@techreport{SalazarMoralesHallerberg, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Salazar-Morales, Diego and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Shaping a New International Trade Order: Competition and Co-operation among the European Union, the United States, and China}, series = {Dahrendorf Forum IV: Working Paper No. 12}, journal = {Dahrendorf Forum IV: Working Paper No. 12}, pages = {31}, abstract = {Following the establishment of the World Trade Organisationin January 1995, American and European trade relationships werefor a timecharacterised by 'competitive interdependence',astheUS and EUsimultaneously aimedtoadvance their commercial interests inthird countries. Under conditions of competitive interdependence, trade actorsresort to certain policy choices to gain advantage for their producers while restricting others' ability to enter a market (Sbragia, 2010).In the last decade, however, European and American trade policymakers have facedthe challenges of a more competitive world and the emergence of newer trade powers such as China. Both actors have veered away frommultilateral deals as their preferred trade policy choices. In this paper, weuse the Sbragia (2010) framework to analyse the trade policy shifts made bythe EU and the US in the last decade. We argue that what had been a competitive interdependence relationship has recently changed toa trilateral structure in which both the EU and the US have focused their attention on countering Chinese competition. Moreover, China's emergence has also pushed the USto reinvigorate the role of unilateralism and the EU to bolsterbilateralism as they both seek to secure their commercial shares worldwide.}, language = {en} } @incollection{HallerbergScartascini, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Particularistic Political Institutions and Tax Neutrality in Latin America}, series = {The Political Economy of Taxation in Latin America}, booktitle = {The Political Economy of Taxation in Latin America}, editor = {Flores-Mac{\´i}as, Gustavo A.}, publisher = {Cambridge University Press}, isbn = {9781108655934}, doi = {10.1017/9781108655934}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {144 -- 171}, language = {en} } @techreport{HallerbergYlaeoutinen2008, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Yl{\"a}outinen, Sami}, title = {Fiscal Governance in Central and Eastern Europe before and after European Union Accession: What Role Europeanisation?}, publisher = {Hertie School of Governance}, address = {Berlin}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-1667}, pages = {28}, year = {2008}, abstract = {Our paper focuses on the development of fiscal institutions in Central and East European countries from 1998 to 2007. Following the Europeanisation literature as well as the expectations that the European Union established in its dialogue with prospective members through annual "Preaccession Economic Programmes," one would anticipate that there would have been reform of fiscal institutions in the run-up to EU accession. Unlike in most other policy fields, there is an additional incentive to continue reform once a country has joined the EU, which is eurozone membership. This paper explains how we measure fiscal institutions and fiscal reforms. We provide time series data on the fiscal institutions each country has had in place, and, based on a new set of surveys and interviews we conducted, we compare the state of these fiscal institutions in 2007, or after the countries had acceded to the EU, with the institutions in place before accession. We find that preparations for the EU accession prior to 2004 did lead to some changes in budget process in this set of countries. The carrot of EMU membership after acceding to the EU, however, has so far not had the same effect--the pace of reform has since stalled, with most countries leaving the same fiscal institutions in place.In some countries further reforms to develop medium-term fiscal frameworks are either planned or are in a process of being initiated but it is too early to say if the reforms will truly materialise and transform the frameworks into a vehicle that would impose a serious constraint for government spending.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergWolff2008, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Wolff, Guntram B.}, title = {Fiscal institutions, fiscal policy and sovereign risk premia in EMU}, series = {Public Choice}, volume = {136}, journal = {Public Choice}, number = {3-4}, pages = {379 -- 396}, year = {2008}, abstract = {We investigate the effect of fiscal institutions such as the strength of the finance minister in the budget process and deficits on interest rate spreads of Eurozone countries. Deficits significantly increase risk premia measured by relative swap spreads. The effect of deficits is significantly lower under EMU. This effect partly results from neglecting the role of fiscal institutions. After controlling for institutional changes, fiscal policy remains a significant determinant of risk premia in EMU. Better institutions are connected with lower risk premia. Furthermore deficits matter less for risk premia in countries with better institutions. Markets acknowledge that better institutions reduce fiscal difficulties rendering the monitoring of annual developments less important.