@article{GandrudHallerbergDeoetal., author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark and Deo, Sahil and Franz, Christian}, title = {Preventing German Bank Failures: Federalism and decisions to save troubled banks}, series = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift}, volume = {56}, journal = {Politische Vierteljahresschrift}, number = {2}, publisher = {Westdt. Verl.}, address = {K{\"o}ln [u.a.]}, issn = {0032-3470}, doi = {10.5771/0032-3470-2015-2-159}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:kobv:b1570-opus4-15475}, pages = {159 -- 181}, abstract = {We examine government decisions to support troubled banks. Our contribution is the examination of how federalism can affect decisions to classify banks as systemically important. Whether a bank is viewed by politicians as 'systemically important' varies based on how its failure would affect supporters of the government. How a federation is designed has a strong influence on which banks are given public assistance. Where the top level of government is solely responsible for banks, there will be fewer systemically important institutions and so more banks will be allowed to fail. Where lower levels are responsible, governments will allow fewer failures. We use this approach to understand government support for failing banks in Germany. Our findings are relevant for the European Banking Union.}, language = {en} } @article{BearceHallerberg, author = {Bearce, David and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Democracy and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes}, series = {Economics and Politics}, volume = {23}, journal = {Economics and Politics}, number = {2}, issn = {0954-1985}, doi = {10.1111/j.1468-0343.2011.00381.x}, pages = {172 -- 194}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Fiscal federalism reforms in the European Union and the Greek crisis}, series = {European Union Politics}, volume = {12}, journal = {European Union Politics}, number = {1}, issn = {1465-1165}, doi = {10.1177/1465116510387652}, pages = {127 -- 142}, language = {en} } @book{HallerbergScartasciniStein, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos G. and Stein, Ernesto Hugo}, title = {Who decides the budget? : a political economy analysis of the budget process in Latin America}, publisher = {Inter-American Development Bank [u.a.]}, address = {Washington, DC [u.a.]}, isbn = {1-59782-089-x}, pages = {XI, 320 S.}, language = {en} } @book{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Domestic Budgets in a United Europe : Fiscal Governance from the End of Bretton Woods to EMU}, publisher = {Cornell Univ. Press}, address = {Ithaca [u.a.]}, isbn = {0801442710}, pages = {X, 245 S.}, language = {en} } @book{DoeringHallerberg, author = {D{\"o}ring, Herbert and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Patterns of parliamentary behavior : Passage of legislation across Western Europe}, publisher = {Ashgate}, address = {Aldershot [u.a.]}, isbn = {0-7546-3936-3}, pages = {IX, 240 S.}, language = {en} } @article{GandrudHallerberg, author = {Gandrud, Christopher and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Statistical Agencies and Responses to Financial Crises : Eurostat, Bad Banks and the ESM}, series = {West European Politics}, journal = {West European Politics}, language = {en} } @article{StolfiHallerberg, author = {Stolfi, Francesco and Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Clientelistic budget cycles: evidence from health policy in the Italian regions}, series = {Journal of European Public Policy}, journal = {Journal of European Public Policy}, doi = {10.1080/13501763.2015.1075577}, pages = {1 -- 18}, language = {en} } @techreport{FocantiHallerbergScartascini, type = {Working Paper}, author = {Focanti, Diego and Hallerberg, Mark and Scartascini, Carlos}, title = {Tax Reforms in Latin America in an Era of Democracy IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-457}, language = {en} } @article{ClarkHallerbergKeiletal., author = {Clark, William R. and Hallerberg, Mark and Keil, Manfred and Willett, Thomas D.}, title = {Measures of financial openness and interdependence}, series = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, volume = {4}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, number = {1}, issn = {1757-6385}, doi = {10.1108/17576381211206497}, pages = {58 -- 75}, language = {en} } @article{BurdekinBanaianHallerbergetal., author = {Burdekin, Richard C.K. and Banaian, King and Hallerberg, Mark and Siklos, Pierre L.}, title = {Fiscal and monetary institutions and policies: onward and upward?}, series = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, volume = {3}, journal = {Journal of Financial Economic Policy}, number = {4}, issn = {1757-6385}, doi = {10.1108/17576381111182918}, pages = {340 -- 354}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergWehner, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Wehner, Joachim}, title = {When do you get Economists as Policy-Makers?