {West European Politics}, volume = {41}, journal = {West European Politics}, number = {4, Secrecy in Europe}, issn = {0140-2382}, doi = {10.1080/01402382.2017.1389421}, pages = {1025 -- 1048}, abstract = {Some European Union member states' financial regulators choose to make some of the data they routinely collect on individual banks publicly available. Others treat this data as confidential. What explains this difference? This paper considers the possible effects of crises, path-dependent legal institutions, and the design of deposit insurance schemes. At the national level, the paper focuses on contrasting German and Dutch cases. After the recent economic crisis, the Dutch released more data while the German authorities maintained strict confidentiality rules. The design of deposit insurance schemes provides a key reason why the level of secrecy varies, with the Dutch move from an ex post to an ex ante scheme where the government served as the ultimate backstop leading to questions about the accounts of individual banks while the German system favoured continued secrecy. The paper also describes the level of transparency at the EU level. Multilevel legal restrictions and bureaucratic capacity tilt EU banking union practices towards member states that treat financial supervisory data as confidential.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Fiscal Governance and Fiscal Outcomes under EMU before and after the Crisis}, series = {The Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis}, booktitle = {The Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {9780198755739}, pages = {320}, language = {en} }