}, language = {en} } @book{HallerbergStrauchvonHagen2009, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Strauch, Rolf Rainer and von Hagen, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Fiscal Governance in Europe}, publisher = {Cambridge Univ. Press}, address = {Cambridge [u.a.]}, isbn = {9780521138260}, pages = {230}, year = {2009}, abstract = {This book presents a theoretical framework to discuss how governments coordinate budgeting decisions. There are two modes of fiscal governance conducive to greater fiscal discipline, a mode of delegation and a mode of contracts. These modes contrast with a fiefdom form of governance, in which the decision-making process is decentralized. An important insight is that the effectiveness of a given form of fiscal governance depends crucially upon the underlying political system. Delegation functions well when there few, or no, ideological differences among government parties, whereas contracts are effective when there are many such differences. Based on original research, the book classifies European Union countries from 1985 to 2004. Empirically, delegation and contract states perform better than fiefdom states if they match the underlying political system. Additional chapters consider why countries have the fiscal institutions that they do, fiscal governance in Central and Eastern Europe, and the role of such institutions in the European Union.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergYlaeoutinen2010, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Yl{\"a}outinen, Sami}, title = {Political Power, Fiscal Institutions and Budgetary Outcomes in Central and Eastern Europe}, series = {Journal of Public Policy}, volume = {30}, journal = {Journal of Public Policy}, number = {1}, issn = {0143-814X}, doi = {10.1017/S0143814X09990213}, pages = {45 -- 62}, year = {2010}, abstract = {This paper considers the effects of fiscal governance in Central and East European countries 1998-2008. The first part makes predictions about which form of fiscal governance fits which form of government. Under multi-party coalition governments, fiscal contracts where governments make political commitments to multi-annual fiscal plans work well. In countries where two political blocks face off against one another, delegation based around a strong finance ministry should be most effective. The second part examines electoral and party systems, which affect the form of government in place. The third part documents norms, rules, and institutions in place. The final section considers the joint effects of fiscal governance on fiscal outcomes. On balance, the underlying political climate is crucial for determining what types of fiscal norms, institutions, and rules function best. The more countries diverge from their expected form of fiscal governance, the greater the increase in a country's debt burden.}, language = {en} } @incollection{SalazarMoralesHallerberg, author = {Salazar-Morales, Diego and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Trilateral Competitive Interdependence: European and American Trade Policy Choices and the rise of China}, series = {The European Union and Beyond: Multilevel-Governance, Institutions and Policymaking}, booktitle = {The European Union and Beyond: Multilevel-Governance, Institutions and Policymaking}, editor = {Spoon, Jae-Jae and Ringe, Nils}, publisher = {European Council of Political Research Press}, address = {Colchester}, isbn = {9781785523359}, publisher = {Hertie School}, language = {en} } @techreport{SalazarMoralesHallerberg, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Salazar-Morales, Diego and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {The Role of Fiscal Coordination and Partisanship in the Spanish Fiscal Federalist System: Lessons for European Union reforms}, pages = {28}, abstract = {An issue that the European Union continues to face is how to coordinate the economic and fiscal policies of its member states. Recent reforms that created the European Semester require additional information concerning member states' fiscal plans for the Commission and Council to review more rigorously. Spain has developed similar provisions for its regions. In this paper, Mark Hallerberg and Diego Salazar-Morales consider the possible lessons arising from the emerging federation in Spain for the European framework. They analyse the performance of Spain's fiscal federalist framework with a special emphasis on its coordination and political relationship with the autonomous regions. Their findings suggest that coordination agreements are negatively correlated with balances, indicating that such agreements are indicators of fiscal problems and also that they did not contribute to lower deficits. Moreover, they find that politics, rather than fiscal rules and frameworks, led to differing fiscal performance. The paper concludes with lessons from Spain's experience for the European Union.}, language = {en} } @article{WehnerHallerberg, author = {Wehner, Joachim and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Regimes, Leaders, and Lockdowns: Who Responded More Quickly to the COVID-19 Pandemic?