}, series = {British Journal of Political Science}, journal = {British Journal of Political Science}, issn = {1469-2112}, doi = {10.1017/S0007123417000801}, pages = {1 -- 13}, abstract = {We analyze when economists become top-level "economic policy-makers", focusing on financial crises and the partisanship of a country's leader. We present a new dataset of the educational and occupational background of 1200 political leaders, finance ministers, and central bank governors from 40 developed democracies from 1973 to 2010. We find that left leaders appoint economic policy-makers who are more highly trained in economics and finance ministers who are less likely to have private finance backgrounds but more likely to be former central bankers. Finance ministers appointed during financial crises are less likely to have a financial services background. A leader's exposure to economics training is also related to appointments. This suggests one crucial mechanism for affecting economic policy is through the selection of certain types of economic policy-makers.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergGandrud, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Gandrud, Christopher}, title = {The Measurement of Real-Time Perceptions of Financial Stress: Implications for Political Science}, series = {British Journal of Political Science}, journal = {British Journal of Political Science}, doi = {10.1017/S0007123417000291}, pages = {1 -- 13}, abstract = {How do politicians and voters respond to financial market stress, and with what political effects? Previous research addressing these questions lacks a crucial variable: a continuous, real-time indicator of the level of financial market stress that policy makers and voters perceived. We need a measure of actors'contemporary perceptions of financial market conditions to understand why they made a given choice and with what effects. Previous binary crisis measures are constructed post hoc, so tend to be biased towards severe crises and away from circumstances in which governments effectively responded to emerging trouble. As such, they suffer from clear selection bias. Annual post hoc measures do not necessarily capture conditions as they were perceived at the time of events such as elections. As dichotomous indicators, they do not measure crisis severity or how it varies over time. They use ad hoc methods to determine when crises have ended. Previous continuous measures of financial market stress are less common and suffer from other problems. They capture quantities whose importance, measurement, and reporting varies significantly across countries and over time. To overcome these issues, we develop a continuous measure of real-time perceptions of financial market stress with a kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) of detailed qualitative data, namely monthly Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) reports. We call it the EIU Perceptions of Financial Market Stress Index, or FinStress for short. FinStress enables new political research possibilities. As a continuous measure, it could be used to examine which policies can effectively prevent or reduce extreme stress, and which political conditions are conducive to implementing these policies. As a comparable continuous monthly indicator, FinStress could be used to test hypotheses that rely on sub-annual data and follow the intensity of stress over time. Here we provide examples for studying the impact of financial market stress on voters'choices and on revisions to European Union government budget figures. We thus contribute to the wider methodological toolkit by showing how KPCA can be used to summarize vast quantities of similarly formatted qualitative texts into continuous cross-sectional time-series indicators.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergGandrud, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Gandrud, Christopher}, title = {Explaining variation and change in supervisory confidentiality in the European Union}, series = {West European Politics}, volume = {41}, journal = {West European Politics}, number = {4, Secrecy in Europe}, issn = {0140-2382}, doi = {10.1080/01402382.2017.1389421}, pages = {1025 -- 1048}, abstract = {Some European Union member states' financial regulators choose to make some of the data they routinely collect on individual banks publicly available. Others treat this data as confidential. What explains this difference? This paper considers the possible effects of crises, path-dependent legal institutions, and the design of deposit insurance schemes. At the national level, the paper focuses on contrasting German and Dutch cases. After the recent economic crisis, the Dutch released more data while the German authorities maintained strict confidentiality rules. The design of deposit insurance schemes provides a key reason why the level of secrecy varies, with the Dutch move from an ex post to an ex ante scheme where the government served as the ultimate backstop leading to questions about the accounts of individual banks while the German system favoured continued secrecy. The paper also describes the level of transparency at the EU level. Multilevel legal restrictions and bureaucratic capacity tilt EU banking union practices towards member states that treat financial supervisory data as confidential.