}, series = {The Journal of Politics}, journal = {The Journal of Politics}, issn = {0022-3816}, doi = {10.1086/739403}, abstract = {Do institutions or individuals shape policy in a crisis? We examine the timing of COVID-19 lockdowns in relation to regime type and leader characteristics. One view emphasizes institutional structure: were autocracies, with fewer constraints, quicker to lock down? Another highlights individual traits: did the speed of response depend on whether those in charge were doctors, scientists, women, or populists? Using a global dataset for 188 countries of political leaders and health ministers in office at the start of the pandemic, we find that democracies implemented lockdowns faster than autocracies. Individual traits of leaders mattered little, though countries with doctors heading health ministries were less likely to lock down—suggesting their presence may have helped hesitant leaders delay action. Our design addresses concerns about reciprocal causation and sample selection bias and proves robust to potential confounders. Political institutions, more than individual attributes, shaped the initial pandemic response}, language = {en} } @article{ArdanazHallerbergScartascini, author = {Ardanaz, Mart{\´i}n and Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Fiscal consolidations and electoral outcomes in emerging economies: Does the policy mix matter? Macro and micro level evidence from Latin America}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {Volume 64}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {September 2020, 101918}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2020.101918}, abstract = {Do voters punish governments that introduce fiscal "austerity" measures? If so, does voter response vary according to the composition of fiscal adjustments? The empirical literature on the political economy of fiscal adjustments, which is mostly OECD-based, argues that consolidations do not have significant electoral consequences. In contrast, we find that voters punish fiscal consolidations at the polls in Latin America. To explain this result, we focus on the way fiscal adjustments episodes are implemented, both in terms of their design (taxes vs. spending) and timing. Such episodes rely fundamentally on increasing tax rates and bases of indirect taxes (such as the VAT) that hit broad segments of the population. Moreover, these policies are often implemented when politicians have no choice but to consolidate, that is, under severe economic circumstances. These macro results are corroborated with micro evidence from an original survey experiment that measures voter's fiscal policy preferences over the business cycle in seven countries across Latin America. The experimental evidence shows that respondents prefer expenditure cuts to tax increases during downturns, which is the opposite of the type of consolidations that countries typically pursue.}, language = {en} } @book{HallerbergKucikMukherjee, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Kucik, Jeffrey and Mukherjee, Bumba}, title = {Principles of International Political Economy}, publisher = {Oxford University Press Inc}, address = {New York}, isbn = {978-0-19-979618-2}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {336}, abstract = {Principles of International Political Economy is the only text to bridge the gap between the real world of politics underlying the international economy and the tools that researchers use to understand IPE. Utilizing a central theoretical framework, the book provides a systematic and widespread introduction to the standard topics covered in an IPE course. It also emphasizes the role of domestic and international institutions in IPE and incorporates several subject areas that are not covered well in other texts, including political determinants and consequences of financial crises; implications of the rise of the BRICs; international environmental politics; the political origins and effect of sovereign debt; and the politics of foreign aid and its effect on development, democracy, and human rights.}, language = {en} } @article{SalazarMoralesHallerberg, author = {Salazar-Morales, Diego A and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {The role of fiscal coordination and partisanship in the Spanish fiscal federalist system}, series = {Regional \& Federal Studies}, volume = {32}, journal = {Regional \& Federal Studies}, number = {5}, doi = {10.1080/13597566.2021.1915778}, pages = {617 -- 639}, abstract = {During the euro crisis, the sustainability of Spain's debt burden was called into question. By 2019, however, Spain had successfully navigated its own crisis and reduced its debt burden. What role did Spain's emerging fiscal federal system play in this recovery? We analyze the performance of Spain's fiscal federalist framework and how it affected the country's budgetary balance, with a special emphasis on its coordination and on political relationships within the autonomous regions. Contrary to what advocates of the benefits of fiscal coordination argue, we find that coordination does not prevent the erosion of fiscal discipline in regions. Our results show that politics, rather than fiscal rules and frameworks, play an important role and have led to differing fiscal performance. In regions where incumbents were re-elected, coordination is employed to ensure more positive budgetary balances. Conversely, in regions with changing incumbents, coordination serves as an indicator of future fiscal problems.}, language = {en} } @article{BaergHallerberg, author = {Baerg, Nicole and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Council Checks of the Commission under the European Semester: Does Member State Power and Euroscepticism Still Matter?}, series = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, volume = {60}, journal = {Journal of Common Market Studies}, number = {1}, doi = {10.1111/jcms.13268}, pages = {58 -- 80}, abstract = {The European Commission recommends evaluations of the economic plans of member states. The Council then provides final text. Previous research suggests that the Council selectively edits the Commission's recommendations. Both large member states and those with eurosceptic populations are likely to have the Council weaken what the Commission writes about them. We examine the determinants of the Council's editing of these texts after the introduction of the European Semester in the period 2011-18. We also account for different varieties of euroscepticism as the literature has become more differentiated. Using metrics of textual changes based on automated and hand-coding, we find little evidence of a systematic relationship between euroscepticism and textual editing. We do, however, find evidence that member state's voting power and euro status matters. Our findings suggest that eurosceptic no longer affects textual editing of such documents under the European Semester.}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Der Markt als Umverteilungsinstrument und die Rolle des Staates}, series = {Zur Kritik des liberalen Skripts: Innere Spannungen, gebrochene Versprechen und die Notwendigkeit der Selbsttransformation (Leviathan Sonderband)}, volume = {Sonderband 42}, journal = {Zur Kritik des liberalen Skripts: Innere Spannungen, gebrochene Versprechen und die Notwendigkeit der Selbsttransformation (Leviathan Sonderband)}, editor = {Z{\"u}rn, Michael}, publisher = {Nomos}, address = {Baden-Baden}, isbn = {ISBN 978-3-7560-1829-1}, pages = {216 -- 239}, language = {de} } @techreport{HallerbergScartascini, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Research Insights: How Do Economic Crises Affect Reforms to Fiscal Rules in Latin America?}, edition = {\#105}, publisher = {Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)}, doi = {10.18235/0012999}, abstract = {Economic crises may favor reforms in fiscal rules, either because they increase the cost of maintaining fiscal imbalances or because these imbalances are behind the origin of the crises. Banking crises would not necessarily explain fiscal reforms in some democratic governments in the region. Financial crises favor reforms the longer the crisis extends over time. If the crisis turns into a sovereign debt crisis, fiscal reforms are much more likely.}, language = {en} } @techreport{ArdanazHallerbergScartascini, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Ardan{\´a}z, Mart{\´i}n and Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Research Insights: When Fiscal Adjustments Must Be Made, Do Voters Care Which Policy Is Used?}, edition = {\#101}, publisher = {Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)}, doi = {10.18235/0005292}, abstract = {Fiscal adjustments, aimed at resolving imbalances that can lead to an economic crisis, have a high political cost in Latin America and the Caribbean. Fiscal consolidations in the region generally focuses on raising indirect taxes, such as the value added tax (VAT), which are relatively easy to collect. Experimental evidence, however, indicates that citizens would prefer to reduce public spending rather than increase taxes. The countries of Latin America and the Caribbean must invest in fiscal tools that give them more room to maneuver in times of economic crisis and thus reduce negative impacts on electoral results.}, language = {en} } @techreport{HallerbergScartascini, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Research Insights: Does Politics Trump the Ability of Having Successful Tax Reforms?}, edition = {\#80}, doi = {10.18235/0005267}, abstract = {The probability of tax reform is higher during banking crises. Tax reform is unlikely to occur during election periodseven if the government is facing financing problemsso reforms that seek to raise taxes should be avoided at those times. The ideology of the president does not explain which taxes are reformed, or how they are changed, but the presence of an IMF program does.}, language = {en} } @article{WehnerHallerberg, author = {Wehner, Joachim and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Regimes, Leaders, and Lockdowns: Who Responded More Quickly to the COVID-19 Pandemic?}, doi = {10.31235/osf.io/9pazw}, pages = {73}, abstract = {Explanations of the speed of policy responses to COVID-19 highlight two sets of arguments. One focuses on regime type. Did autocracies, with fewer institutional constraints and high coercive power, lock down more quickly than democracies? The second concerns the "type" of health policymaker. Did governments led by doctors or natural scientists respond more quickly, and did men and populists delay lockdown? We examine these relationships with a global dataset of political regimes and relevant traits of 188 political leaders and health ministers in office at the start of the pandemic. Our setup addresses concerns about reciprocal causation and sample selection bias and proves robust to potential confounders. We find autocracies locked down more slowly than democracies, while leader traits appear not to matter. However, medical doctors in the health portfolio are associated with lower likelihood of lockdown, suggesting they may have provided cover for leaders hesitant to do so.}, language = {en} }