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Fiscal Governance and Fiscal Outcomes under EMU before and after the Crisis}, series = {The Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis}, booktitle = {The Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis}, publisher = {Oxford University Press}, address = {Oxford}, isbn = {9780198755739}, pages = {320}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergStrauchvonHagen, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Strauch, Rolf and von Hagen, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {The design of fiscal rules and forms of governance in European Union countries}, series = {European Journal of Political Economy}, volume = {23}, journal = {European Journal of Political Economy}, number = {2}, issn = {1873-5703}, doi = {10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2006.11.005}, pages = {338 -- 359}, abstract = {This paper uses a new data set on budgetary institutions in Europe to examine the impact of fiscal rules and budget procedures in EU countries on public finances. It briefly describes the main pattern of budgetary institutions and their determinants across the EU 15 member states. Empirical evidence for the time period 1985-2004 suggests that the centralisation of budgeting procedures restrains public debt. In countries with one-party governments or coalition governments where parties are closely aligned and where political competition among them is low, this is achieved by the delegation of decision-making power to the minister of finance. Fiscal contracts that require countries to set multi-year targets and that reinforce those targets increase fiscal discipline in countries with ideologically dispersed coalitions and where parties regularly compete against each other.}, language = {en} } @incollection{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Who Provides Signals to Voters about Government Competence on Fiscal Matters? The Importance of Independent Watchdogs}, series = {Policy Instruments for Sound Fiscal Policies}, booktitle = {Policy Instruments for Sound Fiscal Policies}, editor = {Ayuso-i-Casals, Joaquim and Deroose, Servaas and Flores, Elena and Moulin, Laurent}, publisher = {Palgrave Macmillan}, address = {London}, isbn = {978-0-230-27179-1}, doi = {10.1057/9780230271791_11}, publisher = {Hertie School}, pages = {241-255}, abstract = {The Maastricht Treaty set a series of convergence criteria that Member States have to meet to join the euro area. The Treaty is not specific, however, about how to prevent free-riding fiscal behaviour once Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is in place. The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) represents an institutional response.1 Its design includes preventive and corrective mechanisms. The emphasis for the preventive arm rests on the monitoring of Member State behaviour. Euro-area Member States produce Stability Programme updates yearly in the autumn. The European Commission, for its part, assesses the programmes and makes recommendations to the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers (henceforth 'ECOFIN') on whether the programmes meet European fiscal objectives, which in particular includes the achievement of budget positions 'close to balance or in surplus'. In order to move to the formal corrective arm of the Pact, a Member State would have to be found to have an 'excessive deficit'.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergBasinger, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Basinger, scott}, title = {Remodeling the Competition for Capital: How Domestic Politics Erases the Race to the Bottom}, series = {American Political Science Review}, volume = {98}, journal = {American Political Science Review}, number = {2}, issn = {1537-5943}, doi = {10.1017/S0003055404001133}, pages = {261 -- 276}, abstract = {This paper proposes and tests a new formal model of the competition for capital, using the analogy of a "tournament" as a substitute for the "race-to-the-bottom" model. Our key insight is that political costs that accompany legislating have both direct and indirect effects on the likelihood and scale of reforms. While countries with higher political costs are less likely themselves to enact reforms, the presence of these costs also reduces competing countries' incentives to reform regardless of their own political costs. Domestic politics therefore mitigates the pressures for downward convergence of tax policy despite increased capital mobility. We examine the capital tax policies in OECD countries during the period from 1980 to 1997 and find that states are sensitive to tax reforms in competitor countries, although their responses to reforms are mediated by their own domestic costs to reform. We define two potential sources of political costs of reform: transaction costs, due to the presence of multiple veto players in the legislative process, and constituency costs, due to ideological opposition to policy changes that benefit capital. Our evidence reveals that a reduction in these costs either domestically or abroad increases the likelihood that a country enacts tax reforms.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergMarier, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Marier, Patrik}, title = {Executive Authority, the Personal Vote, and Budget Discipline in Latin American and Caribbean Countries}, series = {American Journal of Political Science}, volume = {48}, journal = {American Journal of Political Science}, number = {3}, issn = {1540-5907}, doi = {10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00088.x}, pages = {571 -- 587}, abstract = {Recent scholarship on budgeting in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries indicates that political institutions impact the level of budget discipline. Building upon this previous research, we argue that the principal problem that must be addressed in both the government and the legislature to insure strong fiscal discipline is the common pool resource (CPR) problem. At the cabinet level, the CPR problem arises because ministers consider the implications of decisions on their ministries only. The level of the CPR problem in the legislature depends upon the electoral system. Using a data set of LAC countries for the period 1988-97, we find that executive power in the budget process is most effective in reducing budget deficits when electoral incentives for the personal vote is high in the legislature, while strengthening the president (or prime minister) in countries where the personal vote is low in the legislature has no effect.}, language = {en} } @article{HallerbergStrauchvonHagen, author = {Hallerberg, Mark and Strauch, Rolf and von Hagen, J{\"u}rgen}, title = {Budgeting in Europe after Maastrichtpatterns of reform and their effectiveness}, series = {Hacienda Publica Espanola}, journal = {Hacienda Publica Espanola}, edition = {Nº Extra 2004}, issn = {0210-1173}, pages = {203 -- 228}, abstract = {Este trabajo analiza el desarrollo de las reglas e instituciones fiscales en los pa{\´i}ses europeos durante la {\´u}ltima d{\´e}cada. Hallamos que el grado de cambios de los procesos presupuestarios y de las reglas fiscales difiere mucho entre los distintos pa{\´i}ses. Se eval{\´u}a el patr{\´o}n de los cambios con respecto a los diferentes tipos ideales de gobernabilidad fiscal. Nuestro an{\´a}lisis muestra que los pa{\´i}ses que adoptan reglas en consonancia con sus instituciones fiscales predichas consiguen mayores logros en el plano fiscal que otras naciones que no hacen eso. Tenemos, pues, una explicaci{\´o}n parcial de por qu{\´e} raz{\´o}n el efecto del marco fiscal europeo ha sido asim{\´e}trico en relaci{\´o}n con los pa{\´i}ses miembros.}, language = {en} } @article{Hallerberg, author = {Hallerberg, Mark}, title = {Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions}, series = {International Organization}, volume = {56}, journal = {International Organization}, number = {4}, issn = {1531-5088}, doi = {10.1162/002081802760403775}, pages = {775 -- 802}, abstract = {I argue that two types of veto players matter in the choice of monetary institutions: party veto players and subnational governments, which are strong in federal systems but weak in unitary systems. A crucial issue is whether voters can readily identify the manipulation of the economy with party players. A second issue concerns the national party veto player's ability to control either fiscal or monetary policy. In one-party unitary governments identification and control are clear; parties where such governments are common prefer flexible exchange rates and dependent central banks. In multiparty coalition governments in unitary systems, identification is traditionally difficult, and the ability to target benefits to specific constituencies under fiscal policy makes fiscal policy autonomy more attractive for coalition governments. Such governments prefer central banks that are politically independent but that finance government debt. Under federalism, parties that constitute the central government have less control over fiscal policy and they prefer flexible exchange rates. Subnational governments do not support a dependent central bank that gives more power to the central government.}, language = {en} }